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The Common Law "Duty To Serve"
and Protection of Consumers in an
Age of Competitive Retail Public
Utility Restructuring
Jim Rossi 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1233 (1998)
This Article explores the implications of retail competition in public
utility markets, particularly electricity, for customer service obligations. The
common law duty to serve, encompassing both service extension and continu-
ation obligations, has a strong basis in economic efficiency. As utility markets
are restructured around a competitive model, however, the nature and justifi-
cations for extraordinary service obligations must be reassessed. This Article
assesses the structure and financing of utility service obligations in various
institutional market settings. The Article concludes that, in a retail competi-
tion environment, extraordinary service obligations should not extend to serv-
ice suppliers and marketers, but should be limited to distribution utilities. As
a structure for implementing and financing service obligations, mandated bid-
ding of power supply into a power exchange coupled with financing through a
distribution surcharge is advocated over alternatives as a way of minimizing
the inefficiency of imposing extraordinary service obligations. In addition, the
possibility of competition in distribution and its implications for service fi-
nancing are explored.
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COMPETITION & THE DUTY TO SERVE
Wires from 10-month-old Montray Cadet's chest lead to a machine that
signals if his heart stops. The sick baby often is fed through a tube in his
stomach. A hole in his trachea helps him breathe.
Montray needs machines to survive, yet last month the power company
turned off the electricity to the baby's Orlando apartment because his parents
hadn't paid the bill for three months.'
I. INTRODUCTION
People like young Montray Cadet and his family will increas-
ingly face the possibility of shut-off and limited access to utility serv-
ices, such as telecommunications, natural gas, and electricity, as
these industries-traditionally subject to obligations to serve custom-
ers-are deregulated. Already, the natural gas industry's introduc-
tion of retail competition in states like New York has been alleged to
adversely affect the quality of and access to gas, essential to many
New Yorkers for heating, and has led to the filing of a lawsuit against
the state by consumer advocates. 2
Can vigorous retail competition of the type public utility de-
regulation envisions coexist with extraordinary obligations to serve
customers? If so, at what costs? Who will bear these costs? These
questions are central to an emerging law and economic analysis
known as the "jurisprudence of network industries,"3 which is of
paramount importance as regulators and courts implement competi-
tion in traditional public utility industries. Yet, to date there has
been little analysis of how customer service obligations in public util-
ity law will be affected at the dawn of the new competitive era
brought about by deregulation.
1. Mike Oliver, When Electricity is a Lifeline, Should it Ever Be Cut?, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Oct. 19, 1997, at Al.
2. See Gerald A. Norlander, Retail Choice: A Race to the Bottom, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jan.
1, 1998, at 8 (letter to the editor).
3. J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the
Regulatory Contract, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 851, 856 (1996) [hereinafter Deregulatory Takings]; see
also J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY
CONTRACT: THE COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDuSTRIES IN THE UNITED
STATES (1997). For criticism, see generally William J. Baumol & Thomas E. Merrill,
Deregulatory Takings, Breach of the Regulatory Contract, and the Telecommunications Act of
1996, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1037 (1997) (questioning Sidak and Spulber's argument); Stephen F.
Williams, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the Regulatory Contract: A Comment, 71 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1000 (1996) (analyzing Sidak and Spulber's argument); Oliver E. Williamson,
Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the Regulatory Contract: Some Precautions, 71 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1007 (1996) (discussing reservations regarding Sidak and Spulber's argument). Sidak and
Spulber respond to their critics in Givings, Takings and the Fallacy of Forward-Looking Costs,
72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1068 (1997).
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For hundreds of years, public utilities have assumed obliga-
tions to extend service to customers within their service territories
and to continue providing service once service has commenced. 4 At
common law and under statutes and regulations passed in the twenti-
eth century by state and federal regulators, public utilities are obli-
gated-largely as conditions of their monopoly franchises-to provide
service to all customers within their service territories, sometimes
even when the cost of providing service to a customer is in excess of
the anticipated revenue from that customer.5 Although ordinary
private businesses may unilaterally refuse to deal with particular
customers and set the terms and conditions under which they con-
tract pursuant to antitrust laws,6 utilities are held to significantly
more rigorous dealing requirements and service terms and
conditions.7
Yet today, public utilities' service obligations-which I will
collectively refer to as the "duty to serve"--face their largest challenge
4. See CHARLES M. HAAR & DANIEL W. FESSLER, THE WRONG SIDE OF THE TRACKS: A
REVOLUTIONARY REDISCOVERY OF THE COMMON LAW TRADITION OF FAIRNESS IN THE STRUGGLE
AGAINST INEQUALITY 15 (1986) ("Over the centuries, the common law doctrine of equal services
and the duty to serve surfaced and resurfaced as a potent and dynamic means to address
changing-and often the grimmest imaginable-social and economic traditions."); Policy and
Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations
Therefor, 84 F.C.C.2d 445, 520 (1981) (exploring common law origins of the duty to serve)
[hereinafter FCC Origins of the Duty to Serve]. For an engaging argument that the common law
duty to serve extends beyond common carriers and innkeepers, to include private retail
establishments, see Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and
Private Property, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1283, 1298 (1996) ("the most plausible statement of the law
is that all businesses open to the public had a duty to serve the public"); see also David S. Bogen,
The Innkeeper's Tale: The Legal Development of a Public Calling, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 51, 53
(arguing that the legal rule requiring innkeepers to serve the public derived from a concern for
criminal activity in the inn and the eventual imposition of strict liability on innkeepers and
common carriers for their customers' goods).
5. For a description, see infra Part II.
6. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (noting that a firm may
unilaterally refuse to deal with a customer so long as that refusal does not intend to create or
maintain a monopoly).
7. For example, in the telecommunications industry, the extraordinary obligations
applicable to service providers have come to be known as 'universal service," recently endorsed
by the United States Congress in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
§ 254, 110 Stat. 71 (1996) (directing Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to define
"umiversal service," consistent with principles in statute). This provision was the subject of
deliberations of a joint federal/state board and FCC rules issued in 1997. See In re Federal-
State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., FCC Docket No. 96-45 (May 7, 1997) (discussing plans to
implement universal access for all schools and libraries). These rules have been clarified in
several orders on reconsideration, most recently in December 1997. See In re Federal-State
Joint Board on Universal Service, FCC Docket No. 96-45 (Dec. 30, 1997). For criticism of this
new statutory provision, see generally MILTON J. MUELLER, JR., UNIVERSAL SERVICE:
COMPETITION, INTERCONNECTION, AND MONOPOLY IN THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN TELEPHONE
SYSTEM (1997). Additional papers and comments regarding universal service are available
through the Benton Foundation website (visited Feb. 1, 1998) <http'//www.benton.org/>.
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ever. Competition has dawned on the electricity, natural gas and
telecommunications industries. These industries were previously
dominated by the staid "public utility," a large vertically-integrated
firm that provides service to all customers within its geographically-
defined service area. With the growth of competition, regulators and
courts face new issues regarding the protection of consumers, particu-
larly residential customers who historically have purchased their
service at retail from the incumbent public utility serving their com-
munity. Not surprisingly, one regulatory development that is espe-
cially threatening to small customers is the growth of retail competi-
tion-the introduction of a choice of supplier for all consumers of
utility service. Some states will soon implement retail competition
and others are considering it as a serious policy proposal for tele-
phonic, natural gas, and electricity services, although none of these
historically regulated public utility industries has completely imple-
mented retail competition. For example, the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 endorsed several policies designed to promote retail competi-
tion in local telephony.8 In the natural gas industry, deregulated by
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") in 1992,9 local
gas distribution companies are already beginning to offer many
customers retail choices in many states. 0
Though impending, competitive reforms to the electricity in-
dustry lag behind reforms in the telecommunications and natural gas
industries." Access to electricity service, however, is a necessity for
many-probably of greater social and economic consequence than
access to telephonic or natural gas service. 2 This Article focuses on
8. Telecommunications Act § 251. Part H of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
"Development of Competitive Markets," deals with competition.
9. See infra notes 189-91 and accompanying text.
10. See George R. Hall & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Retail Gas Reform: Learning from the
Georgia Model, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Apr. 15, 1997, at 22, 24 (summarizing state developments and
predicting that more than 12 million homes, comprising greater than 20 percent of U.S.
residential customers, will have a choice of gas suppliers by the year 2000); see also KENNETH
W. COSTELLO & J. RODNEY LEMON, THE NATIONAL REGULATORY RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
UNBUNDLING THE RETAIL NATURAL GAS MARKET: CURRENT ACTIVITIES AND GUIDANCE FOR
SERVING RESIDENTiAL AND SMALL CusTOMERs (1996).
11. The development of competition in electricity is not a U.S.-specific phenomenon.
Many other countries have also deregulated the electricity industry. Electricity competition is
also the subject of a recent directive of the European Communities. See Council Directive 96/92
Concerning Common Rules for the Internal Market in Electricity, 1997 O.J. (L 27) 20 (requiring
member states to take measures to open up markets for electricity). See generally A.M. Mom,
Effects of Deregulation Policies on Electricity Competition in the EU, 15 J. ENERGY & NAT.
RESOURCEs L. 1 (1997).
12. For example, far more low income households have access to electricity than telephone
service. According to one study, penetration of electricity service approaches 100 percent, even
for low income customers, while 56 percent of the population relying on public assistance lives
1998] 1237
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1233
the growth of retail competition in the electric utility industry, re-
ferred to as "retail wheeling," and its implications for the traditional
public utility duty to serve. With retail competition, a power genera-
tor can sell electricity directly to an end use customer, such as a resi-
dence, school, or business. For customers, retail competition promises
to offer a "choice"3 of power supplfers. 14  Laws in many states cur-
rently prohibit such retail shopping15 or allow it for only a limited
class of customers, typically large commercial and industrial custom-
ers.16 However, in recent years states experimenting with competition
in the electric power industry have introduced retail wheeling.
California, Illinois, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont,
among others, have recently adopted statutes or regulations to facili-
tate a complete transition to retail wheeling, and many other states
are considering the adoption of reforms as well.'7 Congress is also
considering federal legislation designed to facilitate the growth of
retail power markets. 8
The duty to serve is richly steeped in the common law and in
the history of American industry. Part I of this Article addresses the
without telephone service. See ROGER D. COLTON, THE 'OBLIGATION TO SERVE' AND A
COMPETITIVE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY 47 (May 1997 Draft).
13. I place "choice" in quotation marks because, as is discussed below, consumer choiqe is
a little misleading when applied to the electricity industry. Electricity does not travel over a
contract path between suppliers and customers and thus consumers will not be able to choose
specific suppliers for the power they consume, although they may be able to select a supplier for
dispatch to a distribution system. See infra text accompanying note 128 (discussing technical
characteristics of electricity).
14. For a description of retail competition and some of its practical problems, see generally
Bernard S. Black & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Choice Between Markets and Central Planning in
Regulating the U.S. Electricity Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1339 (1993); see also Richard D.
Cudahy, Retail Wheeling: Is This Revolution Necessary?, 15 ENERGY L.J. 351, 351-52 (1994);
infra Part IU.B.
15. Florida is one example. See TEC Cogeneration, Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 76
F.3d 1560, 1568 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that antitrust litigation over independent cogenerator
access to transmission facilities was precluded because of the state action doctrine where a
pervasive regulatory scheme prohibits requiring utility transmission of a supplier's power
absent an exact identity of ownership between the generator and the end use consumer); see
also FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 25-17.0882 (1997) (requiring exact identity of ownership); PW
Ventures, Inc. v. Nichols, 533 So.2d 281, 284 (Fla. 1988) (precluding cogenerator from selling
power to a retail customer).
16. Regardless of whether retail wheeling is allowed de jure by states, large commercial
and industrial customers have retail power supply choices pursuant to federal law. See infra
Part IIIA
17. See Benjamin A. Holden, Electric-Deregulation Machine Starts to Pick Up Steam:
Fearing Federal Action and the Flight of Business, States are Taking Steps, WALL ST. J., July 14,
1997, at B4 (describing the "trickle" of states addressing retail competition as "turning into a
flood"); see also infra Part HIL.B (discussing various state retail competition plans).
18. See Joseph F. Schuler, Jr., Bipartisan Energy Politics? 105th Congress Takes on
Restructuring in Earnest, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 15, 1997, at 18 (describing key bills before
Congress).
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historical and intellectual origins of the duty to serve in the utility
industry. Although it has been largely supplanted in the modern age
by regulations implemented by utility governing boards or by volun-
tary tariffs, the public utility duty to serve has some foundation in the
common law regulation of mills, ferries and the like. It is comprised
of distinct obligations to extend service, and to maintain certain qual-
ity standards once service commences. Not surprisingly, it has been a
particularly important tool for consumer advocates in the electric
utility industry.19 While the service obligations applicable to utilities
are analogous to the obligations applicable to private businesses
under public accommodations laws,20 I argue that the obligations
applicable to utilities are extraordinary, often requiring utilities to
extend and provide service to customers where it is not always profit-
able to do so.
Extraordinary utility service obligations have fairness and
distributive goals. Yet, they also have an intellectual basis in modern
economic theory, particularly theories of monopoly regulation. The
economic efficiency rationales for the common law obligations vary
somewhat across different utility industries. A rationale often given
for universal service obligations in the telecommunications industry is
that universal service, by promoting interconnectivity, enhances net-
work-system benefits for all customers. Part I shows that this effi-
ciency rationale is tenuous when applied to the natural gas and elec-
tricity industries. However, as Part I illustrates, the intellectual
framework of a "regulatory compact" approach to regulating utility
franchises and prices, coupled with a Williamsonian transaction cost
economic analysis, provides an economic efficiency justification for
extraordinary utility service obligations in these industries.
Part II of this Article describes the introduction of competition
to the electric utility industry and the emergence of retail wheeling.
Wholesale competition in the electric utility industry is well under-
way, brought on by federal legislation passed in 1992 and a major
rulemaking adopted by FERC in 1996.21 Retail competition is cur-
19. Several reports published in recent years address the importance of the duty to serve
for consumers of electricity in light of recent changes to the regulatory structure of the industry.
See generally BARBARA ALEXANDER, THE NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, CONSUMER
PROTECTION PROPOSALS FOR RETAIL ELECTRIC COMPETITION: MODEL LEGISLATION AND
REGULATIONS (1996) [hereinafter CONSUMER PROTECTION PROPOSALS]; ROBERT E. BURNS ET AL.,
THE NATIONAL REGULATORY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, ALTERNATIVES TO UTILITY SERVICE
DISCONNECTION (1995); MARGOT FREEMAN SAUNDERS ET AL., NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER,
ACCESS TO UTILITY SERVICE (1996); COLTON, supra note 12..
20. See Singer, supra note 4, at 1298 (discussing duty to serve the public).
21. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
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rently being addressed by over a dozen states and in several federal
legislative proposals. Most agree that in coming years the transition
to retail competition in electricity will be inevitable. Although details
remain tentative, Part II sketches the general form that retail compe-
tition in power markets will likely take.
In Part III, I address the widely-perceived tension between the
duty to serve and the growth of retail power markets.22 Based on a
study of state retail competition plans to date, I also survey the vari-
ous alternatives for implementing universal access to electricity serv-
ice in an age of retail competition, with the objective of minimizing
the structural inefficiencies of promoting access goals.23 Many re-
formers look askance at the duty to serve in competitive retail utility
service markets. The ostensible tension between the duty to serve
and economic efficiency has been acknowledged by leading commenta-
tors in the telecommunications context, who observe that there is an
inherent "conflict" between economic efficiency and universal service
in the telephone industry.24 So too have commentators observed a
tension between retail competition in electricity and the duty to
serve.25
As I suggest in Part III, the conflict between retail competition
and the duty to serve need not lead to the immediate abandonment of
22. This tension, perhaps, is one that inhabits a variety of industries and social programs.
See generally ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENcY: THE BIG TRADEOFF (1975).
23. For early efforts to address the related tension between wholesale competition and
utility service obligations, see generally J.A. Bouknight & David B. Raskin, Planning for
Wholesale Customer Loads in a Competitive Environment: The Obligation to Provide Wholesale
Service Under the Federal Power Act, 8 ENERGY L.J. 237 (1987) (noting potential conflict
between FERC's legal obligations and wholesale competition); Floyd Norton & Mark Spivak,
The Wholesale Service Obligation of Electric Utilities, 6 ENERGY L.J. 179 (1985) (speculating
about implications of competition for the obligation to provide wholesale electric service); Joe D.
Pace, Wheeling and the Obligation to Serve, 8 ENERGY L.J. 265 (1987) (warning of potential
conflict, but offering no specific solution). This Article provides a more complete approach than
these earlier efforts, in part because most of the wholesale restructuring that previously was the
subject of speculation has materialized so key facts about a restructured industry are available
for analysis. In addition, this Article focuses on impacts for end use, not wholesale, customers
and applies generally to restructured public utility industries, not just electricity.
24. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & J. GREGORY SIDA, TOWARD COMPETITION IN LOCAL
TELEPHONY 25 (1994) [hereinafter TOWARD COMPETITION]; see also Livia Solange West, Note,
Deregulating Telecommunications: The Conflict Between Competition and Universal Service, 9
DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 159, 175 (1996) ("[u]niversal service... results in inefficient usage").
25. There is little, if any, disagreement that retail wheeling is incompatible with an obli-
gation to serve. A utility cannot be obligated to meet the energy needs of potential customers
within its service territory without some guarantee of recovering the costs associated with that
obligation. To do otherwise would clearly result in economic inefficiencies. It would also lead to
further inequities, since the costs and risks of meeting a standing obligation would be borne
either by the utility's remaining customers or its stockholders. See Jonathon A. Lesser &
Malcolm D. Ainspan, Retail Wheeling: Deja Vu All Over Again?, ELECTRICITY J., Apr. 1994, at
34, 40-41.
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extraordinary service obligations, to the extent these obligations
remain desirable social goals. While this Article adopts an agnostic
stance towards the fairness and distributional goals of the common
law duty to serve,26 I argue that, in the short run, application of ex-
traordinary service obligations to distribution companies that succeed
public utilities in providing sales to small customers can coexist with
improved efficiency in retail power markets. Continuation of extraor-
dinary service obligations will continue to have costs-greater costs
than existed under full regulation-but these costs can be minimized
in a way that is consistent with retail competition, so long as distribu-
tion remains a natural monopoly and regulators do not hold other
market actors to extraordinary service obligations. At the same time,
I urge reassessment of the broad common law duty to serve that has
characterized the utility industry over the last hundred or so years.
For some services in a competitive electricity industry, I suggest, the
duty to serve will be replaced by a legal obligation to pay, enforced
through the mechanisms of contract law. I suggest that, to facilitate
efficient retail power markets, the duty to serve be initially limited to
incumbent utilities providing distribution services. On an interim
basis, the duty to serve can be financed through imposition of a sys-
tem benefits charge on distribution customers.27 To minimize struc-
tural inefficiencies associated with service obligations in this interim
period, however, regulators must make efforts to unbundle generation
from distribution, either structurally or financially, and set
appropriate exit fees to avoid uneconomic bypass.28
In the longer run, I suggest, power distribution may lose its
natural monopoly status, becoming competitive or at least contest-
able. Should this occur, to the extent that the service access goals
associated with the duty to serve remain desirable, a system benefits
charge will no longer provide adequate financing. Instead, a national
26. Unfortunately, to the extent arguments have been made, many of the redistributional
arguments in favor of the duty to serve lack analytical rigor. A plausible set of analytical tools
for measuring the duty to serve against distributional goals is Edward Zajac's stakeholder-
fairness-efficiency framework, which borrows heavily from political theory as well as economics.
See generally EDWARD E. ZAJAc, PoLITIcAL ECONOMY OF FAIRNESS (1995).
27. Although the economic and policy goals may differ, the system benefits charge can be
used to finance both consumer protection and environmental programs. Thus, many observa-
tions regarding efficient imposition of the system benefits charge for purposes of promoting
consumer protection may also be applicable to environmental programs, such as demand-side
management.
28. Uneconomic bypass is bypass that might reduce costs to one customer but increases
overall average network costs, thus creating costs for all customers. See Paul W. MacAvoy et
al., Is Competitive Entry Free? Bypass and Partial Deregulation in Natural Gas Markets, 6
YALE J. ON REG. 209, 244 (1989) (discussing how regulatory actions may lead to uneconomic
bypass).
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retail sales or industry tax on electric power supply may be necessary
to fund access for low income customers. A national sales or power
supply tax on electricity will likely prove the most efficient mecha-
nism for enhancing access to utility service in competitive retail mar-
kets by allowing competition or contestability in power distribution,
forcing explicit consideration of cross-subsidies, and minimizing
power supply market distortions. It is doubtful, however, that such a
tax will be enacted in the near future, so for the time being regulators
must take seriously the implementation and monitoring of interim
extraordinary service obligations. Extraordinary service obligations
can continue to survive in retail power markets, even if we abandon
natural monopoly models for sectors of the industry, but continuation
of these obligations will ultimately require more explicit political
commitment-and thus improved accountability-by regulators.
II. THE PUBLIC UTILITY'S "DUTY TO SERVE" IN THE ERA OF RATE
REGULATION
Building on an ancient common law duty that applied to public
utilities such as ferries, mills, and railroads, most state regulatory
commissions in the twentieth century have imposed upon public utili-
ties a "duty to serve"-an obligation to provide extraordinary levels of
service to customers, especially small residential customers. The link
between the public utility concept and the duty to serve has an ex-
tremely rich history in law. It has survived many different regulatory
eras and institutional arrangements, garnering a variety of intellec-
tual explanations.29
Not all, though, see the obligations borne by utilities as
unique. Joseph William Singer, in his recent survey of common law
obligations applicable to private businesses, suggests that the duty to
serve is a general relational one-an obligation to provide service that
attaches to all private firms holding themselves out to the public as
willing to provide service.30 Singer may be right that the common law
29. See generally Norman F. Arterburn, The Origin and First Test of Public Callings, 75
U. PA. L. REV. 411 (1927) (discussing the origins of the public utility); Charles M. Burdick, The
Origin of the Peculiar Duties of Public Service Companies, 11 COLUM. L. REV. 514 (1911) (tracing
doctrine and history); Gustavus H. Robinson, The Public Utility Concept in American Law, 41
HARv. L. REv. 277 (1928) (tracing the evolution of the concept and defining it with respect to the
provision of necessities); Bruce Wyman, The Law of the Public Callings as a Solution of the
Trust Problem, 17 HARV. L. REV. 156, 161 (1903) [hereinafter Public Callings] (suggesting that
"virtual monopoly" is the distinguishing feature of public utilities).
30. See Singer, supra note 4, at 1294 (noting "there is a substantial argument that the
duty to serve the public extended to all businesses that held themselves out as open to the
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imposed some access obligations on most private firms. But the obli-
gations of a regulated utility providing service are extraordi-
nary-much more extensive than the obligations of other private
firms providing products or services to consumers, such as banks,
restaurants, or retail stores.
As applied today in most states, the public utility duty to serve
entails several obligations, among them duties to interconnect and
extend service if requested, to provide continuing reliable service, to
provide advanced notice of service disconnection, and to continue
service without full payment. Unlike other obligations that apply to
private firms, even those representing or holding themselves out to
serve the public, the duty to serve applicable to utilities requires the
provision of service even where it is not profitable. These extraordi-
nary obligations were first given intellectual justification in the legal
literature by the early twentieth century Harvard Law School Profes-
sor Bruce Wyman,3' whose writings towards the end of the Gilded Age
form a basis for the modern regulatory compact understanding of
utility law.3 2 This Part discusses the common law and intellectual
origins of the public utility duty to serve, the introduction of the duty
to serve into modern regulatory law, and some of the economic effi-
ciency rationales supporting imposition of an extraordinary service
obligation on regulated public utilities.
public"). Singer's reading of the case law, motivated in part by a concern with expanding public
accommodations law to include retail establishments, finds some early intellectual support in
Burdick, supra note 29, at 515 (arguing that holding out to the public a willingness to provide
service, not "virtual monopoly," is key to triggering utility service obligations).
31. Wyman's reputation is not an untarnished one. In a little mentioned, but fascinating,
episode in the Harvard Law School's history, Wyman, the first administrative law professor at
Harvard, resigned his chair in 1913 over a controversy regarding some speeches he made about
a pending investigation into the affairs of New Haven Railroad. Wyman, speaking as a scholar,
publicly advocated some views in favor of the railroad's position, while under an annual retainer
by the railroad. At the time, Louis D. Brandeis was the leading instigator of the New Haven
investigation. See generally ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD: A HISTORY OF
IDEAS AND MEN, 1817-1967, at 217 (1967) (discussing the events leading to Wyman's
resignation). It has been reported by Felix Frankfurter that Wyman's public advocacy attacked
Brandeis' book Other People's Money and How the Bankers Use It, but this seems unlikely given
that the book was not published until the year after Wyman's resignation. Frankfurter also
recounts that Wyman's forced resignation opened up a position for Frankfurter to join Harvard's
faculty. See generally HARLAN B. PHILLIPS, FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES (1960). The rest is
history.
32. See Wyman, Public Callings, supra note 29, at 161 (suggesting that "virtual monop-
oly," giving rise to an obligation to serve all, is the distinguishing feature of public utilities,
whereas virtual competition is the distinguishing feature of private business). See generally
BRUCE WYMAN, WYMAN ON PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS (1911) [hereinafter PUBLIC SERVICE
CORPORATIONS].
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A. Common Law Antecedents
The duty to serve can be traced to the English common law,
which recognized that monopolies granted by the King entailed cer-
tain obligations. Lord Chief Justice Hale, in his treatise on seaports,
De Portibus Maris, stated:
A man, for his own private advantage, may, in a port or town, set up a wharf or
crane, and may take what rates he and his customers can agree for cranage,
wharfage, housellage, pesage; for he doth no more than is lawful for any man
to do, viz., makes the most of his own... If the king or subject have a public
wharf, unto which all persons that come to that port must come and unlade or
lade their goods as for the purpose, because they are the wharfs only licensed
by the king... or because there is no other wharf in that port, as it may fall
out where a port is newly erected; in that case there cannot be taken arbitrary
and excessive duties for cranage, wharfage, pesage, etc., neither can they be
enhanced to an immoderate rate; but the duties must be reasonable and mod-
erate, though settled by the king's license or charter. For now the wharf and
crane and other conveniences are affected with a public interest and they cease
to be juris privati only; as if a man set out a street in a new building on his
own land, and it is now no longer bare private interest, but is affected by a
public interest. 3
Hale's writings reflected an earlier tradition,34 but one that would
become extremely influential in twentieth century American regu-
lation of the telephone, natural gas, and electricity industries.
Medieval mills are perhaps the strongest analogy to the mod-
ern public utility. Without access to the services of a mill, the inhabi-
tants of a medieval village or manor were left without flour for bread
or malt for brewing.3 5 Yet the construction of a mill had to be fi-
nanced by the lord, who needed an adequate incentive to invest capi-
tal in a facility large enough to provide access to everyone in the vil-
lage or manor. 6 Thus, in medieval times, the "mill-soke" obligation,
enforced by injunction in the Manor Court, compelled all inhabitants
of the medieval manor to grind all grain at the lord's mill.37 The feu-
dal law of mills has been described by Professors Charles Haar and
Daniel Fessler, the authors of a comprehensive modern study of the
duty to serve, as arising from two primary factors: (1) access to a mill
33. MATTHEw HALE, DE PORTIBUS MARI5 (1670) (1 HARGRAVE LAW TRACTS 77-78 (1787)),
quoted in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 127 (1876).
34. Norman Arterburn, writing early in the twentieth century, placed its origins around
the time of the Black Death. See Arterburn, supra note 29, at 421-24.
35. See H.S. BENNETT, LIFE ON THE ENGLISH MANOR: A STUDY OF PEASANT CONDITIONS
130-31 (1937).
36. See id.
37. See id.
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was a necessity for all local inhabitants, and (2) a relatively large
investment was required to finance construction. 38
While mills were regulated primarily at the local level, the
duty to serve was later extended to crown-answering services, such as
ferries and markets. Tripp v. Frank, a ferry case decided in England
in 1792, is illustrative.39 Tripp, the lessee of a common ferry that
provided service across the River Humber, had claim to an exclusive
right granted by the Crown to provide travel service between Barton
(where the Lincoln road initially terminated) and Kingston, a major
shipping point between York and London.40 Tripp's franchise was
exclusive but others, such as Frank, had limited rights to water car-
riage on the Humber. In the case, it was conceded that Frank pos-
sessed a right to operate a market boat that departed from Barrow,
two miles to the East of Barton, and that Frank also provided some
service to Kingston. Tripp maintained, however, that Frank's right to
provide this service was limited to high-demand times, particularly
days during which a regional market was operating in Kingston.41
When the Lincoln road was extended from Barton to Barrow, it
became possible for a person traveling from York to quicken the jour-
ney by proceeding directly to Barrow. Not surprisingly, following the
road's extension Frank saw it profitable to expand his service.42 Tripp
filed a complaint, taking the position that the profits from Frank's
expanded service were the rewards of Tripp's ferry. A jury in York
returned a verdict for Tripp with a nominal award of one shilling,43
and Frank appealed. On appeal, in response to a question from the
court, Tripp admitted that he had no obligation to provide service to
any place other than Barton." Lord Chief Justice Kenyon, com-
menting on the implications of Tripp's obligation to provide service to
Barton, observed:
If certain persons wishing to go to Barton had applied to the defendant, and he
had carried them at a little distance above or below the ferry, it would have
been fraud on the plaintiffs right, and would be the ground of an
action .... [However] it is absurd to say that no person shall be permitted to
go any other place on the Humber than that to which the plaintiff chuses to
carry them. It is now admitted that the ferryman cannot be compelled to carry
38. See HAAR & FESSLER, supra note 4, at 69.
39. 100 Eng. Rep. 1234 (1792).
40. See id.
41. See HAAR & FESSLER, supra note 4, at 97-98.
42. See Tripp, 100 Eng. Rep. at 1235.
43. See id.
44. See id.
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passengers to any other place than Barton: then his right must be
commensurate wuth his duty.45
Tripp had rights under his franchise, but in order to establish com-
petitive injury he would need to establish that travelers who pre-
sented themselves in Barrow did so with fraudulent intent.
Building on precedents such as Tripp v. Frank, the duty to
serve was given a creative extension by American judges in the late
nineteenth century. At this time, abuses by railroads were of particu-
lar concern. For example, Standard Oil would agree to make a rail-
road its exclusive carrier in a certain region if, in exchange, the rail-
road would agree to aid Standard in fighting competitors. Standard
Oil demanded a rate of ten cents a barrel whereas other shippers
were to pay thirty-five cents a barrel, and Standard enforced this
demand by threatening to withdraw its entire business.46
Initially, only the state courts were active in stemming rail-
road abuses. 47 The most common approach was to promote equal
terms of access. In Messenger v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, the
New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals addressed the service
obligations of railroads, stating "[t]his public good is common, and
unequal and unjust favors are entirely inconsistent with the common
right." 8 It further suggested that railroads, as common carriers,
stand in a trust relationship with the public:
But there is an additional ground upon which [discriminating in rates] is also
objectionable.... [i1n the grant of a franchise of building and using a public
railway ... there is an implied condition that it is held as a quasi public trust,
for the benefit of all the public, and that the company possessed of the grant
must exercise a perfect impartiality to all who seek the benefit of the
trust.... [11n their very constitution and relation to the public, there is
necessarily implied a duty on their part, and a right in the public, to have fair
treatment and immunity from unjust discrimination. The right of the public is
equal in every citizen, and the trust must be performed so as to secure and
protect it.
49
As a condition to the grant of a monopoly franchise, courts routinely
prohibited any rate differential that was not justified by overwhelm-
ing economic or public policy rationales. According to the New
Hampshire Supreme Court:
45. Id.
46. See WILLIAM LARRABEE, THE RAILROAD QUESTION 160-62 (1893).
47. See WYMAN, PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS, supra note 32, at chs.7-40.
48. 37 N.J.L. 531, 537 (1874).
49. Id. at 536-37.
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That is not, in the ordinary legal sense, a public highway, in which one man is
unreasonably privileged to use a convenient path, and another is unreasonably
restricted to the gutter; and that is not a public service of common carriage, in
which one enjoys an unreasonable preference or advantage, and another suf-
fers an unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage.50
Most courts rejected railroads' arguments that, in the absence of stat-
ute, they were required to provide reasonable, but not equal, rates.51
Railroads, as a condition of their monopoly franchises, clearly bore the
burden of justifying any differential in rates.
Before the passage of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 52 courts
admonished the usage of exclusive contracts. In the latter decades of
the nineteenth century, state courts prohibited railroads from grant-
ing exclusive privileges for purposes of creating an express monopoly.
Cases from Pennsylvania, Maine, and New Hampshire are illustra-
tive. Sandford v. Railroad Co., a case decided by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in 1855, recognized the "public nature" of the railroad
company and stated, "[an express company engaged in the business
of transporting small packages has as good a right to the benefits of
the railroad as the owners of the packages possess in person."53 This
opinion's closing words made a historical analogy to the regulation of
mills:
Such a power in a railroad corporation might produce evils of the most alarm-
ing character. The rights of the people are not subject to any such corporate
control. Like the customers of a grist-mill they have a right to be served, all
other things equal, in the order of their applications. A regulation, to be valid,
must operate on all alike.-'
Maine upheld a state statute challenged by a defendant railroad com-
pany, noting that the statute merely restated principles of the old
common law:
The very definition of a common carrier excludes the idea of the right to grant
monopolies or to give special and unequal preferences. It implies indifference
50. McDuffee v. Portland & Rochester R.R., 52 N.H. 430, 450 (1873) (holding the railroad
liable for discrimination in its performance of its public service of transportation).
51. See HAAR & FESSLER, supra note 4, at 128. But see Johnson v. Pensacola & Perdido
R.R., 16 Fla. 623, 667-78 (1878) (stating that charges must be measured against the value of the
service performed "not by what is charged another").
52. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1994) (originally enacted in 1890); Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 12 et seq. (1994) (originally enacted in 1914). These federal statutes were designed to
curtail monopolistic abuses. For further discussion, see HERBERT HOvENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND
AMERICAN LAw 1836-1937, at 276-85 (1991).
53. 24 Pa. 378, 381 (1855).
54. Id. at 381.
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as to whom they may serve, and an equal readiness to serve all who may
apply, and in the order of their application. The defendants derive their
chartered right from the State. They owe an equal duty to each
citizen.... Such is the common law on the subject. The legislation of the State
has been in accordance with and in confirmation of these views.55
McDuffee v. Portland & Rochester Railroad, a New Hampshire case,
followed four years later with a refusal to allow the grant of an exclu-
sive contract.56
B. The Growth of the Modern Regulatory Compact
Over the past century and a half or so, two discernable periods
characterize American regulatory law. The first, stretching from
approximately the 1870s until the end of the century, featured direct
judicial intervention in regulation of public utility monopoly fran-
chises. The second era, beginning at the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury, was dominated by the establishment of new regulatory commis-
sions, subject to direct judicial review. As the twentieth century
progressed, the judicial doctrines regarding the duty to serve were
eventually enshrined into statutes or administrative regula-
tions-sometimes with modifications-or were adopted voluntarily by
utilities in their tariffs. However, the duty to serve is richly steeped
in the common law, and many of its direct judicial remnants continue
to survive.
1. Judicial Applications to Monopolistic Industries
The early American public utility cases on the duty to serve,
building on the ferry and railroad common carrier cases, involved the
refusal of telephone service. Telephone companies-the functional
equivalent of telegraph companies, which were long-regarded as
common carriers-almost always lost these cases. Like railroads,
telephone companies were under a duty to provide access to all
customers on an equal basis.57
By the 1890s, the duty to serve had also been extended to gas
companies. The Indiana Supreme Court, for example, imposed an
unequivocal duty to provide service upon a gas company after the
55. New England Express Co. v. Maine Cent. R.R., 57 Me. 188, 196-97 (1869).
56. See 52 N.H. 430, 448-49 (1873) (stating that a common carrier assumes a public duty).
57. See State ex rel. Webster v. Nebraska Tel. Co., 22 N.W. 237, 238-39 (Neb. 1885)
(noting that the telephone, like the telegraph, is a common carrier).
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company had refused to serve a potential customer connected to its
mains. The court reasoned:
Mr. Beach, in his work on Private Corporations, (volume 2, § 835) says: "Gas
companies, being engaged in a business of a public character, are charged with
the performance of public duties. Their use of the streets, whose fee is held by
the municipal corporation in trust for the benefit of the public, has been lik-
ened to the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Accordingly, a gas com-
pany is bound to supply gas to premises with which its pipes are connected."
Mr. Cook, in his work on Stock and Stockholders and Corporation Law,
(section 674) says: "Gas companies, also, are somewhat public in their nature,
and owe a duty to supply gas to all."... In the view of these authorities, we
are constrained to hold that a natural gas company, occupying the streets of a
town or city with its mains, owes it as a duty to furnish those who own or oc-
cupy the houses abutting on such street... such gas as they may require, and
that, where it refuses or neglects to perform such duty, it may be compelled to
do so by writ of mandamus. 58
In similar manner, the duty to serve was extended to water suppli-
ers.59
Thus, by the beginning of the twentieth century, most courts
recognized a public utility duty to serve, even with no statutory
authorization. For example, the Indiana Supreme Court ordered a
gas company to allow a prospective customer to interconnect with its
gas lines, despite the utility's allegation that it lacked adequate
supply to meet existing customers. Writing for the court, Justice
Hadley wrote:
The principle here announced is not new. It is as old as the common law itself.
It has arisen in a multitude of cases affecting railroad, navigation, telegraph,
telephone, water, gas, and other like companies, and has been many times dis-
cussed and decided by the courts; and no statute has ever been deemed neces-
sary to aid the courts in holding that when a person or company has under-
taken to supply a demand which is affected with a public interest, it must sup-
ply all alike who are like situated, and not discriminate in favor of nor against
any.60
State courts were not the only institutions to embrace a duty to serve
during the Gilded Age. In 1886, Chief Justice Morrison Waite
presented his majority opinion in the appeal to the U.S. Supreme
Court of three cases known collectively as the Express Cases. The
58. Portland Natural Gas & Oil Co. v. State ex rel. Keen, 34 N.E. 818, 818-19 (Ind. 1893).
59. See, e.g., City of Danville v. Danville Water Co., 53 N.E. 118, 122 (Ill. 1899) ("It is well
settled that parties who carry on a business which is public in its nature, or which is impressed
with a public interest, must serve all who apply on equal terms and at reasonable rates.").
60. State ex rel. Wood v. Consumers' Gas Trust Co., 61 N.E. 674, 677 (Ind. 1901) (citations
omitted).
19981 1249
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Express Cases were "each brought by an express company against a
railway company to restrain the railway company from interfering
with or disturbing in any manner the facilities theretofore afforded
the express company for doing its business on the railway of the
railroad company."61 The Court rejected the argument that equality
in service was required, but did concede that the public is entitled to
reasonable service.62 Although the decision was widely perceived to be
a pro-railroad case, the duty of service had been endorsed by the
United States Supreme Court.
At the same time, though, by the late nineteenth century a
movement to commence federal regulation of railroads by statute had
begun. In the railroad context, the common law approach to enforcing
the duty to serve, like any common law enforcement mechanism, had
a number of drawbacks. Litigation was extremely costly. Many
feared retaliation for bringing a lawsuit against a railroad. Railroads
settled many cases, avoiding judicial determinations on the most
controversial and difficult issues. And courts, accustomed to deciding
the legality of the rates in individual cases, were simply not institu-
tionally outfitted to enforce the general rule of reasonableness in
rates. Statutory responses began in the states, but by the 1880s it
was apparent that state legislation was a partial answer at best. The
dramatic shift from common law supervision to regulation culminated
with the passage in 1887 of the Interstate Commerce Act, which em-
bodied service obligations for railroads.3 By the time that the federal
government adopted the Interstate Commerce Act,64 states had begun
adopting their own regulatory programs for public utilities.5
2. The Growth of the Regulatory Commission
A centerpiece of early state regulation of utilities outside of
courts was the utility franchise, a monopoly charter typically granted
by local government.66 This was essentially a fictional contract, or
61. The Express Cases, 117 U.S. 1, 2 (1886).
62. See id. at 28 (rejecting railroad duty to the public, but noting that the case would be
different if the public "were complaining because the railroad companies refused to carry
express matter themselves on their passenger trains, or to allow it to be carried by others").
63. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (codified as amended at 49
U.S.C. §§ 10101-11908 (1994)). The structure of the Interstate Commerce Act would be
replicated in federal approaches to regulating natural gas in the Natural Gas Act and electricity
in Part H of the Federal Power Act in the 1930s.
64. Id.
65. See M.H. Hunter, The Early Regulation of Pubic Service Corporations, 7 AM. ECON.
REV. 569, 580 (1917) (observing that utility regulation existed in some states as early as 1820).
66. See id.
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"regulatory compact," that determined the respective rights and du-
ties (sometimes referred to as "incumbent burdens") of the Utility.67
After a number of years, this local system was abandoned for state-
wide legislative approaches because of a perception of corruption.
New York and Wisconsin were the first states to establish regulatory
commissions, and their commissions soon became models for other
states. 6
8
Most of the early statutes defining the jurisdiction of regula-
tory commissions were vague. A common approach was for a statute
to require that telephonic, gas, or electric service be adequate and
rates be reasonable.69 Many courts and commentators have opined
that these statutes set forth the extant common law. A United States
District Court in Oregon stated in 1953:
The suggestion that these obligations have been abrogated or essentially modi-
fied by statute law or policy is unthinkable .... Congress has acted upon this
assumption of an ascertainable body of common law .... The original
Interstate Commerce Act and its subsequent amendments and addenda are
unintelligible unless viewed in the bright daylight of this customary law....
The Congress has never shown a disposition to destroy these original
remedies or to repudiate the common law of the respective states relating to
carriers. The common law remedies for breach of the obligations thereof were
preserved by positive mandate, and the statutory remedial devices were made
additions thereto.70
Several state commissions adopted a similar approach, viewing statu-
tory obligations as codifications of the common law. Sometimes the
statutory or regulatory obligations went beyond the common law, and
led to some expansion. Judges thus worked with agencies in develop-
ing new meanings and applications for the duty to serve, particularly
in the context of electric utility regulation, although in many respects
commissioners and legislators had more power in defining the par-
ticulars of modern utility obligations.
In the twentieth century, the public utility duty to serve
evolved into two distinct obligations, which today appear in the regu-
lations, statutes, and case law governing privately-owned public utili-
67. See Deregulatory Takings, supra note 3, at 858 (describing incumbent burdens).
68. See Hunter, supra note 65, at 569.
69. See Werner Troesken, The Institutional Antecedents of State Utility Regulation: The
Chicago Gas Industry, 1860 to 1913, in THE REGULATED ECONOMY: A HISTORICAL APPROACH TO
POLITICAL ECONOMY 55, 66-68 (Claudia Goldin & Gary D. Libecap eds., 1994) (discussing the
effects of the gas acts).
70. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Northern Pac. Terminal Co., 128 F. Supp. 475, 494, 496
(1). Or. 1953).
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ties:71 obligations regarding the extension of services and abandon-
ment of service requirements. The extension duty requires public
utilities to build facilities at least to a property line and to provide
adequate pressure or power to transport service to the customer, even
if the customer could not pay for the cost of extending service.
Abandonment obligations include procedures governing service dis-
connection, and obligations to notify customers prior to shut-off and to
continue with service provision even if a customer cannot pay in full.
a. Service Extension
Nearly seventy years ago, Bruce Wyman commented on the
limits of the common law extension obligation:
One thing is as certain as anything can be at common law in this doubtful
subject, and that is that those who have provided certain facilities in order to
give a designated service are under no obligation to go beyond the service they
have professed and substantially extend their existing facilities so as to make
physical connection with another service.72
Yet, Wyman noted, statutes in the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth century began to require utility extension of service beyond the
common law.7 3
Although the states differ in the details, the basic modern rule
for the extension of service generally accepted by all fifty states is
that a utility can be required by a regulatory authority to make all
71. The analysis in this Article focuses primarily on the application of the duty to serve to
public utilities which are not owned by governmental bodies, as this is the important issue
regulators will face in the near future. Privately owned public utilities supply nearly 80 percent
of the power supplied today in the United States. See PETER Fox-PENNER, ELECTRIC UTILITY
RESTRUCTURING: A GUIDE TO THE COmPETITIE ERA 129 (1997). Moreover, with deregulation, it
is expected that the number of private suppliers of electricity will grow, due to enhanced incen-
tives for entering power supply markets and a movement away from public ownership of power
generation.
In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358-59 (1974), the Supreme Court held
that state action is not present if a utility is privately owned, despite regulation of utilities and
the grant of a monopoly franchise by the state. Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution does not directly restrict the service decisions of most electric utilities,
although there may be an opportunity to apply constitutional doctrines to service decisions
where a governmental body has ordered no extension or has compelled service termination. See
Iowa Citizen/Labor Energy Coalition v. Iowa State Commerce Comm'n, 335 N.W.2d 178, 183
(Iowa 1983) (stating that shut-offs by investor-owned utilities do not constitute state action,
because service shut-off was not ordered by state regulators, even though regulators considered,
acquiesced in, and encouraged shut-off).
72. Bruce Wyman, The Obligations of Public Services to Make Connections, 22 HARV. L.
REv. 564, 571 (1909) [hereinafter Make Connections].
73. See id. at 577 (noting that "statutes are going further than to make the common law
more intensive; they are making the legal obligation more extensive").
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reasonable additions within the area to which it has dedicated its
services, but that no extensions can be mandated outside of that area.
"Reasonable" extensions are those for which the economic cost to
provide service is not disproportionate to the overall expected return
to the utility in accomodating the new customer. Because in most
jurisdictions regulatory agencies make decisions to require extension
of service pursuant to statutes or regulations, modern courts are
unlikely to require extension of service over the denial of the regula-
tory agency absent an abuse of discretion or action that is otherwise
arbitrary and capricious.74
The United States Supreme Court acknowledged the extension
component of the duty to serve in 1917 in New York ex rel. New York
& Queens Gas Co. v. McCall.75  The New York Public Service
Commission had ordered a local gas utility with an exclusive fran-
chise to extend its gas mains and pipes to Douglaston, a community
"located about a mile and a half beyond the then terminus of the com-
pany's gas mains, but within the Third Ward of the Borough of
Queens."76 Although the extension was seen as an opportunity to
enhance the utility's customer base,77 the gas utility was reluctant to
agree to this extension because "the mains of the company, which
extended to the point nearest to Douglaston, were being used to al-
most their full capacity, and for this reason the estimated cost of
making the improvement included new mains of some eight miles in
length."78 The utility estimated its return on the eight mile extension
of its mains at only two and one quarter percent, which was likely
well below the cost of capital at the time. Nevertheless, the Court
rejected the utility's due process argument against the Commission's
order, stating:
Corporations which devote their property to a public use may not pick
and choose, serving only the portions of the territory covered by their fran-
chises which it is presently profitable for them to serve and restricting the de-
velopment of the remaining portions by leaving their inhabitants in discomfort
without the service that they alone can render. To correct this disposition to
serve where it is profitable and to neglect where it is not, is one of the impor-
74. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
75. 245 U.S. 345, 351 (1917) (stating further that sometimes commissions or courts may
allow extension with ex ante contribution by the requester for disproportionate extensions).
76. Id. at 346.
77. At the time, Douglaston was an affluent and growing community of 330 homes, the
number of which had doubled within a few years. See id. at 349.
78. Id. at 349-50.
1998] 1253
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
taut purposes for which these administrative commissions, with large powers,
were called into existence .... 79
McCall, by accepting the political process of commission regulation of
service extension, implicitly endorsed cross-subsidies to finance ex-
tension when the anticipated revenues from new customers are below
the costs of extension to serve those customers.80
A 1915 case spelled out the basic obligation that applies to
modern utility extension requests. In Lukrawka v. Spring Valley
Water Co., the California Supreme Court, ordering a private utility
with a franchise to provide water to the residents of San Francisco to
extend its mains to a recently settled area of the city, noted:
The proper discharge of this public duty required not only that the company
should provide a supply of water and establish a system for its distribution to
meet the reasonable needs of the municipal community as it then existed, but
it was under the obligation to keep in view the prospective and probable in-
crease in population of the municipality and the necessarily increasing de-
mand for a water supply which would be consequent therefrom; to anticipate
the natural growth of the municipality it had undertaken to serve as a whole
and to take reasonable measures to have under its control a sufficient supply
of water and make gradual extensions of its distributive system to meet the
reasonable demands for water by the growing community.8'
Several factors were articulated by the Lukrawka court as providing
guidance for future determinations of the reasonableness of compelled
extension: the company's duty, the adequacy of water supply for dis-
tribution, the adequacy of facilities burdened by extension, the rights
of existing customers, the necessity of the company to supply the
extension, and the effect of extension on existing customers. 82 The
court found that the water company had enough of a supply of water
79. Id. at 351.
80. Some, such as Sidak and Spulber, over-read McCall as expressing a required duty to
serve and guaranteeing utility cost recovery of this obligation through rates. See Deregulatory
Takings, supra note 3, at 913 ("[tihe McCall rule thus guarantees the existence of a cross-
subsidy in the utility's late structure"). However, McCall provides very weak support for
mandatory cost recovery of customer service obligations. More accurately, the case suggests
that the state commission and its political process is the best forum for evaluating the
appropriateness and scope of the duty to serve and how to pay for it. See generally McCall, 245
U.S. at 351 (noting the importance of the commission process to resolving the nature and fi-
nancing of service obligations).
81. Lukrawka v. Spring Valley Water Co., 146 P. 640, 645-46 (Cal. 1915). The decision
has since been cited and followed in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Cedar Island Improvement
Assoc. v. Clinton Elec. Light & Power Corp., 114 A.2d 535, 541 (Conn. 1955); Reid Dev. Corp. v.
Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 89 A.2d 667, 670 (N.J. 1952); Crownhill Homes, Inc., v. City
of San Antonio, 433 S.W.2d 448, 478 (Tex, App. 1968); State v. Renick, 116 S.E.2d 763, 770 (W.
Va. 1960).
82. See Lukrawka, 146 P. at 643.
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so that service could be extended to the new community without af-
fecting water supply to current customers.83 Thus, the court con-
cluded, by accepting a franchise and undertaking the power of emi-
nent domain, the utility had accepted a duty to serve that entailed the
extension of service.8
This obligation to extend service, however, is not totally un-
qualified, even under modern statutes and regulations. An isolated
individual cannot compel an uneconomical addition to an area with a
very low demand for service.8 Despite this, a recent New York court
decision required service extension to a single landowner because
additional customers were anticipated and the request for extension
could reasonably be accommodated without hindering service to other
customers.86 Likewise, the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed a trial
court decision that required water extension to three customers who
were located only 500 feet from a water main distribution line without
requiring ex ante contribution from the customers.87
Utility extension cases tend to focus on the financial burden of
extension,m but most cases preclude a utility from refusing to extend
service simply because it is not profitable.8 9 In fact, the main distin-
83. See id. at 646.
84. See id. at 642. In Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Oregon-Washington R.R. &
Navigation Co., 288 U.S. 14, 34 (1933), the United States Supreme Court recognized this
obligation by finding that the Commission charged with making a decision could compel service
extension of a railroad provided that public convenience and necessity required the extension
and the extension did not impair a carrier's obligation to continue to provide adequate and
reasonable service on its existing routes. However, the Court refused to require the carrier to
extend service beyond the geographic area it had undertaken to serve. See id. at 37, 40.
85. See Lukrawka, 146 P. at 646 (stating that a public duty will arise only "when there is a
reasonable demand for it and a reasonable extension of the service can be made to meet the
demand"); see also Colonial Prod. Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 146 A.2d 657, 663 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1958) (stating that the court would not subject a utility to unreasonable expenditures
because of the extraordinary demands of one customer).
86. See Peschel v. Village of Monroe, 641 N.Y.S.2d 89, 90 (N.Y. 1996) (finding denial of
application for extension arbitrary and capricious).
87. See Johnson v. Reasor, 392 S.W.2d 54, 56 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965) (stating that there is "a
basic underlying obligation of a city owning a general domestic utility system to supply impar-
tially all applicants who are in substantially like position to those being served").
88. See Jordan v. Clarke-Washington Elec. Membership Corp., 80 So. 2d 527, 529 (Ala.
1955) (defining "reasonableness" as depending on the need and cost of the extension, return on
revenue, financial position of the utility, public advantage from extension, and any contractual
obligation on the part of the utility to make the extension); see also Mongiello v. Borough of
Hightstown, 112 A.2d 241, 243 (N.J. 1955) (noting that a municipality may deny a service
extension request where the "cost to the community would be grossly disproportionate to the
individual needs presented").
89. See New York ex rel. New York & Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, 245 U.S. 345, 351 (1917)
(suggesting a utility cannot "pick and choose" its customers based on profitability considera-
tions); Board of Fire Comm'rs v. Elizabethtown Water Co., 142 A.2d 85, 90 (N.J. 1958) (stating
that the utility cannot "pick and choose its customers solely on the basis of pecuniary advantage
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guishing feature of the utility duty to extend service that does not
apply to an ordinary, unregulated business is that service extension
may be compelled even where it is not profitable to the utility in the
short term. For example, a New Jersey extension case addressed
statutory language that required "sufficient business to justify the
construction and maintenance," with extension costs to be borne by
the utility.90 The cost to the water district of completing the extension
was estimated at $34,570, but the immediate annual revenue from
the thirty-six new customers, if the extension were made, was
estimated at $1600. 91 The court found that the comparison between
extension cost and annual revenue would have "no material effect on
[the utility's] financial condition"2 and required construction and
maintenance of the extension with no ex ante contribution from the
new customers.93
Of course, with ex ante contribution from the applicant re-
questing service, the financial portions of the reasonableness test can
be met. Generally, "where... improvements desired are primarily for
the benefit and convenience of one customer... the attitude of the
particular customer relative to participating in the cost of construc-
tion" may be considered.94 Alternatively, if there is evidence that total
revenue from an extension will not produce a fair and reasonable
return, extension may still be required if a general increase in cus-
tomer rates can adequately compensate the utility for its expenditure
without harming existing customers.95 However, extension may still
be refused if there is an adverse effect on existing customers or if the
applicant is requesting service beyond the utility's franchise territory.
Because in most modern jurisdictions the service extension
obligation is enforced by a regulatory commission, courts considering
service extension cases often defer to agency decisions unless the
agency abuses its discretion or the agency's action is arbitrary and
capricious. 96 But, because regulatory commission decisions are often
and refuse to supply those who constitute an integral part of the locality simply because, consid-
ered in isolation, their consumption of the product will not produce a profit").
90. N.J. STAT. ANN § 48:2-27, discussed in Board of Fire Comm'rs, 142 A.2d at 89.
91. See Board of Fire Comm'rs, 142 A.2d at 88.
92. Id. at 89.
93. See id. at 93.
94. Colonial Prods. Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 146 A.2d 657, 662-63 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1958).
95. See Lakewood Township v. Lakewood Water Co., 102 A-2d 671, 677 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1954) (stating that immediate profit is not necessary to justify order of extension).
96. See Reid Dev. Corp. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 89 A.2d 667, 669 (N.J.
1952) (reversing commission refusal to extend service for abuse of discretion); Rose v. Plymouth
Town, 173 P.2d 285, 287 (Utah 1946) (upholding decision of town board not to compel a water
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appealed immediately to the high court of the state, rather than to a
trial or mid-level appellate court, even these cases are rare.
Moreover, in many instances, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
works to keep modern service extension disputes out of court.9 7
Nevertheless, the principles behind the extension duty lie dormant in
the case law and have been invoked to compel the extension of service
even though modern statutes and regulations impose a more exten-
sive obligation than the common law.98
b. Service Continuation
Like many other duties in law,s9 the duty to serve encompasses
both positive and negative obligations. The positive obligation
requires, if reasonable, affirmative actions to extend a utility's service
to customers within its franchise area. Related to the duty to extend
service is its opposite: an obligation to continue with existing service
once it has commenced, or negative restrictions on the abandonment
or termination of service.
Early in the development of regulation of the telephone, natu-
ral gas, and electricity industries, precedents, primarily from railroad
cases, were used to enforce standards of reasonableness in the event
of a utility abandonment or cut-off of all or part of its service. In
1878, the Nebraska Supreme Court refused to allow a railroad to
abandon service to a small town, stating:
The fact that the operation of the road is unprofitable furnishes no excuse
whatever for the failure to comply with the conditions of the grant [of a
franchise to run the railroad through a certain town], and the state may
main extension where the board used its discretion to decide that a lengthy extension was
unreasonable).
97. See, e.g., DiSanto v. Dauphin Consol. Water Supply Co., 436 A.2d 197, 200 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1981) (noting that regulatory commission has primary jurisdiction over extension request
where requestor has an adequate remedy before the Public Utility Commission).
98. See Messer v. Southern Airways Sales Co., 17 So.2d 679, 681 (Ala. 1944) (stating that
a duty to serve exists independent of statutes governing public utilities); Foltz v. City of
Indianapolis, 130 N.E.2d 650, 656-57 (Ind. 1955) (finding that an obligation to extend service
applied to businesses "affected with a public interest" independent of statutes or regulations);
Rasp v. Hidden Valley Lake, Inc., 519 N.E.2d 153, 156 (Ind. App. 1988) (noting that a private
developer may be impressed with a "public interest" to install water and sewer lines in
subdivisions because of the common law duty for a business with a public interest to serve all
who apply 'so long as facilities are available without discrimination").
99. See generally Saul Levmore, Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and
Incentive Structure of the Law of Affirmative Obligations, 72 VA. L. REV. 879 (1986) (discussing
tort liability for omissions and commissions).
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compel a compliance with the terms of the contract by mandamus or other
appropriate remedy. 100
The basic test developed by courts required continuing service
so long as the utility earned an adequate return on investment.
According to the Pennsylvania Public Service Commission:
It is a general policy of the Commission to require a public service company to
continue a portion of its service even when that portion is operated at a loss,
where public necessity for such continuance exists, and the loss sustained from
the operation will not jeopardize or place an undue burden upon the general
service rendered by the public service company.1 1
Courts ruled that the standards for abandonment were essentially the
same for both publicly and privately owned utilities. 0 2
Modern regulatory commissions and courts distinguish be-
tween abandonment-permanent suspension of service to cus-
tomer-and shut-off-temporary discontinuation of service. When a
utility seeks to abandon service, it is first required to obtain the per-
mission of the regulatory authority, which will generally grant per-
mission to abandon if the utility can show it no longer has a franchise
to serve, public demand is minimal, a shortage of supplies exists,
operation is at a substantial economic loss, or customers have failed to
meet necessary conditions for receiving service.'0
In contrast to abandonment, which generally applies to a util-
ity's surrender of its franchise with respect to a group of similarly
located customers, such as a township or development,104 shut-off
100. State v. Sioux City & Pac. R.R., 7 Neb. 357, 374 (1878); see also DeCamp Bus Lines v.
Dep't of Transp., 440 A.2d 32, 34 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1981) ("there is authority to support the power of
the State to require a utility to continue to provide services, even unprofitably, upon a finding of
public necessity.").
101. Public Service Comm'n v. Delaware & Hudson R.R., 14 P.U.R. 326, 331 (Pa. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1936). The Uniform Commercial Code ('U.C.C.") provides an interesting analogy.
Under section 2-615 of the U.C.C., outlining the basic excuse of commercial impracticability, the
burden of proof of claiming impracticability lies with the seller and an increase in cost alone,
even if astronomical, is not enough to excuse performance. U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 4 (1995)
("[ilncreased cost alone does not excuse performance"). Nonperformance of requirements
contracts "merely to curtail losses" may constitute breach. U.C.C. § 2-306 cmt. 2 (1995).
102. See Yezioro v. North Fayette County Mun. Auth., 164 A.2d 129, 137 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1960) (holding that a private water authority's abandonment of service was an abuse of discre-
tion).
103. See In re Atlanta Power Co., 65 P.U.R.3d 269, 271 (Idaho Pub. Util. Comm'n 1966)
(allowing an electric company to discontinue its service because it was an isolated company
operating at a loss); In re Valley Mercantile Corp., 6 P.U.R. 32, 34 (Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1934) (recognizing the right of the operator of a public utility heating plant to withdraw from
public service).
104. Abandonment, however, may apply to a utility's action vis-A-vis a single customer with
idiosyncratic location or service demands.
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typically refers to a utility's action vis-A-vis a single customer.
Temporary service shut-off is only required to be accompanied by
notice when interruptions have been planned, the particular custom-
ers' needs are known, and notice is possible. 10 5 Permanent service
shut-off generally requires actual notice. Of course, if a utility has a
specific curtailment plan that provides for more restrictions on service
cut off, or if representations were made to a customer by a sales rep-
resentative, a utility may have an obligation to give actual notice. 1 6
In addition to notice requirements, the continuation obligation
of the duty to serve precludes a utility from disconnecting service for a
disputed bill pending resolution of the dispute, because of some collat-
eral matter unrelated to service, because of some third party debt, to
collect a mistaken undercharge, or as a mechanism to assist in debt
collection. 1O7 Many states also have in place winter moratoria'0 8 or
105. See Langley v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 262 P.2d 846, 850 (Cal. 1953) (stating that
where a utility knew of a customer's dependence on electricity to operate his fish hatchery and
had assured customer of prompt notification of all interruptions, its failure to telephone the
customer with notice of known interruption made it liable for injuries caused by the delay);
National Food Stores, Inc. v. Union Elec. Co., 494 S.W.2d 379, 383 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (holding
that a utility must give reasonable advance notice of anticipated service shut-off because of
excessive heat during summer to protect customers from foreseeable loss or harm); Valley Util.
Co., 73 P.U.R.3d 41, 45 (Ohio Pub. Util. Comm'n 1968) (finding rule that permits water company
to shut off service "for any purpose at any time" is unreasonable unless it requires that notice be
given to all customers of particular shutoffs); Rohrbaugh v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n,
663 A.2d 809, 812 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995) (stating that a utility must give notice of shutoff to a
landlord prior to disconnecting electricity at the request of a tenant during period of subzero
temperatures in which inadequate heat could cause property damage). But see Stroup v.
Alabama Power Co., 113 So. 18, 20 (Ala. 1927) (dismissing a negligence action by customer
whose wife was having an operation in her home at 2:00 a.m. when the electricity was inten-
tionally shut off to make necessary repairs); Brame v. Light, Heat & Water Co., 48 So. 728, 729
(Miss. 1909) (dismissing a tort action against a water utility where the utility did not have
knowledge of the customer's type of equipment, and damage from the shutoff was unforesee-
able). Gas utilities are consistently required to notify all customers of planned or unavoidable
interruptions because the utility is imputed knowledge of the dangerous nature of gas and the
hazardous consequences of irregular service. See Beyer v. Consol. Gas Co., 60 N.Y. 628, 630
(1899) (stating that it was the duty of the gas company to use proper care to warn customers to
protect themselves before they shut off service); Cramer v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 257
N.Y.S.2d 380, 382 (Albany County Ct. 1965) (stating that it was the gas company's implied duty
advise its customers before it cut off their gas).
106. Notice obligations for shut-off also have an analogy in the U.C.C. Where a buyer and
seller have a contract and the seller is claiming commercial impracticability as a grounds for
excusing (or changing the terms of) performance, in order to prevent this from constituting
breach the seller must "notify the buyer seasonably" that there will be delay or non-delivery.
U.C.C. § 2-615(c).
107. See SAUNDERS ETAL., supra note 19, at 123-41.
108. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-262c(b) (1958) (precluding electric and gas utilities
from terminating service in hardship cases from November 1 to April 15); IDAHO ADmiN. CODE
31.21.01.306 (1997) (precluding service termination from December through February to any
residential customer who is unable to pay and whose household includes children, elderly, or
infirm persons). Iowa's regulations preclude disconnection from November 1 through April 1 for
residents who are eligible for low-income energy assistance or weatherization programs. See
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prohibitions on termination during "extreme weather."10 9 And the
duty to serve often requires utilities to continue to provide service
even when a customer has not fully paid its bills. A recent National
Regulatory Research Institute survey reports that thirty-two of forty
states surveyed allow a customer to continue to receive utility service
without full payment so long as some partial payment is made on the
customer's bill.110  However, absent some other prohibition on
termination, utilities generally may disconnect service in the case of a
nonpaying customer to help to avoid future losses.
As with the extension obligations, in most states utility obliga-
tions regarding service continuation are reinforced by statutes and/or
regulations."' Nevertheless, the common law principles lay dormant
in judicial decisions, especially those involving interpretation of con-
tracts or tort claims."2
C. The Efficiency of the "Duty to Serve" in the Era of
Public Utility Regulation
The duty to serve applicable to utilities encompasses distinct
obligations, among them requirements to extend service and restric-
tions on service abandonment or shut-off. In many jurisdictions util-
ity governing entities enforce the modern duty to serve, but the duty
to serve is richly steeped in the common law and many of its judicial
remnants survive. Although today the common law doctrine has
IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 199-19.4(17) (1997). For discussion of the practical impact of these, see
Cam Simpson, Thousands Without Heat in Area, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 9, 1997, at 1 (noting that
because debts build throughout the winter, allowing utility companies to disconnect in spring,
the situation remains through the next winter).
109. See, e.g., TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 23.46(j) (West 1998) (precluding disconnection unless
the utility ascertains that no life-threatening condition exists because of "severe weather
conditions").
110. See BURNS ET AL., supra note 19, at 27. For reasons discussed in Part lI.C, in some
states this is not required by law or regulation, but may be provided voluntarily by utilities with
the expectation of recovery in rates.
111. See, e.g., FLA. ADYnN. CODE ANN. r. 25-6.044(3-4) (1998) (requiring electric utilities to
make "all reasonable efforts" to prevent interruptions, requiring temporary service interruption
for prolonged periods to be preceded by notice "whenever practicable to affected customers," and
requiring attempts to restore service "within the shortest time practicable consistent with
safety"); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 25-6.105(5) (allowing an electric utility to refuse or
discontinue service with notice for noncompliance with law, defective wiring, refusal to provide
space for metering, failure to provide deposit, or nonpayment of bills).
112. Further private law remedies also have applied to public utilities in contract and tort,
particularly with respect to service discontinuation. However, for purposes of this Article,
discussion is limited to the duty to serve, in contrast to the duty to use care in providing service.
See generally FCC Origins of the Duty to Serve, supra note 4, at 534 (contrasting the duty to
serve to cases addressing tort liability); Arterburn, supra note 29 (distinguishing between the
"duty to use care" and the "duty to serve").
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taken a back seat to the politics of the legislative process and commis-
sion regulation, the legal principles behind the duty to serve lie dor-
mant in the case law and continue to be invoked by courts from time
to time.
While there are strong fairness or distributional arguments
supporting a duty to serve, in the modern era of public utility regula-
tion-beginning with the Gilded Age and lasting through the pre-
sent-economic efficiency rationales provide an intellectual frame-
work to support the extraordinary obligations that apply to providers
of utility services. One rationale proffered for universal service obli-
gations in the telecommunications industry is that universal service
enhances the value of service by creating network-system benefits for
all customers. Applied to natural gas and electric utilities, however,
this rationale is tenuous. Under a contractual or "regulatory com-
pact" approach to regulating utility franchises and prices, the con-
stituent obligations of the duty to serve may be economically efficient
pursuant to a Williamsonian transaction cost economic analysis," 3
although regulators have been required to oversee this compact to
minimize the impacts of cross-subsidization.
1. Limitations of the Positive Externality Justification for Service
Obligations in the Natural Gas and Electric Utility Industries
In the telecommunications context, the predominant economic
rationale for a universal service obligation is that pervasive access
increases network-system benefits for customers. The basic idea is
that a service obligation for providers of telecommunications service
enhances the value of network service for all customers to such a
degree that customers are willing to pay a premium to subsidize uni-
versal access. The FCC, in its 1997 universal service order, recog-
nized this economic rationale:
Universal service support mechanisms that are designed to increase sub-
scribership by keeping rates affordable will benefit everyone in the country, in-
cluding those who can afford basic service. At the simplest level, increasing
the number of people connected to the telecommunications network makes the
network more valuable to all its users by increasing its usefulness to them.
Increasing subscribership also benefits society in ways unrelated to the value
113. For a discussion of Wiliamsonian transaction cost analysis, see infra notes 130-34 and
accompanying text.
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of the network per se. For example, all of us benefit from the widespread
availability of basic public safety services, such as 911.11
Because the value of telecommunications service increases to custom-
ers with greater degrees of system interconnectivity, universal service
is regarded as economically valuable by telecommunications firms and
customers, even those that can afford market-priced services. Put
another way, universal service creates a positive externality, which
inures to the benefit of all customers through pervasive interconnec-
tivity. For example, the more pervasive access to the Internet is, the
more valuable the Internet is as a communication tool.115
While intuitively attractive, this rationale is not without its
problems. First, clearly there is some limit on the amount the aver-
age consumer is willing to pay to subsidize universal service. At some
point, the marginal benefits of enhanced access will not justify the
additional cost. For example, expansion of a network initially fi-
nanced by middle-class customers to include the poor, particularly
those with whom middle-class customers rarely interact, might
provide few benefits of the sort that the average middle-class cus-
tomer will be willing to pay for. The average middle-class customer
who can afford to pay for his or her own access will likely not be will-
ing to pay a significant premium to enhance access for others unless
there is some cognizable benefit to the network system or to the value
of service. Empirically, it is unclear how much the average consumer
is willing to pay to subsidize universal service, but clearly there is
some limit on the average consumer's willingness to pay for network-
system benefits. Without empirical study, this theory fails to provide
a clear criterion for limiting its application. For example, taken to its
extreme it could require not only subsidization of the network, but a
redistributive tax to provide computers or other electronic devices to
customers who cannot afford to pay for them.
A second limitation with this rationale for universal service in
the telecommunications context is that it does not factor in network
congestion costs. If the infrastructure is already in place to accommo-
date additional customers at a low incremental cost, the positive
externality rationale provides a powerful rationale for enhancing
access. However, with limited infrastructure, additional participants
114. In re Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., FCC Docket No. 96-45, slip op. at 8
(May 7, 1997).
115. So too with the fax machine, an appliance that only became valuable once it was
distributed among multiple persons connected by a network. See Kevin Kelly, New Rules for the
New Economy, WIRED, Sept. 1997, at 140, 142-43.
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may actually cause the value of service for incumbent customers to
decline if congestion ensues or if the quality of service is otherwise
adversely affected. For example, the congestion bottlenecks resulting
from mass access to Internet system networks are obvious and have
led high bandwidth users to seek alternative network solutions.
These problems aside, while this positive externality rationale
for universal service might explain why consumers, in a nonregulated
context, may be willing to pay for some cross-subsidization of univer-
sal service in telecommunications, it is a tenuous argument, at best,
for supporting a duty to serve in the natural gas and electricity indus-
tries. Under traditional public utility regulation, the consumption of
gas and electricity commodities, unlike communications services, does
not depend on interconnectivity for its value. Additional customers
might make certain secondary markets possible-Circuit City would
not exist if customers did not have circuits"16-and this may stimulate
demand for electricity or natural gas. Moreover, as is discussed
below, increasing the number of customers on a network may work to
decrease the fixed costs associated with providing electric or natural
gas service, reducing the price each customer pays in a rate-regulated
environment. However, any individual customer can obtain great
value from utilizing electrical or natural gas appliances in complete
isolation. An electrical generator, for example, can easily power a
home or office, so long as adequate fuel is available. Thus, although
some economic benefits to pervasive access can be identified for these
industries, they relate primarily to the costs and supply of network
service, not to its demand value or the amount customers are willing
to pay for universal service. To this extent, the positive externality
argument for universal service is weak when applied to commodities
like electricity and natural gas sold by the traditional public util-
ity-or, at least it demands some other economic explanation.
2. The Regulatory Compact Efficiency Argument
Another, more powerful, economic efficiency rationale for the
duty to serve is embedded in an understanding of public utility regu-
lation known as the "regulatory compact," coupled with the modern
economic rationales for vertical and horizontal integration. The regu-
latory compact, a fictional contract between the utility and the state,
views the utility as consensually agreeing to certain obligations, such
as the duty to serve, in return for its geographic franchise and ex-
116. Thanks to my colleague Larry Garvin for putting it to me this way.
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pected recovery of its costs of service through regulated rates. Some
go so far as to suggest that this contract, though fictional, must be
honored by the state as any other legal contract," 7 but the regulatory
compact rationale is perhaps best understood as one account of the
historical development of utility regulation. For example, George
Priest describes utility regulation as evolving not primarily from
regulatory capture, but from a pragmatic negotiation between utilities
and local governments that gave utilities the power of eminent
domain." 8
Application of the regulatory compact as an intellectual
grounding for utility service obligations finds support in Bruce
Wyman's Gilded Age writings on public utility regulation. Wyman
viewed extraordinary obligations as attaching to utilities by virtue of
their monopoly status."9 The regulatory compact rationale is most
powerful when united with other economic justifications for public
utility law, particularly rationales related to the law and economics of
contract and the firm. Although a complete defense of the economics
of vertical and horizontal integration and regulation of public utility
rates is beyond the scope of this Article, some introduction is neces-
sary to understand the efficiency of the traditional duty to serve in
the regulated utility context. 20
A firm is a natural monopoly if the entire market demand can
be served at lower cost by a single firm than by two or more firms. 21
The traditional public utility, regarded by most as a natural monop-
oly, possesses a high degree of horizontal monopoly, due to economies
117. See, e.g., Deregulatory Takings, supra note 3. For the opposing view, see critical
sources cited supra note 3.
118. See George L. Priest, The Origins of Utility Regulation and the "Theories of
Regulation" Debate, 36 J.L. & ECON. 289, 303 (1993) ("utility companies voluntarily... sub-
ject[ed] themselves to regulation... to use public right-of-way").
119. See Public Callings, supra note 29, at 166.
120. The modern neoclassical theory of natural monopoly may have originated with John
Stuart Mill, who argued that it would be uneconomical and duplicatively wasteful for cities to be
connected to parallel railroad tracks, or for a city to be served by more than a single postal
service. See JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1848) (arguing that the
London gas light industry would perform more efficiently if it were a regulated monopoly rather
than a competitive industry). See generally E. Benjamin Andrew, The Economic Law of
Monopoly, 26 J. SOC. Sm. 1 (1890); Arthur T. Hadley, Private Monopolies and Private Rights, 1
Q.J. ECON. 28 (1887). An excellent modem history is Herbert Hovenkamp, Technology, Politics,
and Regulated Monopoly: An American Historical Perspective, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1263 (1984). Of
course, long before Mill it was well recognized outside of political economists, by Lord Hale and
others, that certain industries should be operated exclusively under Crown franchise grants,
price regulated, and forced to serve all customers willing to pay.
121. See MARK SEIDENFELD, MICROECONOMIC PREDICATES TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 61-63
(1996) (describing how a stable market structure may create a natural monopoly); WILLIAM W.
SHARKEY, THE THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY 20 (1982) (same).
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of scale or congestion or network economies, as well as a high degree
of vertical integration of constituent services within a single firm.
For example, the modern, investor-owned electric utility was
conceived in the nineteenth century in Chicago, by Samuel Insull, an
associate of Thomas Edison.122  By this time, economists such as
Richard T. Ely and Henry Carter Adams had written that "monopolies
result from economies of scale achieved by technological innova-
tion."123  Such was the origin of Insull's monopoly. Initially, large
Chicago electricity users, such as apartment buildings, hotels, fancy
shops, and department stores, generated power locally. 1A Eventually,
Chicago Edison (Commonwealth Edison's predecessor), competing for
increased service territory, realized that ownership of multiple
generators within the same horizontal firm structure allowed
significant coordination economies. 25 Hence, Insull was able to con-
solidate horizontally a geographic service territory for a single utility,
Chicago Edison; the utility was required to provide service, and in
return, the utility was given an exclusive franchise, precluding others
from providing service within its franchise area.
Integration of generation, transmission, and distribution func-
tions within the same vertical firm allows significant operational
economies. 126 In addressing the economic arguments for vertical
integration, it is useful to consider electricity's technical characteris-
tics. First, electricity transmission follows physical, not economic,
relationships. Because electrons travel in the path of least resistance
(according to Kirchhoffs laws),127 the physical transmission of elec-
122. The historian Harold Platt provides an excellent account. See HAROLD L. PLATT, THE
ELECTRIC CITY. ENERGY AND THE GROWTH OF THE CHICAGO AREA, 1880-1930, at 59-92 (1991);
see also JAMEs A. THROGMORTON, PLANNING AS PERSUASIVE STORYTELLING: THE RHETORICAL
CONSTRUCTION OF CHICAGO'S ELECTRIC FUTURE (1996).
123. Hovenkamp, supra note 120, at 1270 (discussing economists' and historians' views on
monopolies); see also Richard T. Ely, The Growth of Corporations, 75 HARPER'S MAG. 71 (1887);
Henry Carter Adams, Relation of the State to Industrial Action, PROC. AM. ECON. A., Jan. 1887,
at 55.
124. See PLATT, supra note 122, at 22-25, 69-70.
125. See id. at 74-82. As Platt suggests, such horizontal integration was dependent on the
development of AC current, allowing the extension of electricity transmission beyond a mile and
a half, and the technology of central station coordination. See id; see also THOMAS P. HUGHES,
NETWORKS OF POWER: ELECTRIFICATION IN WESTERN SOCIETY, 1880-1930, at 122-25 (1983)
(describing the relationship between horizontal intergration and universal access to electricity).
126. See PLATT, supra note 122, at 74 (noting that Insull's approach "represented a
practical application of a novel economic and constitutional theory of 'natural' monopoly").
127. Kirchhoffs voltage law has been summarized as follows: "At each instant of time, the
algebraic sum of the voltage rise is equal to the algebraic sum of the voltage drops, both being
taken in the same direction around the closed loop." MCGRAW-HILL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHYSICS
649 (Sybil P. Parker ed., 2d ed. 1991). According to Kirchhoffs current law, "[alt any given
instant, the sum of the instantaneous values of all the currents flowing toward a point is equal
to the sum of the instantaneous values of all the currents flowing away from the point." Id. at
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tricity defies a predefined contract path linking particular buyers and
sellers to physically identifiable products. Thus, analogies to high-
ways, railroads, or pipelines can be misleading. Second, electricity
cannot be feasibly stored. Although high-voltage cells are physically
capable of storing large capacities of electricity, their cost is prohibi-
tively high. It is also not feasible to simply let electricity travel
through the grid until it finds a user, as kilowatts are quickly lost
with every mile of transmission and the risk of overload (and accom-
panying blackout) is great. It is far more efficient to use electricity as
it is produced, requiring tight coordination between power supply and
demand. Third, the transmission of electricity is sensitive to the
generation input acting upon the grid. For these reasons, electricity
must be moved on a closely coordinated, integrated transmission
system that displays large economies of scale.1' Beginning with
Insull's efforts, economies have historically been realized through the
vertical integration of generation and transmission and the horizontal
integration of multiple generators.
In his famous article The Nature of the Firm, Ronald Coase
observed that all transactions in an economy are not necessarily most
efficiently realized through explicit exchange in the market.129 The
economist Oliver Williamson has generalized Coase's observation,
presenting a useful framework for analyzing the costs of market con-
tracting that affect the optimal degree of vertical and horizontal
integration.130 Williamson views the costs of market contracting as
varying with uncertainty, the frequency of transactions, asset specific-
ity,13' and problems caused by opportunism. 132 Transactions exhibit-
650; see also George C. Loehr, Transmission Reliability in the "Brave New World," PUB. UTIL.
FoRT., Feb. 1, 1996, at 12, 13.
128. We should be careful, though, not to exaggerate the economic relevance of these tech-
nical characteristics. The differences between electricity and other commodities are only
differences in degree. For instance, other industries face physical constraints on transportation
(e.g., railroads) and other commodities are difficult and costly to store (e.g., natural gas). Firms
in the electricity industry, like firms in other industries, have found ways to economize on the
costly technical characteristics of electricity.
129. There is, in principle, no need for the market to organize around firms. Instead,
market actors could organize through arms-length transactions with the guidance of price
mechanisms. A firm simply bypasses (or internalizes) the system of market prices and coordi-
nates production without the use of explicit prices. See Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4
ECONOMICA 386 (1937). Essentially, Coase was taking exception to the then-dominant under-
standing that the "natural" evolution of the firm was defined by technology and its costs and
could be taken as given.
130. See generally OIVER E. WMLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE (1996)
[hereinafter MECHANISMS]; Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance
of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979).
131. Asset specificity is the extent to which durable assets are tailored to specific transac-
tions. See MECHANISMS, supra note 130, at 59-60. For example, if an electric utility has built a
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ing these characteristics require complex contracts and tend to favor
integration within organizations. 133 As the need for contractual com-
plexity rises, so does the cost of bilateral contracting, making internal
control more attractive. 34
This, the Williamsonian framework, provides a powerful ex-
planation for the high degree of vertical integration in the twentieth
century electric utility industry. In the electricity industry, signifi-
cant operational efficiencies have been realized by the vertical inte-
gration of generation and transmission within a single monopoly-
franchised firm. The vertical integration of generation and transmis-
sion is the market's recognition of two technical phenomena that
make de-integration costly: first, "electrical equilibrium," the trans-
mission stasis necessary to avoid blackout, requires that the sum of
power demanded must equal the sum of power supplied at generation
buses minus the amount of power lost in transmission; and second,
individual generators cannot physically direct their output to any
particular customer or demand point. A vertically integrated genera-
tion and transmission utility is able to economize on these technical
complexities by engaging in "economic dispatch" (utilizing the least
expensive generator to meet its customer demands), monitoring gen-
eration to maintain internal electrical equilibrium, and diversifying
its contracts to allow an operationally flexible combination of genera-
tion capacity to meet its customer load. For these reasons, the gen-
eration and transmission utility is virtually universal in the industry,
although some utilities also extend their vertical integration to the
distribution of power.135 This high degree of vertical integration in the
industry minimizes the costs of contracting by internalizing costs,
many of which are informational, 136 within a single firm.
power generator to serve a single large customer within its service territory, there may be a
large degree of specificity with respect to that asset unless that utility is able to access an
alternative purchase market for the output of the asset.
132. See id. at 65-78.
133. See id. at 103-05.
134. See id.
135. Investor-owned utilities commonly integrate distribution with generation and trans-
mission. It is typical for cooperative and municipal utilities to separate distribution from gen-
eration and transmission. Although distribution facilities may be separately owned, they are
typically linked with the generation and transmission firm by long-term requirements contracts.
See PAUL L. JOSKOW & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MARKETS FOR POWER: AN ANALYSIS OF
ELECTRICAL UTILITY DEREGULATION 113 (1983) (observing that iviertical integration between
generation and transmission is virtually universal").
136. See generally MARK CASSON, INFORMATION AND ORGANIZATION: A NEW PERSPECTIVE
ON THE THEORY OF THE FIRM (1997) (offering theory of the firm as a system of structured
information flows).
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In addition to fostering vertical integration of the electrical
utility, Samuel Insull recognized that significant economies could also
be realized from the horizontal integration of electrical generation and
transmission. Much of this is internal to the firm. Originally, it was
difficult to achieve high degrees of horizontal integration because
power systems could not be coordinated. However, with technological
innovations, the central station-a coordinated intersection of various
distribution wires-became feasible for integrating adjacent electric-
ity transmission systems.3 7
These economic rationales favor a high degree of vertical and
horizontal integration in the electricity industry. The integration of
constituent services and a geographic franchise under the rubric of a
single firm, though, calls for some degree of franchise and price regu-
lation to control monopoly abuses. Under the traditional approach,
regulators define a franchise service area for a public utility, guaran-
teeing it access to customers within this area.138 Once a franchise is
defined, the traditional approach to regulating the electric utility is to
regulate rates in a manner designed to approximate the results of a
competitive market. In a competitive market, price equals long-run
marginal economic cost, including a normal rate of return on capi-
tal.139 In contrast, though, a monopolist can increase its profits by
137. See PLATT, supra note 122, at 72-74. In addition, a large degree of horizontal integra-
tion has been externally established through informal coordination and contractual pooling.
"Power pools"--formal and informal agreements among independent utilities to coordinate their
investment and operating activities-also provide certain economies for the industry.
"Electrical equilibrium" between adjacent systems can only be achieved through the operational
coordination pooling provides. Moreover, the efficient operation of power generation requires
adjacent systems to engage in "economy interchanges," the alteration of generation levels to
equate line-loss adjusted marginal cost (operationally known as "system lambda"). The pooling
of separately owned vertically-integrated generation and transmission resources facilitates such
economy interchange. Thus, it is commonplace for vertically-integrated utilities to functionally
and operationally integrate with other separately owned utilities through long-term cooperative
activities and long-term contractual arrangements governing transmission. See JOSKOW &
SCHMALENSEE, supra note 135, at 26. The economists Paul Joskow and Richard Schmalensee,
perhaps the leading U.S. commentators on the economic structure of the electric utility indus-
try, have observed that as of 1979 formal power pools, governed by inter-utility contracts,
accounted for nearly 60 percent of U.S. generating capacity. Informal cooperative pools between
utilities also exist in certain geographic areas. See id. at 66-77. As Joskow and Schmalensee
note, power pooling is a substitute for vertical integration. See id. at 71. In addition to power
pools, federal regulators have established nine regional reliability councils that facilitate infor-
mation exchange within their interconnected member systems and establish reliability criteria
for system interconnections and power supply. Together, these nine regional groups form the
North American Electricity Reliability Council ("NERC"), whose members include utilities,
public authorities, and representatives of the federal government.
138. See CHARLEs F. PHiLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 563-64 (3d ed. 1993).
139. Marginal cost includes both the cost of delivering power and what regulators call a
"capacity charge"--the cost of maintaining reserve capacity to ensure reliable supply.
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charging prices that exceed marginal cost. Because marginal cost is
difficult to measure directly, regulators approximate marginal cost by
computing the utility's invested capital ("rate base"), determining an
allowable rate of return on that invested capital, and setting rates
designed to produce the prescribed rate of return on capital.140
Under this traditional regulatory structure, the duty to extend
service, even when it is not immediately profitable, has some basis in
economic efficiency. Prohibitions on direct competition with a utility
increase system stability and reliability, minimizing some of the costs
of vertical coordination, and decrease horizontal coordination costs by
ensuring that only a few adjacent utilities are parties to any power
pool. In return, though, customers must be guaranteed access to
power supply and distribution services if they request it, as these
services are bundled together and provided by a single firm.
The duty to extend service might thus be seen as economically
efficient because of the industry's structure and regulators' approach
to preserving this structure through franchise and price regulation.
As Richard Epstein has suggested, "[tlhe obligation of universal serv-
ice to all comers is the obvious and effective way to overcome the
holdout advantage that common carriers would otherwise possess as
against their customers."'14 Put another way, utilities subject to a
duty to extend service are not given an ordinary property right to
exclude. Instead, the utility is protected by a liability rule, which
allows customers to take service on demand in return for compensa-
tion, as determined through an elaborate ratemaking system. 42
Effectively, service extension obligations are imposed on the utility,
rather than assumed by the consumer, because the utility is in a bet-
ter position to spread the costs of extension among multiple custom-
ers, thus minimizing the wealth impact on poorer customers, whose
marginal utility of money is relatively high. 43
Cost spreading is a primary rationale behind the extension
obligation applicable to utilities. In contrast, service continuation
obligations are best understood by analogizing to long-term bilateral
contracts between a supplier and a buyer and the identification of the
140. See PHILLIPS, supra note 138, at 62-63, 176-80.
141. Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules,
106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2118 (1997).
142. See id. ("tihose who want its services must pay fair value for them").
143. On the economic basis of loss (or cost) spreading, see generally GuiDo CALABRESI, THE
COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970). Loss spreading will be desirable when not all persons sharing in
the costs of a social policy possess identical marginal utilities of money and where there is
concern with minimizing the impact on certain sub-populations, such as low income persons.
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superior risk-bearer.'" In industries with large up-front capital
investments, long-term contracts are necessary to entice suppliers to
make the necessary investments. Without long-term contracts
guaranteeing a reliable pool of buyers of a good, many suppliers would
not make the necessary capital investments to produce the good or
distribute the good over the market. For example, in the natural gas
industry, long-term contracts between pipelines and local distribution
companies were essential to financing the national pipeline
infrastructure. 145
As is ordinary in practice, long-term contracts in private indus-
tries are often negotiated so as to allow flexibility in either price or
quantity. The extended durations of such contracts pose problems for
planning risk management, and "gaps" in such contracts will always
exist. For sales of goods, once service under such a contract com-
mences, a supplier has an obligation to continue to meet reasonable
demands for services, and not renege on this obligation if a more
profitable alternative comes along. 46 For example, assume that a
seller has agreed to supply all of a buyer's coal requirements for a
twenty year period. The parties base price per ton on a Department
of Labor price index. However, over time incidents such as oil embar-
goes and inflation cause the supplier's production costs to exceed the
agreed index, so that if the seller continues to perform, it will suffer
substantial losses. Nevertheless, the approach of some courts in re-
viewing such contracts has been to hold the seller completely respon-
sible and to grant specific performance. 147 In other words, in the long-
term contract context, some courts have enforced a service con-
tinuation obligation, even in the face of substantial economic losses to
the seller. 48
144. The analogy is made in Victor P. Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7
BELL J. EcoN. 426, 444 (1976). See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Franchise Bidding for
Natural Monopolies-In General and with Respect to CATV, 7 BELL J. ECON. 73 (1976).
145. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconstituting the Natural Gas Industry from Wellhead to
Burnertip, 9 ENERGY L.J. 1, 11-16 (1988) (discussing the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978).
146. See U.C.C. § 2-306 cmt. 2.; see also supra note 101.
147. See Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129, 137 (N.D. Iowa
1978) (refusing to excuse performance under a contract because supplier failed to show that its
cost increases resulted from actions beyond its control or were unforeseeable at the time of
contracting); Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d 721, 728 (Mo. Ct. App.
1979) (enforcing a contract to supply a public utility with coal despite an unprofitable bargain
for seller).
148. See Paul L. Joskow, Commercial Impossibility, The Uranium Market and the
Westinghouse Case, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 119, 150-76 (1977) (discussing commercial impracticability
defense under section 2-615 of the U.C.C.); see also U.C.C. § 2-306 cmt. 2 (noting that elasticity
or requirements to "curtail losses" may constitute breach).
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As others observe, this approach to enforcing contracts has
some efficiency basis in the long-term contract context where the
seller is the superior risk-bearer.'49 In the electric utility context, the
long-term agreement is endorsed by a regulatory authority between a
utility and its customers, which we know as the regulatory compact.
One of the parties to this hypothetical agreement, the utility, is a
rate-regulated monopolist. Vis-A-vis the end use customer, the utility
is the superior risk-bearer with respect to changes in the supply of
electricity and the technological aspects of transmission and distribu-
tion. The customer, though, may be the better risk-bearer with re-
spect to its unforeseeable uses of the utility's service. At the same
time, as between the utility and customers, the utility is in a better
position to spread any losses associated with service shut-off among
multiple customers, especially when those losses might have an im-
pact on low-income ratepayers or small businesses. A general utility
obligation to continue service, and to pay for foreseeable damages,
places the risk of shut-off on the superior risk-bearer and cost-
spreader.150 The utility, then, can attempt to seek compensation for
these risks and costs through rates, while also providing customers
adequate opportunities to contest service curtailment or to seek an
alternative supplier.
Although under traditional franchise and price regulation a
general duty to serve has some intellectual grounding in economic
efficiency, one of the economic problems created by service extension
and continuation obligations is cross-subsidization. Price regulation
of electric utilities, like regulation of other public utilities, focuses on
setting prices equal to the costs of providing service to the customer.
This approach to price regulation is necessary in natural monopoly
markets-particularly those in which scale economies are pre-
sent-because firms otherwise face incentives to set costs higher and
to produce a lower quantity than in competitive markets. Recall the
theoretical solution to this problem presented by neoclassical econom-
ics-set price equal to marginal cost, thus mimicking the result of a
149. See Richard E. Speidel, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments Under Long-Term Supply
Contracts, 76 Nw. U. L. Rev. 369, 381-94 (1981) (discussing efficiency); see also Richard A.
Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An
Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 90 (1977) (describing a superior risk-bearer as the
party who may be in the best position to prevent a risk from materializing).
150. With respect to service continuation the utility is not only the superior risk-bearer, but
also the superior cost-spreader. In most cases it will be desirable to impose continuation obli-
gations on the utility, except in those instances where the customer is, on average, the superior
risk-bearer and the gains from requiring customers to bear the risks of shut-off exceed any loss
spreading gains from imposing the obligation on the utility.
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competitive market. Yet, with economies of scale, the revenues from
marginal cost pricing will fall short of the total costs of a firm's out-
puts. 151 In such contexts, regulators have relied on a body of analysis
known as "Ramsey pricing," which recognizes that in the presence of
scale economies firms would lose money if they were required to set
prices at marginal costs and attempts to identify a set of prices that
yield adequate revenue for a firm to cover all of its costs.152 For regu-
lators, Ramsey pricing has been utilized as "a prescription for deriv-
ing those prices whose deviations from marginal cost will serve the
public interest where scale economies are present."153
With respect to the service extension obligation, customers
who may not benefit from service extension may be allocated a portion
of the fixed costs of extension, which are built into the fixed cost com-
ponent of their rates. However, contribution requirements, which the
common law recognized and many states currently impose by regula-
tion,'5 limit the degree to which utilities can subsidize service exten-
sion by increasing rates for all customers. The traditional ratemaking
process, in which the impacts and cost-effectiveness of intra- and
inter-class cross-subsidization are litigated, also works to minimize
the degree of cross-subsidization resulting for the service extension
obligation.
In addition, the service continuation obligation facilitates in-
tra-class cross-subsidization by building into all customers' rates the
costs of nonpaying customers. Although this likely leads to mis-
matches between any one customer's costs and rates, it allows utili-
ties to spread the cost of nonpayment among all customers. When a
utility removes a nonpaying customer from its system by
disconnecting service, two things occur: first, the utility avoids the
variable costs of producing energy, typically the price of the fuel
required to deliver the units of energy to the customer; and second,
151. See DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
869-71 (1994) (discissing economies of scale); KENNETH E. TRAIN, OPTIMAL REGULATION: THE
ECONOMIC THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY 14-15 (1991) (same).
152. The theory was first presented for analyzing tax policy by a young Cambridge philoso-
pher, Frank Ramsey, who produced contributions to probability theory, combinatorial analysis,
geometry and economics before his death at 26. The original idea is presented in Frank
Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON. J. 47 (1927). For subsequent
reviews of the idea in the literature, see William J. Baumol, Ramsey Pricing, in 3 THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF EcONOMICS 49-51 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987). See generally
William J. Baumol & David F. Bradford, Optimal Departures from Marginal Cost Pricing, 60
AM. ECON. REV. 265 (1970) (presenting theorems to deal with marginal cost pricing).
153. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & J. GREGORY SIDAK, TRANSMISSION PRICING AND STRANDED
COSTS IN THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 33 (1995).
154. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
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the utility forgoes the revenue that it would have collected from the
household if service were continued. So there is a general economic
advantage to all ratepayers in keeping as many customers as possible
on the system. Service continuation obligations allow the utility to
spread fixed costs over a larger number of customers and to reduce
the portion of each customer's bill allocated to fixed costs.155 Thus,
even in the event of nonpayment, it may be cost-effective for a utility
with excess capacity to continue service to a customer and to
accommodate the nonpaying customer by working out a partial
payment plan, so long as it is reasonably expected that the customer
can pay at least the variable cost of service.
Cross-subsidization is a necessary result of the duty to serve,
but the impacts of cross-subsidization have been minimized by contri-
bution requirements, the ratemaking process, and cost-effectiveness
considerations. Although there are inevitable cross-subsidization
costs associated with the duty to serve, regulators have had to strike
a balance to ensure that the benefits of universal access to utility
service offset these costs. The duty to serve thus has led a relatively
peaceful coexistence with franchise and price regulation.
This extended discussion suggests that the economic
justifications for regulation provide different rationales to support
more extension service obligations for natural monopoly industries
than for other private businesses. The common law recognized this,
and it is reinforced by the modern administrative state.156
155. See Roger Colton, A Cost-Based Response to Low-Income Energy Problems, PUB. UTIL.
FORT., Mar. 1, 1991, at 31 (discussing the energy assurance program).
156. Singer, in his recent argument that all private firms assume similar obligations to
serve customers, is dismissive of the contributions Bruce Wyman made in developing an early
twentieth century intellectual grounding for extraordinary service obligations. For example,
Singer states, "Wyman attempted to rationalize the Lochnerian view that public service com-
panies were exceptional and legitimately subject to much more extensive legislative regulation
than were other business corporations." Singer, supra note 4, at 1403. Singer is perhaps
correct that Wyman, in his early approach to developing a progressive theory of utility regula-
tion, was culturally wed to Lochneresque assumptions and was dismissive of the public interest
in requiring access obligations in other contexts. For instance, Singer identifies a few instances
in which Wyman adheres to a bright line distinction between those businesses with a duty to
serve, such as blacksmiths and innkeepers, and those businesses without, such as most retail
stores. See id. at 1403-09. I do not disagree with Singer that some obligations applied at
common law to even non-monopolistic industries that held themselves out as open to the public,
but these obligations were much less extensive and did not have the same intellectual ground-
ing in the economics of natural monopoly as public utility service obligations. See also FCC
Origins of the Duty to Serve, supra note 4, at 534 (contrasting consumer law test for
communications utility service obligations, based on monopoly control over an essential facility,
with tort liability standard for common carriers, based on "holding out" service to the public).
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III. THE DAWN OF RETAIL COMPETITION: PUBLIC UTILITY
RESTRUCTURING AND THE EMERGENCE OF RETAIL POWER MARKETS
Cross-subsidies are not without controversy, but the fiction of
the regulatory compact coupled with the economics of price regulation
have masked the redistributive nature of extraordinary utility service
obligations for the past hundred or so years. Following World War II,
public choice theory began to question the orthodox understanding of
government regulation generally and utility regulation in particular,
providing the intellectual tools for smashing the regulatory compact
in a variety of different industries.157 One of the predominant ac-
counts of the growth of utility regulation is regulatory capture-that
utilities and other interests, such as consumer groups, secure protec-
tion of their interests through the political process by capturing regu-
lation.158
For example, as Eli Noam has recently suggested, in the
telecommunications context there is a public choice explanation for
the existence of a redistributive universal service obligation in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.159 Consumers and utilities may have
formed a coalition to secure legislative endorsement of the universal
service requirement. This inures to the benefit of the average
consumer, who now has more pervasive access through interconnec-
tivity; it also benefits utilities, as regulators allow recovery of univer-
sal service costs by guaranteeing minimum service access charges or
rates.160
If this public choice explanation is applicable to national
legislation regulating telecommunications, it would seem an even
more plausible description of the regulation of electricity and natural
gas commodities. Electricity and natural gas industries have
developed service obligations primarily at the state level, which is
likely more responsive than the U.S. Congress to the preferences,
desires, and needs of state consumers and industries. So modern
endorsement of the duty to serve in statutes and regulations in the
157. Helpful accounts are provided in DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND
PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991); JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS &
GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO NIPROVE PUBLIC LAw (1997).
158. See generally Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for
Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of
Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2
BELL J. ECON. 3 (1971).
159. See Eli M. Noam, Will Universal Service and Common Carriage Survive the
Telecommunications Act of 1996?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 955, 958-63 (1997).
160. See id.
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electricity and natural gas contexts may have resulted from utilities,
consumers, and their representatives securing, or capturing, a
regulatory benefit from the political process, rather than from some
public-spirited regulatory compact.
Capture, though, has not always inured to the benefit of con-
sumers. The account of utility regulation supported by the
Williamsonian framework, coupled with the regulatory compact en-
dorsed by Bruce Wyman, seems plausible. But, as Williamson himself
has observed, it ignores how capture, or strategic and opportunistic
behavior by utilities, might have developed over time to the disadvan-
tage of consumers. 161 Indeed, over the last thirty years the public
choice critique has been put to use by reformers bent on dismantling
or restructuring the traditional regulatory compact in a variety of
contexts, including the railroad, trucking, and telecommunications
industries.162
Aided by the public choice critique and recent technological
innovations in power generation, 63 the introduction of competition to
the electric utility industry has been motivated in large part by large
consumer interests, particularly the interests of high-load industrial
customers, and not by the multiplicity of small residential customers
who depend upon their local utilities to provide dependable, low-cost
electrical service for heat and air conditioning, cooking, health and
personal hygiene, and entertainment.164 Large customers have sought
to enhance competition because, at least for many of them, the
marginal costs of electricity are less than the average costs, which by
and large are built into their rates set by utility regulators.65 This is
not to suggest that small commercial and residential customers will
realize no benefits from competition, but that large consumer
interests have been the primary driving force behind much of the
policy debate to date.
161. See Williamson, supra note 3, at 1012-14.
162. See generally STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982); KENNETH W.
COSTELLO & ROBERT J. GRANiERE, DEREGULATION-RESTRUCTURING: EVIDENCE FOR INDIVIDUAL
INDUSTRIES (1997); RICHARD H.K VIETOR, CONTRIVED COMPETITION: REGULATION AND
DEREGULATION IN AMERICA (1994); see also Mashaw, supra note 157 (summarizing the cynical
view towards regulation of many public choice theorists).
163. These innovations began in the 1970s. See JOSKOW & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 135,
at 51-53.
164. For example, in New York, concerns about losing jobs have been a primary motivation
behind competitive utility restructuring. See Agis Salpukas, The New Push for Less Costly
Electric Power, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1997, at 39 (noting "large industrial customers have
provided the biggest push for deregulation of the electric industry").
165. See JOSKOW & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 135, at 89-90.
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The policy arguments in favor of retail competition in electric-
ity, though, are not solely rhetorical byproducts of interest group
politics. There is some solid support in favor of changes to the tradi-
tional regulatory compact in economic theory and evidence. This Part
presents some of the economic rationales for the recent introduction of
competition to the electric utility industry in the context of recent
restructuring reforms. Following a brief description of some of the
statutory and regulatory developments, retail wheeling policies and
their implications to the industry are briefly summarized.
A. Failures in Rate Regulation and the Rise of Competition in Power
Generation and Wholesale Transmission Access
Following the introduction of electric utility rate regulation,
utilities experienced decades of steady sales growth and declining
prices. Between 1906 and 1970, the industry more than quadrupled
its number of customers, and the average price to residential
customers declined from ten cents to 2.6 cents per kilowatt-hour
("kWh"), without any adjustment for inflation.166 However, in the
1970s there was an abrupt change in this pattern of increased growth
and declining prices. The cumulative effects of inflation, oil price
shocks, and fuel prices, as well as the onset of environmental
regulation, led to consistent increases in the costs of producing power
from traditional generation facilities. 167 Moreover, power generation
cost increases were overwhelmed by the skyrocketing costs of building
new power plants, particularly nuclear plants.168
Together, these events bolstered the perception that tradi-
tional franchise and price regulation were failing at some of their
most basic tasks. 69 Because under rate regulation utilities had fi-
nancial incentives to earn above-normal rates of return on invest-
ment, many utilities overinvested in capital. Electric utilities were
perceived to have some of the same general problems as other indus-
166. See Fox-PENNER, supra note 71, at 12.
167. See JOSKOW & ScHMALENSEE, supra note 135, at 51-58.
168. Peter Fox-Penner observes:
[Tihe average cost per kilowatt hour of capacity for new nuclear power plants finished
between 1968 and 1971 was $161/kilowatt. For plants finished between 1979 and 1984,
average costs rose almost tenfold, to $1,372/kW. And the 20 most expensive nuclear
plants in the United States ranged in cost from $1,607/kW to $5,810/kW.
FOX-PENNER, supra note 71, at 14.
169. See Andrew P. Morriss, Implications of Second-Best Theory for Administrative and
Regulatory Law: A Case Study of Public Utility Regulation, 73 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 135, 136-37
(1998) (arguing that second-best theory suggests a modest attitude towards efficiency in the
design of public utility regulation).
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tries regulated on a cost-of-service basis: bloated costs and other
inefficiencies (i.e., the Averch-Johnson or "AJ" effect). 70 A technology-
driven fall in prices masked these inefficiencies, but by the 1970s
other developments threatened the traditional structure. First, as
has already been described, in the late 1960s and 1970s electric rates
began to increase due to rising fuel and environmental costs. Second,
utilities began to exhaust economies of scale in power production;
power production was no longer considered a natural monopoly, but
was viewed as competitive, or at least contestable.'17 The cumulative
failures of regulation, coupled with remarkable innovations rendering
old technology inefficient or obsolete, suggested that new efficiencies
could be realized by introducing competition to certain sectors of the
electricity industry.7 2
As recently as 1989, the electricity industry was described as
"largely unaffected" by the deregulatory movement that produced
significant changes in the railroad, trucking, airline, telecommunica-
tions, financial services, and natural gas industries. 73 Although rate
regulation was slow to change, beginning in the mid-1970s many
large customers of electricity realized that significant savings could be
realized by self-generating electricity or buying it from independent
power producers ("IPPs"), which are non-utility firms that have
entered into electricity generation markets. As IPPs have attempted
to enter into electricity generation markets, the legal structure
regulating the electric utility industry has undergone significant
changes in several respects. Reforms over the past ten years have
been remarkable. Today, the production, or generation, sector of the
industry is viewed as competitive (or at least contestable) and has
170. See generally Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under
Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052 (1962) (examining the level of prices changed by
the telephone and telegraph industry).
171. See JOSKOW & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 135, at 48-54. On contestable markets, see
generally Elizabeth E. Bailey & William J. Baumol, Deregulation and the Theory of Contestable
Markets, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 111 (1984) (defining contestable markets as between perfect
competition and natural monopoly).
172. A recent Department of Energy Report estimates some of the impacts of regulatory
reform on competitive pricing of electricity. Price reductions between six and thirteen percent
could be realized almost immediately for customers with competitive pricing of electricity,
although this does not include regulatory recovery of stranded investments; over the long run,
price reductions are expected to be larger. See ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, DEP'T OF
ENERGY, ELECTRICITY PRICES IN A COMPEITVE ENVIRONMENT: MARGINAL COST PRICING OF
GENERATION SERVICES AND FINANCIAL STATUS OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES, A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
THROUGH 2015, DOE/EIA-0614, at xi-xvi (Aug. 1997) <http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/elepri97/
comp.html> [hereinafter ELECTRICITY PRICES].
173. Paul L. Joskow, Regulatory Failure, Regulatory Reform, and Structural Change in the
Electrical Power Industry, 1989 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, MICROECONOMICS, 125,
125.
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experienced near-complete economic deregulation. 174 The
transmission and distribution sectors of the industry have, in the
minds of most, remained paradigm natural monopolies-that is, they
are services for which the entire market demand can be served at a
lower cost by a single firm than by two or more firms. 7 5
Initial reform efforts to regulation of the industry focused on
creating adequate incentives for IPPs to compete with traditional,
vertically-integrated utilities. In 1978, Congress adopted the Public
Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 ("PURPA),176 a major piece of
federal legislation designed to create incentives for many IPPs to
provide new power generation, as a conservation and efficiency
enhancing alternative to traditional electric utility power
generation.177 Under PURPA, utilities were required to purchase
surplus power from qualifying IPPs at "avoided cost" rates-that is,
the cost the utility would have to incur if it built another power plant
to meet this need or purchased the power from someone else.178
PURPA also authorized FERC to mandate wholesale transmission
access, although FERC never used this authority directly.79
The second major set of reforms was implemented on a piece-
meal basis in the 1980s and early 1990s, as FERC attempted to
174. Of course, siting and environmental regulation of electricity generation remains
heavy. See Scott F. Bertschi, Integrated Resource Planning and Demand Side Management in
Electric Utility Deregulation: Public Utility Panacea or a Waste of Energy?, 43 EMORY L.J. 815,
830 (1994); see also Robert J. Michaels, Reason for Pessimism, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 15, 1993,
at 16 (noting that FERC's efforts to enhance competition cannot succeed because states have the
power to control siting and certification of electrical facilities).
175. A condition for natural monopoly is the existence of increasing returns to scale (i.e.,
declining average cost) over the relevant range of production. See supra note 121.
176. Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117
(1978) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 824a-1 to a-3, 824i-k, 2601-2645 (1994)).
177. See 16 U.S.C. § 2601 (1994) (PURPA's findings, noting purposes of increased competi-
tion and increased efficiency but not expressly directing FERC to increase competition or
deregulate rates).
178. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b) (1994) (requiring that the rate for purchase from qualifying
generation facilities shall not exceed "the incremental cost to the electric utility of alternative
electric energy").
179. PURPA added sections 211 and 212 to the Federal Power Act, authorizing FERC to
order wholesale transmission by utilities. See 16 U.S.C. § 824j(c) (1994). However, following
several appellate cases addressing the scope of this new authority, FERC interpreted its
authority narrowly and never used it to directly compel wholesale transmission. See, e.g.,
Florida Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 660 F.2d 668, 677-79 (5th Cir. 1981) (reversing FERC order
compelling utility to file amended tariff schedule for interchange transmission service on the
basis that the order would impermissibly impose common carrier status on utilities); New York
State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. FERC, 638 F.2d 388, 402 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[Ilt is clear from the express
requirements of §§ 211 and 212 that the public interest and the enhancement of competition are
not alone sufficient justification for compelling wheeling."); see also Southeastern Power Admin.
v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 26 F.E.R.C. (CCH) T 61,127 at 61,323 (1984) (interpreting section 211 to
"prohibit[ ] the issuance of wheeling orders that have a significant procompetitive effect.").
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commence deregulation of the bulk power industry based on the natu-
ral gas restructuring model.180 Regulators at FERC, which oversees
wholesale power transactions, and state regulatory commissions
applied light-handed regulation to IPPs, initiated market-based rate
mechanisms, and began to require competitive bidding for new gen-
eration capacity. 81 As a routine matter, competitive bidding for new
capacity has replaced the traditional utility decisions to build. As of
1993, non-utility generators accounted for over one-half of generation
capacity anticipated to be on-line by the next year, over thirty PSCs
had initiated "competitive bidding" programs for new generation, and
FERC and many PSCs had accepted hundreds of market-based or
negotiated rate filings in lieu of the traditional cost-of-service, which
often culminated in lengthy adjudicative hearings. 182 Currently, the
independent power sector of the industry is structurally competitive
with nearly fifty major firms and many more small firms bidding to
meet the demand for power. 1'3 Unregulated power producers are now
bearing many industry risks, such as the risks of construction cost
overruns, formerly borne by the consumers responsible for paying
rates to regulated utilities.
In 1992, on the heels of the Gulf Crisis, Congress endorsed
competitive reforms brewing in the electric utility industry when it
passed the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct).'8 The EPAct increased
FERC's authority to mandate wholesale transmission access, 18
inviting FERC to directly require utilities to transmit power for
others for the first time.'8 Also, the EPAct created additional
incentives for the growth of the IPP industry.'87
180. See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., A Proposal to Deregulate the Market for Bulk
Power, 72 VA. L. REV. 1183 (1986); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconsidering the Roles of Regulation
and Competition in the Natural Gas Industry, 97 HARV. L. REV. 345 (1983).
181. See generally Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Review: The Hard Look Doctrine and
Federal Regulatory Efforts to Restructure the Electric Utility Industry, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 763,
794-96 (examining the authority and decisions of FERC).
182. See Order Terminating Proceedings, 64 F.E.R.C. (CCH) 1 61,364 (1993).
183. See Fox-PENNER, supra note 71, at 120.
184. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, §§ 721-22, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992)
(amending §§ 211 & 212 of the Federal Power Act (FPA)), 16 U.S.C. § 824j-k (1994). For
discussion of the political process leading to adoption of the EPAct, see Jim Rossi, Lessons from
the Procedural Politics of the "Comprehensive" National Energy Policy Act of 1992, 19 HARV.
ENVT'LL. REV. 195 (1995).
185. See Energy Policy Act §§ 721-22, 16 U.S.C. § 824 (1994) (replacing transmission access
sections to the Federal Power Act).
186. See Florida Mun. Power Agency v. Florida Power & Light Co., 65 F.E.R.C. (CCH)
61,125 (1993) (granting request for transmission service and establishing further proceedings to
investigate the rates, terms and conditions of such service).
187. See Energy Policy Act § 711, 15 U.S.C. § 79z-5a(e) (1994).
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By far, however, the most significant event to date in
electricity industry restructuring is a rulemaking FERC adopted in
1996, known as the electricity mega-NOPR or Order No. 888.188 Order
No. 888 is designed to restructure wholesale markets for electricity, in
a manner similar to FERC's competitive restructuring of the natural
gas industry which FERC achieved in 1992 by adopting Order No.
636.189 Order No. 636 required that natural gas pipeline companies
file open access tariffs with FERC190 and unbundle natural gas sales
and transportation. 191  Similarly, Order No. 888 requires all
jurisdictional electric utilities to file wholesale transmission access
tariffs192 and creates incentives for structural unbundling-that is, for
utilities to separate ownership and control of transmission and
generation assets. 193  FERC's requirement of open access to
transmission facilities on comparable terms has increased
competition, because now a wider range of generators and utilities
have access to a networked wholesale power grid.
In addition, the separation of generation and transmission
ownership is expected to reduce some of the economic adverse
incentives of vertical integration, such as favoritism in granting
access to the transmission facilities which are essential to the
development of competitive power markets.194 As the Williamsonian
framework illustrates, a vertically integrated industry structure
allowed electric utilities to take advantage of operational and
technical efficiencies in coordinating power supply and demand.
However, vertical integration of generation, transmission, and
distribution also risked reduced access to natural monopoly network
188. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (1996)
(codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35 & 385 (1997)).
189. Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions to Regulations Governing Self-
Implementing Transportation and Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead
Decontrol, 57 Fed. Reg. 13,267 (1992), order on reh'g, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,128 (1992), order on reh'g,
57 Fed. Reg. 57,911 (1992), reversed and remanded, United Distribution Companies v. FERC, 88
F.3d 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1996), order on remand, 78 F.E.R.C. (CCH) 61,186 (1997) (codified at 18
C.F.R. pt. 284 (1997)).
190. See id. at 13,282 (1992).
191. See id. at 13,279.
192. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,541.
193. See id.
194. Unlike the natural gas industry, which was characterized by modest vertical integra-
tion prior to restructuring, the electric utility industry has a high degree of vertical integration.
This structural characteristic of the industry will impede competition, and that vertical deinte-
gration or unbundling will be necessary for competition in the industry. See Richard J. Pierce,
Jr., The State of the Transition to Competitive Markets in Natural Gas & Electricity, 15 ENERGY
L.J. 323,342-49 (1994) [hereinafter Transition].
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facilities, particularly transmission and distribution.195 Without
access to essential transmission facilities, competitive generation
markets were thwarted. Following FERC's regulations, utilities that
spin off generation or functionally separate generation from other
utility functions will realize greater benefits in a competitive
wholesale power market.196
B. The Introduction of Retail Wheeling
The legal and institutional structures for implementing whole-
sale competition are well under development, but under current fed-
eral law the implementation of retail competition is beyond FERC's
authority.197 Because of this, retail competition is the subject of very
heated debate in many states. 98 It is well-recognized that, in order to
maximize the benefits of competition in wholesale power markets,
retail access to competition for all customers will be necessary.
Although small commercial and residential consumers currently real-
ize many of the benefits of wholesale competition, which are passed on
through their utility's rates, without retail competition, individual
consumers do not have power supply options and must purchase their
power from the incumbent utility. The incumbent utility, which in
most cases continues to own both transmission and generation, is
typically reluctant to allow consumers to opt to purchase their power
elsewhere, so consumers generally remain captive to the incumbent
even though lower-priced power may be available from another
supplier. The result is to limit participation in retail markets to large
industrial, governmental, and large commercial customers, to the
195. For the general argument that vertical integration may exert influence on barriers to
entry, see ROGER D. BLAIR & DAvm L. KASERMAN, LAW AND ECONOMICS OF VERTICAL
INTEGRATION AND CONTROL 42-47 (1983).
196. See Jim Rossi, Can the FERC Overcome Special Interest Politics, PUB. UTIL. FORT.,
Oct. 15, 1995, at 31 (observing that proposal leading to FERC Order No. 888 offers incentives for
voluntary unbundling).
197. The EPAct, continuing the bright line jurisdiction between wholesale (federally regu-
lated) and retail (state regulated) transactions well-known to electric regulators, amended the
FPA to expressly preclude FERC from exercising its jurisdiction over retail transmissions. See
16 U.S.C. § 824k(h) (1994). The FPA, as amended, preserves the "authority of any State or local
government concerning the transmission of electric energy directly to an ultimate consumer."
Id-
198. Of course, not all states considering the issue have decided to adopt retail competition.
See, e.g., In re Changes Occurring in the Elec. Indus., 172 P.U.R.4th 11 (Idaho Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1996) ("express[ing] the expectation that the electric industry... will continue to
experience a transformation toward free market principles" but recommending caution to
protect Idaho ratepayers); In re Emerging Competition in the Elec. Util. Indus., 165 P.U.R.4th
101 (Iowa Util. Brd. 1995) (noting "no consensus as to whether full retail competition would
benefit electric consumers in the state" and recommending further research and study).
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extent allowed by state law.199 Yet, as these larger customers benefit
from retail supply options, smaller customers continue to bear the
burden of financing generation assets the incumbent utility may have
planned and built to meet the large customer demand. Without retail
choice opportunities for all customers, smaller customers are at a
significant risk of bearing the burden of excess capacity as larger
customers self-generate, bypass the system, or wheel power if allowed
by state law.
Many states, including California, Illinois, New Hampshire,
Rhode Island, and Vermont, have already adopted legislation or regu-
lations designed to implement retail wheeling for all customers.200 In
addition, some states, such as New York, have initiated retail wheel-
ing pilot programs for residential customers. 20 1 Most states either
have statewide retail wheeling proposals under consideration or are
currently studying the issue.202  In addition, some proposed federal
legislation designed to address competition in the electric utility
industry requires states to implement retail wheeling.203
Retail wheeling will bring about significant changes to the
current structure of the electric utility industry. As an illustration,
consider California's framework for introducing consumer choice to
the industry,204 the first state retail competition plan in the United
States. 205 California's plan envisions giving all customers a choice of
199. Larger consumers have had retail choices pursuant to federal law since 1978. See su-
pra notes 176-83 and accompanying text.
200. See, e.g., CAL. A.B. No. 1890 (enacted Sept. 24, 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-1-27.3 (e)-(f)
(1997); In re Restructuring New Hampshire's Elec. Util. Indus., 175 P.U.R.4th 193, 249 (N.H.
Pub. Util. Comm'n 1997); In re Restructuring of the Elec. Util. Indus. in Vermont, 174 P.U.R.4th
409, 434 (Vt. Pub. Serv. Bd. 1996).
201. See Joseph F. Schuler, Jr., Residential Pilot Programs: Who's Doing, Who's Dealing?,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 1, 1997, at 16.
202. See ELEcTRiCITY PRIcEs, supra note 172, at 5 (noting Arkansas, Florida, Montana,
Tennessee and South Dakota were the only states as of December 1996 that had not initiated
activities to address the issue of electricity competition).
203. See Schuler, supra note 18 (describing key bills before Congress). The Clinton
Administration stepped into the fray with its own set of restructuring proposals in March 1998.
See Agis Salpukas, Power Deregulation: Shadow, Substance and Politics, N.Y. TmIES, Mar. 26,
1998, at D3.
204. Act of September 23, 1996, ch. 854, 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 854 (West) (A.B. 1890,
codified in scattered sections of CAL. CODE) (restructuring of public electric utilities) (available
in Westlaw database CA-LEGIS-OLD).
205. California's Public Utilities Commission began its investigation of the issue in 1992
and commenced a rulemaking in April 1994. It issued its policy decision in Spring 1996. See In
re Proposed Policies Governing Restructuring California's Elec. Servs. Indus. and Reforming
Regulation, 166 P.U.R.4th 1 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1996) [hereinafter California's Reforming].
While this decision envisioned that all customers would have retail choice opportunities within
five years, id. at 1, the Legislature shortened this to four years in Fall 1996, when it adopted
A.B. 1890.
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power suppliers after a four year transition period.26 Customers
under California's plan will have a variety of options. They "can
choose to purchase power according to default rates from their current
utility, through direct negotiated terms and conditions with compet-
ing non-utility retail electric service providers, or through brokers,
marketers, aggregators, and other retailers."2°7 A utility distribution
company, what has come in the industry to be known as a "DisCo,"
208
"will continue to procure power for those customers who do not want
to arrange their own retail contracts with non-utility suppliers."209
The DisCo seems similar to the traditional incumbent utility,
but it serves a completely different function in emerging competitive
retail markets. Like the traditional incumbent electric utility, it is a
provider of last resort power, but the DisCo is not necessarily the
power supplier. Instead, customers, through brokers or marketers,
can choose alternative suppliers. The DisCo gives these suppliers
access to its system for a fee, and its primary role will be to use ad-
vanced metering equipment to ensure that power supply on its system
is roughly equal to power demands at any given moment. However,
under California's retail competition plan, as with most, complete
DisCo divestiture of generation assets is not required: "Utilities will
continue to control and operate their distribution system, to own and
operate their generation assets (subject to some divestiture), and to
procure generation services for their energy service customers."210 In
addition, a DisCo or other utility may continue to own transmission,
although transmission will be operated by an Independent Service
Operator ("ISO"), which unifies the state's grid "to coordinate the
daily scheduling and dispatch activities of all market participants as
required to meet the critical objectives of providing open, nondiscrimi-
natory access to the transmission grid while preserving reliability and
achieving the lowest total cost for all uses of the transmission sys-
tem.))211
To the extent that the DisCo owns or controls generation as
well as transmission facilities, in California the DisCo is required to
206. See In re Proposed Policies Governing Restructuring Cal. Elec. Servs. Indus. and
Reforming Regulation, 177 P.U.R.4th 1, 6 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1997) [hereinafter
California's Restructuring] (adopting policies and rules to facilitate competition in California's
electric energy market).
207. Id.
208. See Fox-PENNER, supra note 71, at ch. 9 (discussing the roles of the DisCo in retail
markets).
209. California's Restructuring, 177 P.U.R.4th at 6.
210. California's Reforming, 166 P.U.R.4th at 79.
211. Id. at 14.
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bid into the power exchange, a market that is open to all suppliers,
including out of state suppliers and municipal utilities. The power
exchange, which has no financial interest in generation, is designed to
"foster and sustain the development of a transparent spot market for
the generation of electricity."212  It facilitates "the auction
determination of real time pricing of electricity and the transparent
manifestation of these price signals."213 Power needs for the DisCo's
incumbent customers who opt not to participate in the retail market,
in turn, must be purchased from the power exchange.21 4 California's
approach, known as the "PoolCo" model, provides a novel mechanism
for developing spot markets in electricity while also discouraging
incumbent DisCos from acting strategically to thwart consumer choice
of non-DisCo power.21 65 California's PoolCo approach is likely to prove
a model for other states addressing competition.2 6
With retail wheeling, increased vertical de-integration, and the
rise of contestable generation markets, some operational transaction-
cost efficiencies will also be lost. However, it is hoped that the evolu-
212. Id. at 13.
213. Id.
214. See id. at 26 (during transition period preceeding unbundling, "our investor owned
utilities should be required to bid all of their generation into the Power Exchange and satisfy
their need for electric energy on behalf of their full service customers with purchases made from
the Exchange").
215. The transmission restructuring debate, at both wholesale and retail levels, has fo-
cused on two main models for delivery of electricity: 1) direct access through bilateral transac-
tions, and 2) trading through a pool, known as "'PoolCo." Under direct access, consumers
negotiate directly with electricity sellers such as IPPs. All sellers have access to the transmis-
sion grid, which functions as a contract path to consummate transactions with buyers. This
may occur through a central informational clearinghouse, or through the assistance of brokers
and traders. The PoolCo approach differs in that buyers and sellers must trade through a
centralized power pool, which establishes a transparent market clearing price and dispatches
power according to the principles of economic dispatch. Under the PoolCo approach, the grid
also acts as a contract path, but it dispatches power on an integrated network basis. Spot prices
under the PoolCo approach are still set by the market, but the centralized pool ensures that a
robust market for power will develop. The leading advocate of the PoolCo approach is a
Harvard economist, William Hogan. See William W. Hogan, Electricity Transmission and
Emerging Competition: Why the FERC's Mega-NOPR Falls Short, PUB. UTIL. FORT., July 1,
1995, at 32. For discussions of the merits of the bilateral transaction/PoolCo debate, see SALLY
HUNT & GRAHAM SHUTTLEWORTH, COMPETITION AND CHOICE IN ELECTRICrrY 83-84 (1996)
(mildly favoring the PoolCo approach because it will help to evolve spot markets and has lower
relative litigation costs); Peter Navarro, A Guidebook and Research Agenda for Restructuring
the Electricity Industry, 16 ENERGY L.J. 347, 383-93 (1995) (surveying the debate and proposing
a PoolPlus alternative, which posts a menu of short, medium and long range prices).
216. California's power exchange opened on March 31, 1998. See Kenneth Howe, It's
Lights, Cameras and Deregulation, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 1, 1998, at Al (noting drop in average
price of electricity on first day of market's operation). Of course, not all of the reaction to
California's emerging electricity market has been positive. One well-recognized problem is
apathy among residential consumers. See Agis Salpukas, Power Deregulated. Consumers Yawn,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 26, 1998, at C1.
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tion of creative new transactional relationships will recapture some of
the operational efficiencies of integration without sacrificing price
efficiency. For example, a vertically de-integrated electricity industry
will create strong incentives for instant, spot and futures markets
in-as well as contractual purchases of-electricity.
Brokering and trading217 of electricity commodities, if appro-
priately implemented through a market such as California's power
exchange, could recapture the economies of vertical integration and
pooling without giving rise to the transaction costs associated with
complex long-term contracts or intra-firm vertical integration. This
will rely on efficient pricing mechanisms, such as implementing a
PoolCo system along with contracts for differences. Such an approach
would allow bilateral negotiations between buyers and sellers, as well
as participation in a PoolCo. For example, under this approach buy-
ers and sellers would negotiate a contract for differences, binding the
seller to provide power at four cents per kWh. If the PoolCo price is
five cents per kWh, the supplier gets five cents from the pool and
rebates one cent to the buyer. However, if the PoolCo price is three
cents per kWh, the generator gets three cents from the pool and one
cent from the buyer.218
So envisioned, in a competitive electricity market the coordina-
tion economies currently provided through vertical integration and
the state's grant of a franchise territory could occur automatically, if
individual brokers and traders were encouraged to competitively buy
and sell the various services they need or produce at various times
and locations. Market players need open and nondiscriminatory
access to markets for trading and dealing in, not just for wheeling,
electricity. Increasing the scope, membership, and pricing sophistica-
tion of utility dispatch, pooling, and economy energy trading processes
could eventually lead to the rise of open spot and futures markets in
electricity. Instant, spot and future trading markets can promote the
same operational economies as the traditional vertically-integrated
institutional infrastructure monopoly in the electricity industry.
There are analogues in other commodity contexts. For exam-
ple, crude oil is produced, moved, processed, and consumed by geo-
graphically dispersed and economically diversified buyers, sellers, and
transporters through complex, long-term bilateral agreements.
217. Brokers match buyers and sellers for a fee. Traders act as independent buyers and
sellers of electricity. Brokers bear none of the risk associated with supply obligations while
traders bear the contractual risk of meeting supply similar to present utility obligations to serve
their customers.
218. See Navarro, supra note 215, at 394.
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However, at any given instance, brokers and traders look for the most
economical way to use the industry's dispersed assets to meet total
dispersed demand. They do this by shifting production from one well
to another, processing from one refinery to another, and physical
shipments from one route to another, independent of pre-defined
contract paths. The fact that a producer (P) at a specific location (X)
has a contract to deliver oil to a customer at another location (Y) by
means of a specific tanker (T) does not mean that P will produce its
own oil at X and move it from X to Y in T.219 Oil contracts move
money, not oil. So too could competitive electricity markets move
money, not power.220
Commodity markets in electricity would not only encourage
operational efficiency, but would also enhance greater degrees of price
competition. In such a regime, energy prices must clear the market
instantaneously if generation is to be fully competitive. Traditional
rate regulation, based on the cost of providing service, inhibits prices
from increasing to market-clearing or rationing levels when demand
exceeds available capacity. Under traditional rate regulation, some
firms must have an obligation to maintain sufficient capacity to meet
under-priced demand during such periods. A competitive regime
would regard prices as technical devices that the industry uses to
manage its daily affairs. For the average customer, prices would
remain fairly stable. 221
In a competitive electricity regime, pooling companies would
provide economy dispatch and coordinate system marginal prices
("system lambda") with separately owned suppliers, DisCos, and
transmission utilities.222 Once all players have access to the same
system of regional spot markets, or PoolCos, energy contracts having
no direct effect on system operations or spot pricing can be written.
Each entity interacts directly with its local PoolCo to maximize profits
or minimize costs on a daily basis. Ex post payments between con-
tracting parties would maintain contractually specified results.
219. See generally STEWART L. BROWN & STEVEN ERRERA, TRADING ENERGY FUTURES: A
MANUAL FOR ENERGY INDUSTRY PROFESSIONALS (1987).
220. The wheeling money (not power) approach to power markets has been articulated in
Putnam, Bayes & Harlett's comments in FERC's transmission pricing inquiry. For a brief
summary of these comments, see Larry E. Ruff, Stop Wheeling and Start Dealing: Resolving the
Transmission Dilemma, ELECTRICITY J., June 1994, at 24.
221. Similarly, the overnight bank rates central banks use manage the money supply and
exchange rates. Even though interest rates in the banking system may occasionally surge to
several hundred percent per year for a day or two, the average customer remains unaffected.
222. See William W. Hogan, Contract Networks for Electric Power Transmission, 4 J. REG.
ECON. 211, 212 (1992) (suggesting the use of contract networks or short-term efficient pricing
and long-term firm use of a transmission network).
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Mechanisms such as futures and options contracts are already begin-
ning to allocate market or operational risks between contracting
parties by allowing the parties to hedge against risks.223
Such operational and pricing economies are being realized in
other countries. In the United Kingdom, the government established
the electricity Pool to create a spot market in electricity. The Pool
determines the prices for dispatch of power plants and provides a
forum for the setting of prices and distribution of payments for elec-
tricity traded. Such payments encourage developers to build generat-
ing capacity to meet peak demand.22 In Norway, where the electricity
industry has also undergone significant de-integration beginning with
the passage of restructuring legislation in 1990,225 electricity brokers
and traders have emerged as significant players in the Pool market,
which accounted for fifteen percent of electricity sales in 1993. The
futures market offers contracts on a weekly basis for a maximum of
five future years. Spot market purchases are based on prices that are
fixed for a period of twenty-four hours, and are established by the
Pool operator on the basis of individual supply and demand curves
communicated electronically by market participants. The Pool also
provides for instant market purchases, allowing participants (limited
to producers that can deliver electricity on fifteen minutes notice) to
adapt production to actual demand. After spot market prices have
been set, market participants are informed of their individual prices
and obligations (financial, not physical) for purchase, production, or
sale. Discrepancies are settled in the instant market.226 New Zealand
has instituted similar reforms. 2 7
223. In 1996, the New York Mercantile Exchange opened trading in electricity futures
contracts. For a discussion, see John R. Eshwiller & Kathryn Kranhold, What's All the Buzz
About Electricity Trading, WALL ST. J., July 9, 1998, at A2; Anna Godlewska et al., Price
Behavior in Electricity Futures: The Story So Far, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 1, 1997, at 32.
224. See John E. Kwoka, Jr., Transforming Power: Lessons from British Electricity
Restructuring, REGULATION, Summer 1997, at 47; Tim Woolf, Retail Competition in the
Electricity Industry: Lessons from the United Kingdom, ELECTRICITY J., May 1994, at 56, 57.
225. See Dan W. York, Competitive Electricity Market in Practice: Experience from Norway,
ELECTIcITY J., June 1994, at 48 (discussing recent Norwegian restructuring legislation). The
Act became effective January 1, 1991, although regulations necessary for complete operation of
the industry were not in place until May 1992. Large portions of Norway's system remain
under public ownership.
226. See id.; Alex Henney, The Global Evolution of Competitive Power Markets, PUB. UTIL.
FORT., Jan. 15, 1995, at 38.
227. See Vernon L. Smith, Can Electric Power-A "Natural Monopoly'--Be Deregulated, in
MAKING NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY 131 (Hans H. Landsberg ed., 1993).
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IV. RETAIL WHEELING AND UNIVERSAL SERVICE: REFIN(-ANC)ING THE
DUTY TO SERVE FOR A POST-PUBLIC UTILITY ERA
The dawn of competition in electricity raises a tension for the
common law duty to serve, historically protected by public utility
franchise and price regulation. This Part discusses the implications
of retail competition for the common law duty to serve. I argue that,
in competitive retail power and natural gas markets, the traditional
economic efficiency arguments in favor of imposing extraordinary
service obligations must be reassessed in light of structural modifica-
tions to the industry.28 If viewed purely from the economic efficiency
perspective, the content of the traditional public utility duty to serve
should be reassessed to fit the structure of a competitive power supply
market. To the extent extraordinary service obligations are continued
for natural gas and electricity in the same manner that they have
been for the past hundred years, regulators will need to articulate
alternative justifications outside of economic efficiency, such as fair-
ness or distributive justice.
Yet, regardless of the reasons supporting the perpetuation of
extraordinary service obligations, extraordinary service obligations
can facilitate access to power supply without undermining efficiency
gains, despite the warnings of free marketeers who look askance at
the continuation of a duty to serve in a competitive era in emerging
competitive retail power markets. At the same time, proposals en-
dorsed by many consumer advocates that suppliers or marketers
assume extraordinary service obligations are specious. Equal applica-
tion of a duty to every institutional actor providing electric utility
services in competitive retail markets will pose significant economic
costs and may thwart the development of retail power markets.
Regulators must acknowledge a need for new approaches to financing
extraordinary service obligations. The introduction of competition
will create a demand for distinct interim and longer-term mechanisms
for financing the duty to serve.
Along these lines, based upon a review of state retail
competition plans to date, this Part addresses the structural efficiency
of alternative proposals designed to continue ensuring access to utility
service for small residential customers in the face of retail choice.
Current state retail wheeling plans require, at a minimum, that the
228. The network system benefits argument, applicable to telecommunications, is less
problematic in a competitive market as an intellectual basis for supporting extraordinary serv-
ice obligations, but it also has its limits. See supra Part II.C.1.
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power distribution sector of the industry assume some extraordinary
service obligation. There is little agreement among the states,
though, about whether the various market institutions interacting
with the DisCo in retail markets should also bear extraordinary serv-
ice obligations. After evaluating some various state approaches, I
conclude that, in emerging retail power markets, a duty to serve can
continue to apply in competitive retail power markets with little
disruption to retail competition, but initially this obligation should be
limited to DisCos. Efficient financing of this obligation will require an
appropriately set system benefits charge ("SBC") on power
distribution, unbundling or mandated use of a PoolCo power exchange
to facilitate supply access, and properly set exit fees. The lesson of
electricity markets is generalizable to other network industries, such
as telecommunications and natural gas: In these industries, too,
unbundling or the development of a robust supply competitive market
clearinghouse, such as the PoolCo, can work to minimize the
structural inefficiencies of imposing a duty to serve and concomitant
financing mechanisms on incumbent distribution utilities.
At the same time, I conclude that in the long run, as retail
power markets flourish, the power distribution industry will
face-and, indeed, is already facing-increased pressure to become
competitive or contestable. As this pressure grows, regulators will be
forced to consider alternatives to an incumbent distribution utility
SBC to finance the duty to serve. Thus, I conclude that eventually
power markets will need to apply taxation mechanisms to power
consumption or supply in order to continue financing the duty to
serve. If appropriately structured, financing mechanisms can work to
minimize the distortions of the duty to serve in retail power markets,
allowing retail competition and the duty to serve to coexist.
A. Continuation of the Duty to Serve in Retail Markets: The Limits of
Economic Efficiency and the Importance of Distribution
Wholesale transmission access and competition among whole-
sale suppliers has not posed any immediate threat to the public utility
duty to serve,2 9 but the introduction of retail competition requires
229. Since FERC's Order No. 888, wholesale access and supply competition occur under
FERC's open access policies, which require a transmission utility to offer transmission service to
customers and suppliers at terms and conditions comparable to the service it offers its own
power supply. During prior times, competition at the wholesale level may have had potentially
adverse impacts on the duty to serve. See Bouknight & Raskin, supra note 23, at 239 (noting "to
the extent that existing obligations are inconsistent with a system of free and fair competition
the Congress and the FERC must address the issue").
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some reassessment of the intellectual foundations for and practical
application of the traditional duty to serve. The California Public
Utility Commission's first order leading to the adoption of retail
choice legislation acknowledged the need for consideration of this
issue as customers begin to shop for power:
To allow eligible customers to choose without restriction between the regulated
price for bundled utility service and the price offered by the generation services
market may severely reduce the utility's ability to plan for, and reliably serve,
its remaining customers. Absent modifications to the compact's traditional
duty to service, consumers may make choices about electric services which
they find economically attractive, but which are undesirable with respect to
the broader goal of allocating society's resources efficiently. 230
The possibility of such uneconomic bypass-bypass that might work
to lower costs for a single shopping customer while raising average
costs for other customers23L--may necessitate some consideration of
the costs of the traditional duty to serve. Moreover, a system that
allows power suppliers and customers to choose to deal with each
other, especially if left unregulated, may allow suppliers or distribu-
tors to elect never to serve certain classes of customers, such as low-
income residents, or to cease service however they wish consistent
with retail power sales agreements. In at least one state, concerns
over the implications of competition for the duty to serve and for
service quality more generally were cited as reasons not to pursue
retail competition for the present. 232 It should come as no surprise
that, in the telecommunications context, many observe a "conflict"
between the telcom analog to the duty to serve-universal serv-
ice-and retail competition.23
230. In re Proposed Policies Governing Restructuring of California's Elec. Servs. Indus. and
Reforming Regulation, 151 P.U.R.4th 73, 92 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1994).
231. For a discussion, see MacAvoy et al., supra note 28, at 244.
232. See In re Changes Occurring in the Elee. Indus., 172 P.U.R.4th 11, 13 (Idaho Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1996) (noting concern with a diminution of service in deregulated environment). The
Commission stated, "[i]f retail wheeling is permitted and customers choose, for a period of time,
to obtain power from other sources and then wish to return to the utility for service, a
legitimate question is whether the utility who [sic] was serving that customer is obligated to
serve them once again and if so, at what rates." Id. at 22.
233. See P. H. LONGSTAFF, TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPETITION AND UNIVERSAL SERVICE:
THE ESSENTIAL TRADEOFFS (1996) (noting tradeoffs between universal service goals and
competition); TOWARD COMPETITION, supra note 24, at 25 ("a goal that conflicts with economic
efficiency is the nearly ubiquitous target called 'universal service' "). But see ORGANISATION FOR
ECONOIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 38 UNIVERSAL SERVICE OBLIGATIONS IN A
COMPETITIVE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ENVIRONMENT 6 (1995) (concluding "competition and the
achievement of universal service objectives are not mutually exclusive nor necessarily in
conflict").
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1. The Challenge of Simultaneous Competition and Access
Of course, perceived conflicts between vigorous retail competi-
tion and customer access can be avoided to the extent that one of
these seemingly incompatible goals is simply abandoned. Because it
is not likely that the movement towards retail competition in tradi-
tional public utility industries will cease, one option in the face of the
tension between retail competition and common law service obliga-
tions is to abandon the duty to serve for electric power markets, treat-
ing electricity service as any other service in a competitive market.
After all, as retail markets open up, it will be increasingly possible for
suppliers and distributors to provide a variety of service qualities to
end users. Without a duty to serve, the electricity market might
operate much like other deregulated markets, such as trucking and
banking, which rely on contractual obligations and general consumer
protection laws to ensure service delivery. If a supplier refuses serv-
ice to a customer, the customer must find alternative suppliers, and
competition in power generation will likely provide customers a range
of power supply qualities.2 4 And, should a power distributor refuse to
extend or continue service to a customer because it is not profitable,
the customer may attempt to find alternatives. For example, alterna-
tives such as self-generation or wheeling around the DisCo may be'
cost feasible for large, heavy load customers of electricity. Markets,
after all, flourish with bilateral relationships; the duty to serve im-
poses a unilateral obligation on the incumbent utility. Customers in
such markets already have a variety of legal protections, including
credit financing and consumer protection statutes, such as the
Uniform Commercial Code.25
234. Some even suggest that traditional rate regulation has had an adverse effect on the
average quality of service. See ANDREW S. CARRON & PAUL W. MACAVOY, THE DECLINE OF
SERVICE IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES (1981) (chronicling a decline in service quality throughout
the 1970s). Notably, in England, which deregulated its electricity industry through privatiza-
tion in 1991, service disconnections fell by 95 percent over the first few years of deregulation.
See COSTELLO & GRANIERE, supra note 162, at 14.
235. For example, express and implied warranty protections appear in both state and fed-
eral law. See U.C.C. § 2-313 (1995) (express warranty); § 2-314 (1995) (implied warranty of
merchantability); § 2-315 (1995) (implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose); § 2-318
(1995) (extension of warranties to third party beneficiaries expected to use goods); see also 15
U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1994) (Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, regulating explicit and implied
warranties). In addition federal law prohibits "unfair methods of competition and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1994). All states have
similar statutes protecting against unfair trade acts. The federal Equal Credit Opportunity Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1691-1691e (1994), and the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994),
establish minimum standards that prevent discrimination in the granting of credit and
consumer safeguards; see also Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. ch. 41 (1994); Fair
Credit Debt Collection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (1994); Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C. §
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Yet, though a challenge, it is not an impossible task for regula-
tors to establish extraordinary service obligations in competitive retail
industries. Many insurance industries provide for universal service
through various sorts of assigned risk pools. For example, the prop-
erty insurance industry has developed Fair Access to Insurance
Requirements ("FAIR") plans.236 In the hospital industry, the obliga-
tion of hospitals to serve the indigent is explicitly made a condition in
the awarding of federal construction grants.27 Nonprofit health care
providers take on an obligation to provide indigent health care, in
part as a condition to the grant of certain governmental benefits, such
as federal, state, or local tax benefits.28 Although it may be ques-
tionable how successful these approaches to promoting universal
service have been, the experience in these industries suggests that the
conffict between retail competition and universal service is not new.
Those who look askance at the duty to serve in the age of competition
refuse the enormous challenge it poses, but the challenge is not an
insurmountable barrier.
To date, those states that have addressed retail competition in
power markets express an awareness of the potential tension between
the common law duty to serve and competitive retail markets without
abandoning either goal. The preamble to California's 1996 retail
wheeling legislation states, "[i]t is the further intent of the
Legislature to continue to fund low-income ratepayer assistance pro-
grams... in an unbundled manner" and maintains 1996-level low-
1637 (1994). State regulation of finance charges, credit terms and the federal Truth in Lending
Act ('TILA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f) (1994), have historically not applied to public utilities because
these laws contain a stricter definition of credit designed to capture transactions in which both
parties intend that payment will be delayed and finance charges imposed as a part of a
lengthened payment schedule. In competitive markets, though, retail electricity suppliers and
distributors may devise payment plans that resemble credit sale transactions or sponsor open-
ended credit plans for the sale of electricity which could trigger TILA disclosure and disputed
bill procedures.
236. The FAIR plan was created under the Urban Property Protection and Reinsurance Act
of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 555 (1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5,
12, 15 & 42 U.S.C.). For a discussion, see Regina Austin, The Insurance Classification
Controversy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 517 (1983).
237. The Hill-Burton Act conditions the fimding of hospital construction on the provision of
uncompensated care to indigent citizens. See 42 U.S.C. § 291 (1994). In addition, a federal law
called the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, adopted in 1986, requires
Medicare-participating hospitals to examine and stabilize all emergency room patients and
women in labor. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1994).
238. See generally James B. Simpson & Sarah D. Strum, How Good a Samaritan? Federal
Income Tax Exemption for Charitable Hospitals Reconsidered, 14 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 633,
633 (1991) (examining whether charitable hospitals provide enough of a benefit to the commu-
nity to justity such tax exemptions).
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income and universal service expenditures. 239 New Hampshire, which
considered similar legislation, is more explicit:
A restructured electric utility industry should provide adequate safeguards to
assure universal service. Minimum residential customer service safeguards
and protections should be maintained. Programs and mechanisms that enable
residential customers with low incomes to manage and afford essential elec-
tricity requirements should be included as a part of industry restructuring.
240
The task of formulating extraordinary service obligations should not
preclude consideration of retail competition by states, nor should it
necessarily lead to the abandonment of extraordinary service obliga-
tions. In fact, the introduction of retail competition may even lead to
enhancement of consumer protection obligations, perhaps from fear of
the abuses markets may yield. In Ohio, for example, the considera-
tion of retail competition has mobilized consumer protection interests,
leading to the proposal of minimum electricity service standards for
the first time in the state's history.21
2. Rationales for the Duty to Serve and Its Application to the DisCo
At least in the short run, for small load customers, such as
residential customers, small business, and single location offices,
power distribution is considered to remain a natural monopoly serv-
ice. Put another way, a single utility will continue to provide distri-
bution to power supply for the large bulk of power customers. So, for
most smaller customers who do not have access to capital financing
markets or own rights of way to build transmission lines, it is cost
prohibitive to duplicate distribution lines if the incumbent DisCo
itself owns the facilities.242 Thus, even in competitive retail markets,
DisCos will initially remain natural monopolies for residential and
small commercial customers, at least with respect to the horizontal
distribution market.243 Following California's approach, to date every
239. Act of September 23, 1996, ch. 854, 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 854, at § 1(d) (West)
(A.B. 1890, codified in scattered sections of CAL. CODE) (restructuring of public electric utilities)
(available in Westlaw database CA-LEGIS-OLD).
240. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 374-F:3 V (1997).
241. See Ohio Regs Set Service Standards, ELECTRICITY DAILY, Feb. 9, 1998; Alan Johnson,
State Board Sets Service Standards for Ohio's Electric Companies, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Feb. 6,
1998, at 4E; see also Simpson, supra note 108 (noting that Illinois' restructuring legislation
contains new low-income customer assistance charges).
242. As Vernon Smith has argued, however, joint ventures may work to solve this problem.
See Smith, supra note 227.
243. See Fox-PENNER, supra note 71, at 88 (citing recent reports by FERC and the Office of
Technology Assessment, as well as the conclusions of Joskow & Schmalensee, supra note 135).
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state retail wheeling plan treats power distribution in this manner by
defining a de jure monopoly for distribution,m subject to fairly tradi-
tional regulation, effectively defining a new regulatory compact that is
limited to power distribution.? 5
Further, to date every state that has seriously considered
moving to retail competition in the sale of electricity has determined
that the DisCo must provide a "basic service" option to those who do
not choose an alternative supplier for electricity, are refused service
by a retail supplier, or have been disconnected.2 6 In some states, this
will be regulated at a rate established to be less than the rates imme-
diately prior to competition, thus minimizing the impact of stranded
costs on small residential customers.2 7
For example, according to Vermont's retail competition re-
structuring order, "exclusive franchises for distribution" remain nec-
essary.248 The DisCo "will retain its obligation to plan, build, and
operate its local distribution system in a manner that ensures safe
and reliable service to customers."M9 Vermont defines the "Basic
Service Offer" as "[s]ervice offered to customers by the distribution
company but provided by a retail service provider through contract."2o
This service "[m]ay be priced either to float with the spot market or
However, not everyone agrees. See Smith, supra note 227. As I suggest below, some degree of
competition in power distribution will likely evolve. See infra Part P1.C.
244. FERC's Order No. 888 offered a seven-factor test for distinguishing between distribu-
tion facilities and transmission facilities. According to FERC, local distribution facilities:
1) are within close proximity of retail customers;
2) are primarily radial in character;
3) have power flowing into them, but rarely have power flowing out;
4) do not reconsign or transport power on to some other market;
5) allow for consumption of power that has entered their systems within a comparatively
restricted geographic area;
6) rely on meters to measure flows;
7) are reduced voltage.
See 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,620 (1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35 & 385).
245. For discussion, see infra Part IV.B.
246. Basic service or the standard offer is independent of a "safety net" provided in many
states for low-income customers. Unlike the safety net, basic service or the standard offer is
designed to provide stable electricity service without major price fluctuations while, at the same
time, providing sufficient education about the available options and benefits of retail competi-
tion in electricity-to stimulate consumer choice and interest. This approach to ensuring
service access is similar to the minimum standard of coverage recommended in health care
reform. See John D. Rockefeller IV, A Call for Action: The Pepper Commission's Blueprint for
Health Care Reform, 265 JAMA 2507, 2509 (May 15, 1991) (providing recommendations for
universal medical coverage).
247. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-1-27.3(d)-(f) (1997); In re Elec. Util. Indus.
Restructuring, Docket No. 95-462 (Main Pub. Util. Comm'n 1996).
248. In re Restructuring of the Elec. Util. Indus., 174 P.U.R.4th 409, 434 (Vt. Pub. Serv. Bd.
1996).
249. Id.
250. Id. at 488.
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fixed on a longer-term basis."251  After the transition to retail
competition this offer, which is limited to franchised customers of
DisCos, "will be made available over a contracted period" and
"through a retail service provider."252
Since retail competition envisions the fragmentation of utility
service into different markets, from generation to transmission to
distribution, the implications of continuing the duty to serve will need
to be assessed in the context of each of these markets. Given power
distribution's de jure monopoly status under state retail wheeling
plans, most state regulators, with little or no analysis, look initially to
the DisCo as the primary bearer of the traditional duty to serve.
However, given the inapplicability of the traditional rate regulation
framework for understanding service obligations in the competitive
market structure and the mobilization of interests likely to support
imposition of new service obligations, the economic efficiency ration-
ales for continuing to impose an extraordinary service obligation on
the incumbent utility require reassessment.
Consider, first, the economic rationales for imposing service
extension obligations. Because the DisCo maintains a horizontal
monopoly with respect to rights of way and essential network facili-
ties, most customers will continue to require its distribution service.
At the same time, the DisCo will be in a better position than suppliers
or others to spread the costs of service extension, minimizing the eco-
nomic impact of the distribution network on customers, particularly
the poor. Customers, on average, are likely to have higher marginal
utilities of money than the DisCo, so imposing upon the DisCo an
obligation to provide service and spread the costs may maximize so-
cial welfare. Even in a competitive retail market, economic efficiency
rationales for requiring the DisCo to extend its distribution network
to customers seem relevant. It should be noted, though, that in a
deregulated environment where power supply is competitive, the
access and cost spreading rationales for the extension obligation apply
to distribution service only, not to competitively provided power
supply. Put another way, despite an economic rationale for requiring
the DisCo to assume some distribution service extension obligation,
economic analysis does not necessarily require the DisCo to also pro-
vide power supply. Thus, without further exploration of the structure
of retail power markets, there does not appear to be a strong economic
rationale for requiring the DisCo to build generation facilities or
251. Id.
252. Id. at 427.
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procure power supply to serve customers. Nevertheless, to the extent
regulators decide to impose basic service obligations on some institu-
tional actor in competitive power markets, the DisCo may also be in
the best position to spread the costs associated with basic service.
With respect to service continuation, the second obligation of
the traditional duty to serve, the economic efficiency rationales behind
the obligation also require some reassessment. Recall that one of the
primary economic efficiency rationales for imposing extraordinary
service continuation obligations relates to the utility's status as the
superior risk-bearer vis-A-vis the customer. 25 3 In deregulated power
markets, however, the long-term contract analogy, which undergirds
application of superior risk-bearer analysis to the regulatory compact,
loses much of its relevance, since customers themselves may select
power suppliers on a month-to-month basis.
Further, in a competitive retail market, the same rationales
cannot justify imposition of an obligation on a private firm to provide
full service below cost, as often applied under rate regulation.254 Now,
as has been observed, there may be some continuing advantage to
avoiding power shut-off to the extent that a customer is able to pay
the variable portion of the costs associated with the supply and distri-
bution of power.2 5 This cost sharing advantage, however, is signifi-
cantly reduced in a competitive market in which power suppliers face
alternative customers for their capacity; it may apply to distribution
service, but, absent excess capacity committed to DisCo customers, it
does not apply to power supply.
Despite these structural and regulatory differences between a
competitive market and the traditional regulated industry, some
efficiency arguments support imposition of a service continuation
obligation on the DisCo or other suppliers in a competitive environ-
ment. First, with respect to service discontinuation, the physics of
power flow may require the DisCo to bear some responsibility if its
grid has not been modernized. Once power is supplied to a distribu-
tion grid without computerized customer metering, the DisCo is
automatically the supplier of last resort to the retail customer; the
customer will continue to receive power until it is physically discon-
nected by the DisCo. In certain areas, technology may necessitate
some DisCo service continuation obligation.
253. See supra Part 1.C.2. Of course, to the extent that utility risk-bearing is desirable, a
cost spreading rationale applies as well.
254. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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A second rationale for imposition of a service continuation
obligation is that power markets may yield poor information.
Assuming that customers have good information about power supply
options and the terms of power supply sales contracts, when com-
pared to the DisCo, the customer will be the superior bearer of the
risks of service shut-off. The customer can purchase supply plans
that provide for early warning or, if necessary, insurance to cover the
risks of property or other damage due to a loss of power. Many cus-
tomers, though, may not have adequate information about power
supply markets so as to react to the risks of shut-off, particularly
where shut-off is due to technological failure or emergencies. In addi-
tion, in competitive power markets, consumers are unlikely to imme-
diately possess the knowledge or experience to react to this informa-
tion when some action, such as the purchasing of power insurance or
backup supply options, is in order. Poor information or consumer
discounting of risks may require the DisCo or a supplier to assume
some service continuation obligation, even in a competitive power
supply market. This will especially be true as these markets initially
evolve and as regulators embark on the task of educating consumers.
Further, given that a welfare system already exists in our
market economy, the imposition of service continuation obligations in
a competitive power supply market might work to mitigate the incen-
tives the welfare system produces for taking excessive credit risks. As
competitive power markets evolve, consumers are likely to be offered
credit financing plans for electricity akin to many of the financing
plans available for other purchases, such as purchase of an automo-
bile. Offerers of such sales are likely to provide creative financing
options, often offering consumers who are poor credit risks high-cost
financing plans. Such risks, to the extent they are repeatedly pre-
sented to low-income consumers in a competitive power supply mar-
ket, will also increase the incidence of default, especially because
utilities will not face the same incentives as under rate regulation to
continue service with acceptance of partial payment. As customers
increasingly default and lose the basic necessities of life, such as elec-
tricity service, over time this could both drive up the cost of the wel-
fare system and undermine its poverty reduction goal.256 Thus, impo-
sition of a service continuation obligation, even in a competitive mar-
256. See generally Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the
Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limits on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J.
LEGAL STUD. 283 (1995) (stating that the laws that restrict contractual freedom are desirable
because they deter the risky behavior encouraged by the welfare system).
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ket, might be seen as a way of reducing the costs of other public
welfare programs.
Though some reassessment is necessary, economic efficiency
arguments for continuing with some extraordinary service obligations
in competitive markets are not completely irrelevant. To the extent
economic arguments exist, though, they relate primarily to horizontal
integration and the quality of information consumers will likely pos-
sess, because with retail competition, the market facilitates many of
the transactions which the traditional public utility previously coordi-
nated within a single, vertically integrated firm. Weaknesses with
the economic efficiency rationales for the traditional duty to serve
aside, to the extent regulators continue to adhere to the constituent
obligations of the common law duty to serve, they will also likely need
to articulate non-efficiency justifications, such as fairness or
distributive justice. In this sense, retail competition is likely to force
more explicit discussion of the costs and benefits of extraordinary
service obligations than occurred under the traditional regulatory
compact. For example, in Ohio the discussion of consumer service
protections has become explicit with the dawn of competition, while
previously consumer protections were sometimes built into utility
tariffs on a voluntary basis.257
To the extent a duty to serve continues to apply to the indus-
try, for whatever reasons, competitively priced retail power markets
will work to minimize many of the price distortions of cross-
subsidization historically associated with extraordinary service
obligations. Under a rate regulation regime, utility service
obligations were paid for through cross-subsidization, but rate
regulation helped to minimize the market distortions caused by this
practice. Utilities generally were not opposed to taking on service
obligations, especially where they worked to enlarge the customer
base, so long as they could recover the costs of these obligations from
some customers. With retail competition and a movement to market-
based pricing, cross-subsidization will continue to exist, but power
supply markets will require DisCos to minimize the impact of
subsidies on customers or risk losing customers, especially larger
ones, to bypass or other suppliers wheeling on the DisCo system.25 8
257. See supra note 241. For reasons discussed supra Part II.C, regulated utilities did not
face disincentives for assuming these obligations, as their cost could easily be recovered through
regulated rates.
258. Of course, not all DisCos are willing to accept the service obligations absent some
compensation guarantee. See George R. Pleat, Should Metering Stay at the Stand-Alone Disco,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 1, 1998, at 44 (MThe most dangerous position for the disco would be as
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Most DisCos are attempting to cover some or all of the cost of
extraordinary access (along with the costs of environmental
programs) through an SBC for which the retail customers who have
power delivered via the distribution system pay. FERC has observed,
"the authority of state commissions to address retail stranded costs is
based on their jurisdiction over local distribution facilities and the
service of delivering electric energy to end users."259 So long as states
are regulating distribution service, there is some basis for a state-
imposed charge and it is unlikely that this will be preempted under
the Federal Power Act.
While imposition of extraordinary service obligations on the
DisCo is a common and noncontroversial element of each state retail
wheeling plan to date, its implementation poses new problems for
regulators. First, is limiting imposition of extraordinary service obli-
gations to the DisCo the best way to ensure an efficient power supply,
or should regulators attempt to find ways to shift some of the extraor-
dinary service obligations to power suppliers or marketers? Second,
absent the traditional levels of vertical integration, how is the DisCo
to obtain basic service power and ensure reliability for incumbent
customers? Will it have an obligation to provide power supply from
generators it owns or operates, or should the DisCo have some other
mechanism for shifting the risk of supply shortage to power suppliers
or others? If the former should be the case, residential and small
commercial customers are unlikely to see many of the benefits of
retail competition. However, because DisCos may have little notice of
power needs-and no time to notify suppliers-it may be a challenge
for them to plan for reliable power. Third, and most important, how
will service obligations be paid for? Structuring this SBC is likely to
be the subject of rate design debate, but in the long run the SBC will
become unworkable if power distribution becomes structurally
competitive. Regulators, then, will be required to look to alternative
financing mechanisms for consumer access.
B. Refin(-anc)ing the Duty to Serve to Fit Competition in
Emerging Retail Power Markets
Study of the state retail competition plans to date suggests
that the scope of extraordinary service obligations and their financing
the backstop provider to customers not effectively served by the market. This scenario is almost
assured if the disco doesn't convince those in power to remove the obligation to serve.").
259. New England Power Co., 75 F.E.R.C. (CCH) 61,356 n.14 (1996).
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will be tantamount to the widespread success of retail competition.260
The most controversial questions are who will bear the responsibility
for providing basic service; how, if at all, will those providing basic
service be regulated to avoid anti-competitive conduct; and how will
basic service be financed?
Several institutional arrangements have already been consid-
ered by regulators addressing, these questions: First, regulators can
require all suppliers or retailers to set aside a portion of their power
to provide a pool of basic service; second, regulators or courts can
apply the telcom model to the DisCo, choosing suppliers for the
provision of basic service via a ballot system; third, regulators can
assign basic service obligations to power suppliers following a
competitive bidding auction conducted under regulated terms; fourth,
as some consumer advocates have suggested, regulators could assign
the obligation to power suppliers in proportion to their market share,
similar to residual assignment of risks in insurance markets. This
Part addresses the risks and costs associated with these proposals as
alternatives for providing reliable service to small residential
customers of electricity.
As I shall argue, while all of these approaches are operation-
ally feasible for maintaining residual service levels adequate to serve
residential and small commercial customer DisCo service obligations,
each poses some significant economic costs for emerging power mar-
kets. Thus, as an alternative proposal, I suggest imposition of a duty
to serve in the form of a basic service obligation on the DisCo, which
could then voluntarily procure its own power-a proposal recently
adopted in New Hampshire. Voluntary DisCo procurement, if fi-
nanced through an SBC and coupled with unbundling or mandatory
participation in a PoolCo power exchange, such as California's, is the
most efficient structural alternative for ensuring efficient, reliable
power for residential customers. As compared to its alternatives,
voluntary DisCo procurement holds promise for promoting economic
efficiency in electricity service, as well as in other competitive retail
260. One consumer advocate notes that customers are unwilling to participate in new natu-
ral gas markets without some assurance from regulators that they will be protected:
Besides the meager financial incentive for a New York residential customer to switch
gas companies, there is another factor contributing to the slow headway being made by
gas marketers: The New York Public Service Commission failed to establish a level
playing field with just and reasonable terms of sale. Instead, the commission built a
two-tier system allowing degraded competitive service lacking in protection for custom-
ers.
Norlander, supra note 2, at 8.
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markets for traditional public utility services, while also passing
through these efficiencies to the average consumer.
1. A Mandatory Power Supply Pool: Applying Extraordinary Service
Obligations to Suppliers or Marketers of Power
A recent analysis of the tension between the traditional duty to
serve and competition in electricity, commissioned by the Department
of Energy, notes that "the extent to which an obligation to serve at-
taches, as well as the definition of what precisely that definition en-
tails, will depend upon which part of the industry-distribution or
generation-is being addressed."261 That analysis maintains, how-
ever, that "[aiffirmative obligations should attach to each part of the
industry."262 According to this analysis, extraordinary service obliga-
tions should attach to both generators and DisCos, and possibly to
marketers or brokers of power.
One mechanism to ensure adequate power supply for a DisCo
to meet its basic service obligation is to create a basic service power
supply pool. Pursuant to this approach, each GenCo that wishes to
compete for basic service-including the DisCo, if it owns or operates
generation-would be required to commit a portion of the power it
produces to this pool; the DisCo, in turn, could draw from this pool to
meet basic service needs. The mandatory supply pool has the advan-
tage of providing a reliable source of power to meet basic service
needs, and it assists the DisCo in meeting its service obligations in
competitive retail markets. The idea behind the mandatory supply
pool is to unbundle DisCo-supplied power from distribution service,
avoiding some of the incentives generation-owning DisCos may have
to sell customers their own power rather than encouraging customer
participation in the competitive power supply market.
So conceived, though, the mandatory supply pool has several
drawbacks from an efficiency perspective. The mandatory basic serv-
ice supply pool would provide no opportunity for basic service custom-
ers to participate in the market; basic service customers would pur-
chase power from the DisCo. The DisCo may acknowledge the basic
service pool on the customer's bill, but there would be no way to iden-
tify the specific supplier of the customer's power. Thus, the manda-
tory power pool would do little to educate customers as to the benefits
261. COLTON, supra note 12, at 45.
262. Id.
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of retail competition or to encourage customer participation in com-
petitive power supply markets.
A second problem with the mandatory basic service pool is that
it risks price distortion in the power supply market. Because power
suppliers would be required to contribute a portion of power to the
pool, the pool would effectively create a secondary market for power.
As is discussed below, this market could succeed if power were priced
based on the spot market for power, but establishing a supply pool
without setting up an appropriate market exchange would contribute
to high levels of volatility in basic service prices. Alternatively, if the
price for basic service pool power is fixed or regulated, this could work
to distort the primary power market or encourage customers to en-
gage in strategic gaming, leaving the DisCo's system whenever mar-
ket prices are significantly lower than the price of basic service.
A final problem with the mandatory supply pool, so conceived,
is that it extends a portion of the power service obligation to power
suppliers. This issue is likely to be highly contested in the states in
the coming years, as states begin to license new power suppliers in
proceedings that will differ from traditional certificate of convenience
and necessity proceedings where a franchise area has been defined.263
Some states are likely to require, as a condition to issuance of the
license, commitment to extraordinary service obligations by the gen-
erator. In fact, some states have already built extraordinary power
supply obligations into their restructuring plans. For example,
Illinois' restructuring legislation makes perhaps the strongest exten-
sion of extraordinary service obligations to power supply markets. In
Illinois, prior to participating in the competitive retail power market,
power suppliers must certify to state regulators that they are willing
to serve the portion of the incumbent utility's customers that they are
proposing to displace, essentially agreeing to maintain the incumbent
utility's service obligations.264 Yet power supply is a structurally
competitive market; bilateral contractual relationships between sup-
pliers, customers, marketers, and brokers establish obligations to
263. See In re Electricity Generation Customer Choice & Competition Act-Licensing
Requirements for Elec. Generation Suppliers, 176 P.U.R.4th 25, 28 (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n
1997) (requiring generators, marketers, and brokers wishing to supply services in Pennsylvania
to apply for a license, but leaving universal service issues for regulators to address "as they are
appropriate in future Commission proceedings"); see also N.J. Bill Would Require Suppliers to
Set Up Offices, MEGAWATr DAILY, Jan. 21, 1998 (observing that the New Jersey bill requires, as
a condition to licensing, setting up a staffed office within the state and providing bonds to
ensure financial viability).
264. See H.R. 362, 90th Gen. Assembly, 1997-98 Regular Sess. (Ill. 1997); Electric Service
Consumer Choice and Rate Relief Act of 1997, H.B. 362 (act effective Dec. 16, 1997), at § 16-115
(to be codified at 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-115).
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provide service or pay damages, so the economic efficiency rationales
for encumbering this market with a full-fledged unilateral duty to
serve are weak. None of the horizontal integration rationales for a
service obligation, relating to network efficiencies, apply to suppliers.
The DisCo is likely to be a superior risk-bearer than suppliers, be-
cause it has better information about its customers' needs and is
therefore better-positioned to meet customer needs by participating as
a wholesale buyer of power on long-term contract and in the spot and
futures markets. It is also in a better position to recover the costs of
basic service from its customers.
In addition, some states also provide that brokers and market-
ers, or RetailCos, are subject to service obligations. For example,
Vermont, in its restructuring order, imposes upon the DisCo a service
continuation obligation. According to the Vermont order, "[a]t this
time, we propose that disconnects should be permitted only when
customers have failed to pay their Disco charges, including charges
associated with the Disco Basic Service Offer."265  With respect to
disconnection, the Vermont Pubic Service Board determined that
service should not be disconnected for nonpayment of a RetailCo's bill,
but that RetailCos are required to notify both the DisCo and retail
customer prior to service discontinuation.266 Consumer advocates in
New York have taken a more aggressive position in the emerging
retail natural gas markets, suing the state Public Service Commission
to require it to subject gas marketers to service obligations as "gas
corporations" subject to the full range of utility service obligations
under New York's consumer protection laws.267
Yet, unlike power distribution, multiple brokers and marketers
will not likely serve a single geographic area, and customers will have
some selection of brokers and marketers. Basic service is intended as
a default-a fall back option-for customers who opt not to participate
in the power supply market. As with power supply markets,
encumbering retail marketers or brokers with service obligations will
thwart competition in these markets. Although it is unclear exactly
265. In re Restructuring of the Elec. Util. Indus. in Vermont, 174 P.U.R.4th. 409, 465 (Vt.
Pub. Serv. Bd. 1996).
266. See id. "Both the Disco and the retail customer will be notified of a date on which
service is to be terminated, at which point service under a Disco's Basic Service Offer shall
begin. Retail service providers will be permitted to require reasonable deposits or appropriate
credit references before providing service." Id.
267. See Norlander, supra note 2. New York's PSC explicitly rejected these arguments in
Proceeding on Motion of the Comm'n to Address Issues Associated with the Restructuring of the
Emerging Competitive Natural Gas Market, Case 93-G-0932, 1996 WL 159878, at *8 (N.Y. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1996).
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how states will regulate RetailCos, such entities will be subject to
laws governing deceptive marketing practices and contractual
obligations, so regulators need not duplicate this legal structure
beyond perhaps requiring the filing of marketer contracts to facilitate
monitoring of marketing practices, such as slamming.268 Compared to
marketers and brokers, the DisCo is in a better position to spread the
costs of expansion in its service area and to bear the risks and spread
the costs of nonpayment or power shortages.
Neither power suppliers nor retail marketing or brokerage
firms should be subject to extraordinary service obligations, because
the DisCo is in the best position to bear this obligation while also
providing competitive power options to its customers. Of course,
power suppliers and marketers may need to be subject to state regis-
tration, perhaps through a modest licensing procedure, in order to
evaluate market practices. However, such a registration system need
not, as a term of participation, require the suppliers and marketers to
agree to extraordinary service obligations beyond contract and con-
sumer protection laws. To the extent it does, regulators will have
imposed a duty to serve on all segments of the industry, regardless of
structural market differences.
2. The Telcom Model
Another model for facilitating a DisCo service obligation is to
borrow, by analogy, from the approach the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") applied to local exchange carriers to facilitate
the development of the long-distance markets following the breakup
of AT&T. The settlement of the Department of Justice's antitrust
action against AT&T required AT&T to divest its local Bell Operating
Companies ("BOCs") and required the BOCs to provide "equal ac-
cess'-access "equal in type, quality, and price" to that provided by
AT&T and its affiliates-to all long-distance carriers wishing to pro-
vide service on local networks. 269 At the time of the settlement, local
268. Slamming, now a well-known problem in the competitive long-distance telephone
market, is the unauthorized switching of service by suppliers. See SAUNDERS ET AL., supra note
19, at 350-51. Of course, the state regulatory commission may be the best institution to monitor
these practices as competitive markets are evolving. To protect against such problems,
California has recently adopted new registration rules for all energy service providers, including
marketers, aggregators, and brokers, and has provided a procedure for filing customer
complaints against these new market actors. See California Adopts Tough New Registration
Rules for All Energy Service Providers, ENERGY SERVICES & TELCOM REP., Apr. 9, 1998, at 1.
269. See United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 227 (D.D.C. 1982).
The BOCs could operate within the local market, but could not themselves provide long-distance
service. See id.
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service consumers could access only AT&T as a long-distance provider
unless they used a special code, sometimes adding as many as ten
digits to their calls.270 In the court's Modification of Final Judgement,
this was found to have a "significant negative impact on competit-
ion"271 and a predesignation system for designating a long-distance
carrier was ordered. 272 This system allowed customers to choose a
long-distance carrier in advance of their monthly service. 273
The predesignation system worked well for consumers who
affirmatively chose their own long-distance carriers. Initially, the
Modification of Final Judgment allowed a local exchange carrier to
designate AT&T the long-distance carrier by default.2 74 But, in an
order issued in response to the anticompetitive allegations of competi-
tors, the FCC found this default practice to be uncompetitive and
unfair and implemented a uniform pro rata allocation plan.275
Under the pro rata allocation plan, local exchange carriers
mailed each customer a ballot to select the preferred long-distance
carrier. If a customer failed to select a carrier, one would be assigned
on a pro rata basis. This allowed AT&T long-distance competitors
greater access to retail customers and encouraged new competition for
retail long-distance service. The ballot allocation plan enhanced
competition by increasing consumer awareness of services available
from the various providers and gave long-distance carriers an incen-
tive to offer a variety of competitive services to attract new customers.
Similarly, in implementing basic service for the competitive
retail electricity markets, regulators could mandate that customers
choose the provider of basic service via a ballot system, randomly
spreading those who have not selected a supplier through the ballot
system among suppliers who have registered with the state regula-
tory authority and who have expressed a willingness to take such
customers. As in the telcom context, such an approach would work to
enhance consumer awareness of competition and supply competition
for retail customers. An advantage of this approach over the manda-
270. See id. at 197 (noting "[1]ong distance calls may presently be placed over the AT&T
network by dialing ten or eleven digits while twenty-two or twenty-three digits are necessary to
use the facilities of other interexchange carriers.").
271. Id.
272. See id. at 232.
273. See id.
274. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 578 F. Supp. 668, 676 (D. D.C. 1983) (allowing
"each operating Company to route to AT&T the calls of any customer who.., has failed to make
a selection of an interexchange carrier").
275. See In re Investigation of Access and Divestiture Related Tariffs, 101 F.C.C.2d 911,
915 (1985) (stating that default is unreasonable and against public interest because it favors one
long-distance carrier over another without a showing of necessity).
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tory power supply pool is that it allows customers to see changes in
suppliers on their bills, thus educating them about the nature of de-
veloping power markets.
Yet, as is well-recognized today, the experience of developing
long-distance markets under the ballot allocation mechanism in the
telcom context had disappointing results. Following the implementa-
tion of balloting, eighty percent of customers that made a selection
chose AT&T, ten percent chose MCI, and four percent chose Sprint,
leaving AT&T the dominant firm with approximately seventy percent
of the total market.2 6 Despite the pro rata allocation policy, AT&T
was able to reap enormous benefits at the onset of competition
because of recognition of its brand name and the continued existence
of price regulation.
Despite this problem with AT&T's market share, which since
has declined further, the ballot and spread approach may be an im-
provement over a mandatory basic service supply pool. One advan-
tage is that customers, to the extent they read their power bills, may
see a change in supplier, and thus may learn something about the
availability of choice in the market. However, to implement the ballot
and spread approach to supply allocation in retail electricity markets,
regulators will need to address pricing of power selected via ballot or
allocated via market share. In addition, in the electricity context, the
issue of power deficiencies must be addressed: in the case of a short-
age, or of a supplier not meeting its pro rata obligation, does the
DisCo have an obligation to make up power deficiency, or will that
obligation lay with the supplier? If the former, the DisCo is required
to hold in reserve a portion of the power it generates, favoring DisCo
power over competitively supplied power for basic service and reduc-
ing the ability of DisCo-owned generation to compete in power supply
markets. If the latter, this approach, like the mandatory pool, will
extend some of the service obligation to power supply markets, risking
distortion of the competitive power supply market.
3. DisCo Competitive Bidding with Cost Pass-Through
An alternative approach to meeting basic service obligations,
adopted by Vermont and Rhode Island, is to mandate that the DisCo
arrange, by bid, for basic service from one or more retail suppliers.
276. See Kerry Diehl & Rich Gillman, Why Your Customers Switch: Loyalty May Depend
More on Age Group Than Anything Else, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Apr. 15, 1997, at 37, 39 (tracking
customer intent and loyalty); see also Peter W. Barnes & Richard Koenig, GTE's Sprint Expected
to Feel Pressure from Challenge Posed by IBM-MCI Link, WALL ST. J., June 27, 1985, at 2.
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This requires the DisCo to assume responsibility for arranging the
service, but customers here would also see a change in the electricity
supplier on their monthly bills.
For example, the Vermont restructuring order provides that
the Basic Service Offer, provided by DisCos, "may be provided
through an affiliated retail service company. This will be possible
provided that its rates are determined through an open, competitive
bidding process managed by the distribution company or through
some other appropriate market-based determination (ultimately,
reviewed by the DPS and Board)."277 As a general manner, Vermont
DisCos are not permitted to own interests in generation, but DisCos
may own interests in generation to meet their basic service offer-to
ensure that customers have at least one power choice.278
Rhode Island has adopted a more explicit bidding approach.
As a part of its Standard Offer for customers who have not opted to
enter into power supply arrangements with unregulated suppliers,
DisCos are required to arrange for a "last resort" power supplier.279
Rhode Island requires each DisCo to "periodically solicit bids from
nonregulated power producers for such service at market prices plus a
fixed contribution from the electric distribution company."280 Bids
requiring the "lowest fixed contribution" from the electric DisCo are
required to be accepted, and acceptance of bids for last resort service
are subject to approval by the Rhode Island Public Utilities
Commission, which determines the terms and conditions for last
resort service.281 However, DisCos may discontinue service in a man-
ner consistent with Commission policy in the event of nonpayment for
service.2 2 In Rhode Island, last resort service is partially subsidized
by other DisCo customers.23
Under such a bidding approach, the DisCo acts as an agent for
the customer and passes through in the SBC the costs of electricity
charged by the winning bidder. The distribution company, acting in
such a capacity, would likely be subject to a fiduciary responsibility to
provide customers the best deal given the offer accepted in response to
277. In re Restructuring of the Elec. Util. Indus. in Vermont, 174 P.U.R.4th 409, 427 (Vt.
Pub. Serv. Bd. 1996).
278. See id at 434.
279. R.L GEN. LAWS § 39-1-27.3(f) (1997).
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. See id.
283. "All fixed contributions and any reasonable costs incurred by the electric distribution
company in arranging this service shall be included in the distribution rates charged to all other
customers." Id.
19981 1307
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
the bid. Under such an approach, it is likely that, as in Rhode Island,
a regulatory body would need to oversee the bidding process and
mandate the terms for basic service, including extension, billing, and
rate design.
One advantage of this approach is that even basic customers
can see the results of competition. If basic service pricing options
were not responsive to customer needs, customers could still pursue
other options, although some customers may be required to pay a
penalty.28 At the same time, to the extent regulators are successful
in policing bidding, this option would not provide the incumbent util-
ity or its retail sales affiliates any unfair advantages.
Yet with this approach an issue regulators must address is
how prices will be determined. Some states that have considered it,
such as Rhode Island, have attempted to link the provision of basic
service by the DisCo with the prices charged customers at the time
retail competition commences. This reflects the reduced prices of
competition, but the price cap is a relic of rate regulation likely to
raise problems in the future.285 Other states go further, continuing to
allow rate regulation of DisCo basic service.286
A further issue that must be addressed with the bidding ap-
proach is the degree of continued regulatory oversight of power supply
markets. To the extent regulators continue to evaluate the ability
and cost of alternative suppliers vying for basic service contracts, a
potential for introducing distortions into power markets will exist. In
addition, bidding contracts, once signed and approved, may require
suppliers to hold power in reserve for basic service, reducing the
amount of power in competitive supply markets, or may lock regula-
tors into above-market prices pursuant to long-term contracts.
284. In Rhode Island,
[nlo customer who initially elects the standard offer and then chooses an alternative
supplier shall be required to pay any withdrawal fee or penalty to the provider of the
standard offer unless such a penalty or withdrawal fee was agreed to as part of the
contract; however, no residential customer shall be required to pay a penalty or
withdrawal fee for choosing an alternative supplier.
Id. § 39-1-27.3(d).
285. Price caps, of course, go largely unrecognized when supply is adequate. However,
should there be a severe short- or long-term shortage in generating capacity, causing a rise in
prices similar to the oil crisis of the 1970s, price caps will contribute further to the shortage and
will likely need to be reassessed.
286. See In re Competition in the Provision of Elec. Servs., 175 P.U.R.4th 1, 11, 14 (Ariz.
Corp. Comm'n 1996) (noting that the standard offer and SBC will be rate regulated); see also In
re Guidelines for Universal Serv. and Energy Conservation Programs, 178 P.U.R.4th 508, 511
(Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1997) (initiating development of a mechanism for DisCos to recover
"appropriate" universal service and energy conservation program expenditures).
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4. Simple Market Share Allocation
A model statute proposed by Barbara Alexander and the
National Consumer Law Center ("NCLC") modifies the bidding ap-
proach with the hope of improving implementation of the "ballot and
spread" approach.287 The model statute requires DisCos to conduct
bids annually, subject to oversight by a regulatory commission, which
determines the minimum requirements for basic service and approves
selection of a supplier. It also authorizes the regulatory commission
to initiate a program that randomly assigns customers to approved
retail suppliers when, in the commission's judgment, "there are suffi-
cient retail electric suppliers willing to accept such customers and the
retail market for the sale of electricity is sufficiently robust and en-
joys a high degree of satisfaction with a majority of customers."2s8
However, even if this "ballot and spread" approach is adopted, basic
service continues under the commission-regulated competitive bid.
Under the model statute, bad debt expense in excess of the
amount negotiated in the contract between the DisCo and supplier is
included in the DisCo's costs and becomes a part of the SBC imposed
on all customers. In other words, all DisCo customers, through the
DisCo access charge, subsidize the costs associated with nonpaying
customers. Regulatory commissions, under this proposal, will regu-
late the conditions under which customers can be disconnected from
basic service. The NCLC model statute allows consumers, after opt-
ing to select among competitive power suppliers, to come back to basic
service but imposes a penalty for consumers that do this more than
once every twelve months as a disincentive for playing the market.28 9
While well intentioned, the basic service provisions of the
NCLC model statute pose several efficiency problems. 290 First, as
with the commission regulated bidding approach, the NCLC statute
involves regulators in a determination of power needs for basic service
and facilitates subsidization of some of these power supply costs,
including reserves, by DisCo customers who are not taking basic serv-
ice. However, there is no reason for regulators to make these deter-
minations in competitive power supply markets. Instead, the DisCo,
287. CONSUMER PROTECTION PROPOSALS, supra note 19, at 32.
288. Id. at 88-89.
289. This penalty is not applicable to consumers who have been denied credit or who are
disconnected by any retail supplier; the model statute also allows the commission to exempt
low-income consumers from any penalty or fee for selecting basic service.
290. As a redistributive measure, the statute also attempts to fund universal service pro-
grams through a fee levied against all suppliers. See CONSUMER PROTECTION PROPOSALS, supra
note 19, at 91.
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which, out of physical necessity, is the provider of last resort power,
will have superior information about residential power needs and is in
an excellent position to bear the risks of an increase in basic service
demand, recover costs through the SBC, and avoid the costly errors
that could be introduced by regulators' inaccurate prediction of power
supply needs. Further, as with other proposals, cross-subsidization of
basic service power supply by other DisCo customers is likely to
introduce several distortions into the pricing of retail power markets,
and may work to fragment retail power markets away from DisCos
with large basic service customer classes, as larger customers bypass
the DisCo's system.
Second, as with the telcom proposal, the service obligation can
be extended to unregulated power suppliers or marketers, which may
be allocated responsibility for contributing power to the basic service
pool based on market share or a random measure. However, in un-
regulated power markets, power suppliers will not have very accurate
information about customer needs; instead, the DisCo, which is the
supplier of last resort, will have superior information about customer
demands at various times. It may prove inefficient for regulators to
extend the service obligation to suppliers, because suppliers are no
longer natural monopolies; yet, under such an approach, the DisCo, by
long-term bidding contracts, may be able to extend some of this obli-
gation to suppliers or marketers. Compared to power suppliers, the
DisCo is the superior risk-bearer of an increase in basic service de-
mand and is also in the best position to spread the costs of basic serv-
ice. Any deficiency in basic service can be made up by DisCos enter-
ing into additional long-term requirements contracts or purchasing
power on the spot market.
5. Limiting the Obligation to the DisCo While Avoiding Strategic
Supply Problems and Ensuring Adequate Supply
The mandatory supply pool, telcom, competitive bidding, and
market share approaches each attempt through regulation to extend
some of the service obligation to power suppliers or marketers. To
police against slamming and other consumer abuses, particularly
those associated with informational problems in power markets, sup-
pliers and marketers are-and should be-required to register with
the governing body in states which have adopted retail wheeling
legislation or regulations. Yet, power supply and marketing have
been recognized to be competitively structured, or at least contestable.
This suggests that the imposition of extraordinary service obligations
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on these industry actors will lead to costly distortions in power supply
markets. Unlike the DisCo, which every state continues to regard as
a natural monopoly, none of the natural monopoly rationales in favor
of imposing a duty to serve apply to suppliers or marketers. Thus, as
I have argued, because of structural differences between the DisCo
and markets for other electricity services, the economic efficiency
rationales for continuing to apply a duty to serve to GenCos or to
RetailCos are weak.
An alternative approach imposes the service obligation entirely
on the DisCo, which assumes the entire burden of the duty to serve
and, along with it, an obligation to procure competitive power supply
to meet basic service needs. New Hampshire adopted an approach
similar to this in early 1997. Under the New Hampshire Public
Utilities Commission's new restructuring regulations, "[t]he utility's
current obligation to provide electricity will be replaced with an obli-
gation of the regulated distribution company to connect and deliver
electricity for all customers requesting such service."2 9' The New
Hampshire Commission considered, but rejected on a trial basis, a
DisCo standard offer service provided by affiliate generators. Instead,
it required a default basic service which is competitively procured and
not price regulated, but priced on the competitive market.292
As the New Hampshire Commission reasoned, "[o]ur vision of
default service is consistent with the development of a competitive
marketplace. The continued provision of a fully regulated service
option, as proposed by the various proponents of standard offer serv-
ice, fails to accomplish that result."293 It remains to be seen how
active a role the New Hampshire Commission will play in evaluating
a DisCo's basic default service. Certainly, to the extent DisCos own
generation affiliates, the Commission will have a role in evaluating
potential affiliate abuses, but the idea of default service is to mini-
mize Commission involvement in the DisCo determination of basic
power needs.
Allowing the DisCo to assume the entire duty to serve in retail
power markets has a strong basis in economic efficiency. The DisCo,
as the provider of last resort power, has superior information about
residential and small commercial customer needs. It is in the best
position to enter into additional long-term contracts, if necessary, or
to obtain additional power for customer needs from power spot mar-
291. In re Restructuring New Hampshire's Elec. Util. Indus., 175 P.U.R.4th 193, 249 (N.H.
Pub. Util. Comm'n 1997).
292. See id.
293. Id. at 250.
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kets. The obligation to take these affirmative steps can be measured
against the standard of "best efforts," a contract principle courts nor-
mally impose when a single party controls the instrumentality neces-
sary to achieve a cooperative goal.294 The DisCo is also in the best
position to take the risks of price differences between the spot and
long-term contract power supply markets. If a DisCo offers basic
service at a price exceeding the spot market price, it will risk losing
basic service customers to other suppliers. Thus, to the extent the
DisCo assumes the entire obligation for basic service, it will face
incentives to keep basic service rates as close as possible to the spot
market prices. Further, to the extent that there are costs associated
with the duty to serve, the DisCo can best spread these across simi-
larly situated customers through an SBC without creating upstream
market distortions.
For example, non-basic service customers may be charged a
portion of basic service costs through the SBC. The DisCo is in the
best position to spread such costs through an SBC among customers
while also keeping distribution rates low. If the SBC is too excessive,
the DisCo risks losing larger customers, who might choose (perhaps
with the assistance of suppliers, marketers or brokers) to build direct
transmission facilities or to self-generate.295 State retail wheeling
plans might attempt to minimize these customer losses through an
exit fee,296 but so long as the exit fee is greater than the incremental
costs to a customer from cross-subsidization, the DisCo continues to
face incentives to provide low-cost access to larger customers without
losing a significant customer base and leaving small commercial and
residential customers with the entire cost of its service obligation. A
294. See COLTON, supra note 12, at 49; see also Charles Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The
Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967,
985, 1015-16 n.126 (1983) (discussing the implied obligation to use best efforts to mitigate). See
generally E. Allan Farnsworth, On Trying to Keep One's Promises: The Duty of Best Efforts in
Contract Law, 46 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1 (1984) (exploring situations in which parties are held to an
express or implied duty to use best efforts).
295. Similarly, following the enactment of FAIR plans, competitive insurance companies
sought to insure the "best" insurance risks while dumping remaining risks into the public
market. See John Hugh Gilmore, Note, Insurance Redlining and the Fair Housing Act: The
Lost Opportunity of Mackey v. Nationwide Insurance Companies, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 563, 579
(1985) (discussing how the FAIR plans failed to make insurance available to all "insurable
risks").
296. In contrast to the SBC, an exit fee is a one-time tax, paid by the customer leaving the
system. It can be combined with a return charge to cover costs associated with customers
returning to the distribution system after exiting. Because exit fees, if appropriately set, will
facilitate cost spreading, proposals to prohibit exit fees, such as Representative Delay's restruc-
turing bill, may be inconsistent with an efficient power supply market providing universal
customer access. See H.R. 4297, 104th Cong. § 3(b) (1996) (banning exit fees and subsidies, but
excepting financing of certain default services).
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DisCo duty to serve, subsidized by an SBC with an exit fee, can be
efficient so long as power distribution service remains a horizontal
natural monopoly.
Of course, some effort must be made by regulators to ensure
that a DisCo which owns generation does not act in an anti-competi-
tive manner that discourages customer participation in power supply
markets or favors its own power supply in basic service provision. To
address such concerns, some states envision structural unbundling by
prohibiting DisCo use of affiliate power to meet basic service needs or
limiting the amount of affiliate power a DisCo can use to meet basic
service demand.297  Presumably, such prohibitions and limits are
designed to rectify the potential costs of DisCo ownership or control of
generation, a competitive market, while the DisCo also owns or con-
trols transmission to the customer. However, such limitations can
work to distort the power supply market by limiting the range of
power supply options available to DisCos and, ultimately, may risk
harming consumers with higher rates.
When a DisCo owns or controls power generation, there is
clearly a potential for DisCo affiliate abuse or gaming in the provision
of supply to meet basic service needs. The alternatives regulators
have considered are designed to mitigate some of these problems.
One approach, often advocated, is to require structural unbundling
achieved by divestiture of power generation by utilities also owning
distribution facilities. 298 New Hampshire, for example, has required
divestiture of generation assets as the most effective way to address
vertical market power concerns. 299 Of course, mandatory divestiture,
to the extent it results in economic losses, may be the subject of tak-
ings challenges.30° Even when divestiture is mandated and survives
legal challenge, some distribution utilities are finding it prudent to
297. New Hampshire's final plan, for example, requires utilities that want to serve the
distribution market to sell off their generation assets by the year 2000. See In re Restructuring
New Hampshire's Elec. Util. Indus., 175 P.U.R.4th 193, 249-50 (N.H. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1997).
298. See Transition, supra note 194, at 323; see generally Charles G. Stalon & Reinier
H.J.H. Lock, State-Federal Relations in the Regulation of Energy, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 427 (1990).
299. See In re Restructuring New Hampshire Elec. Util. Indus., 175 P.U.R.4th at 249.
300. Like regulators' failure to allow complete stranded cost recovery, utilities might claim
that mandated divestiture without just compensation is an unconstitutional taking. For the
arguments, see Deregulatory Takings, supra note 3 (observing that deregulation of utility
industries may constitute unconstitutional takings under the Supreme Court's takings
jurisprudence). But see Williams, supra note 3, at 1006 (observing that Sidak & Spulber's
takings analysis "may not map perfectly onto the Supreme Court's previous analyses."). Cases
addressing the issue to date reject the takings challenge to regulators' failure to guarantee
recovery of stranded costs. See, e.g., In re Energy Ass'n v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 169 Misc.2d
924, 935 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996).
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explore selling generation.3 01 With complete vertical disintegration,
which may occur in some markets, the potential for DisCo abuse or
gaming in the requisition of basic service power will be minimal.
Nevertheless, even absent complete vertical disintegration,
unbundling of DisCo power sales and procurement can be achieved
financially through requiring DisCos with generation to bid into the
power exchange and to meet all basic power needs with power ex-
change purchases. Competitive behavior can be minimized without
active regulatory oversight by requiring the DisCo to sell all of its
power through a power exchange, similar to California's. The power
exchange ensures an active spot and futures market for power reflect-
ing real time prices, and can also facilitate the formation of long-term
contracts to meet basic service needs. The power exchange, unlike
other approaches, will price based entirely on the market of supply
and demand for power. If a DisCo is mandated to bid its power into
the exchange before selling basic service to customers, customers
purchasing basic service would realize more of the benefits of compe-
tition than under competitive bidding, because mandatory bidding
into a power exchange facilitates decoupling DisCo basic service
power purchases from power sales. Under such an approach, the
DisCo has an adequate incentive to purchase from the exchange the
lowest cost power, or it will risk losing basic service customers to
alternative suppliers if those customers opt to participate in the direct
retail purchase market. With such institutional reforms, imposition
of a duty to serve on DisCos, to be financed through an SBC, can work
to simultaneously facilitate the development of robust power supply
markets and pass the new efficiencies of these markets on to consum-
ers without sacrificing access goals.
C. Paying For Universal Service in a Competitive Distribution
Environment
As long as distribution service is a natural monopoly, the duty
to serve can be financed through an appropriately structured SBC
imposed upon retail customers by the incumbent distribution com-
pany. The SBC is likely to pose new rate design issues for customers
301. This is true even in states, such as Florida, that have yet to move forward with formal
state-wide restructuring plans. For example, Tallahassee, Florida, which owns a distribution
utility and 490 MW of power generation but uses profits from electric and gas sales to pay for 32
percent of city services (including fire, police and parks), has evaluated whether to sell its
generation assets. See Florida Muni, Eyeing Deregulation, Considers Partners, Privitization,
ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Dec. 15, 1997, at 14.
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and regulators,0 2 but it is a plausible short-term financing mecha-
nism for continuing extraordinary service obligations in competitive
retail markets.
Despite efforts to maintain the de jure monopoly status of
power distribution, though, in the long run competition may prove
inevitable for this segment of the electricity industry. Increasingly,
the availability of distributed generation threatens the need for power
distribution, as adequate substitutes may be available to customers
who can afford generation. Some have suggested that power distribu-
tion may ultimately become a competitive or contestable industry. 0 3
To the extent these developments occur, the ability of a single DisCo
to recover the costs of its extraordinary service obligations through an
SBC for a geographic area will be weakened significantly.
With the growth in micro-generation, increasingly feasible
with current technology, the number of customers dependent upon
networked distribution is likely to decline. Through its very presence,
the availability of generation alternatives for a larger range of cus-
tomers works to make power distribution competitive, regardless of
its legal status, as more customers will face the possibility of feasible
substitutes. For example, Capstone Turbine Company, a small gen-
eration company in California, is building remarkably efficient power
generators that run on jet engine technology; they cost about half as
much per kWh as the typical coal plant, and are likely to prove feasi-
ble for small stores, restaurants, and farms that wish to generate
their own power.304 Despite the presence of de jure monopoly in power
distribution, the availability of self-owned power supply for small- to
medium-sized electricity customers will work to introduce de facto
competition, as has existed for years for larger industrial customers.
The current power generation and distribution industries may be set
302. For example, in Pennsylvania, regulators rejected an SBC design that applied to all
customers on a kWh consumption basis, because it was seen as too burdensome to high load
customers. See In re Guidelines for Universal Serv. and Energy Conservation Programs, 178
P.U.R.4th 508, 522 (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1997) (stating the goal "in establishing payment
ranges is to maximize customer payments [and to] maintain affordable payments").
303. Of course, the availability of distributed generation may make power distribution
competitive in the sense that for some customers switching to self-generation may make
distribution unnecessary, so distribution markets will begin to compete with the availability of
affordable self-generation, as they already do for some large industrial customers. In addition,
some economists suggest that power distribution networks can operate in a competitive manner
if property rights are defined so as to facilitate the development of joint ventures. See, e.g.,
Smith, supra note 227.
304. See Matthew Carolan & Raymond J. Keating, Microturbines: The Engine of
Deregulation, INvEsTois Bus. DAILY, Dec. 15, 1997, at A40; Laurence Zuckerman, Tiny
Turbine: The Next Generator?; Company Hopes Its Small Unit Will Dominate Power Market,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1997, at D1.
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for a future similar to the current main frame computer industry,
which has been seriously threatened by the desk top personal com-
puter industry.
Further, though not presently imminent, pressures for dis-
mantling the monopoly of power distribution are likely to evolve as
retail supply markets become robust. At a minimum, power distribu-
tion will eventually be considered contestable and may well be a com-
petitive market. For example, large customers, some of whom cur-
rently bypass DisCos individually, may combine their power subsidi-
aries into joint venture or other alliances with phone or cable compa-
nies to finance power distribution.35 Over the long run, it may be
inevitable that these distribution joint ventures will begin to compete
with the incumbent DisCos. Although in the short run the risks of
increasing average distribution costs for all customers can be mini-
mized through appropriately set exit fees, over the long run various
DisCos are likely to compete for the same geographic area.3o6 Even
where DisCos are not in direct competition, larger customers may be
able to avoid contributing to the costs of basic service by building
their own lines. In the telecommunications context, for instance,
large toll business customers have been able to avoid the universal
service obligations implicit in access charges by turning to competitive
access providers, whose services may be profitable even when their
costs exceed those of the incumbent local exchange carrier.3 7 Thirty
years ago, Harold Demsetz observed that the history of utilities has
been characterized by competition for service areas. 30 8 As electricity
supply becomes competitive it is likely that there will be enhanced
305. As Clyde Wayne Crews, Jr. observes, the key to competition in utility distribution
markets will be access to potentially exploitable alternative rights of way, from companies
including cable television providers, phone companies, private railroads, and water and sewer
lines. See Clyde Wayne Crews, Jr., Electric Utility Reform: The Free Market Alternative to
Mandatory Open Access, ELECTRICITY J., Dec. 1997, at 1. In addition, of course, transmission
line siting imposes a significant additional cost for entrants to this market.
306. This is already the case in some areas. There are parallel sets of distribution wires in
Lubbock, Texas and 22 other towns, often because of competition between investor-owned and
municipal utilities for service territory. See Jan Bellamy, Two Utilities Are Better Than One, in
FREE MINDS AND FREE MARKETS 32 (Robert W. Poole & Virginia I. Postrel eds., 1993).
307. The presence of competitive access providers preceded the Telecommunications Act of
1996. See Lawrence A. Sullivan, Elusive Goals Under the Telecommunications Act: Preserving
Long-distance Competition Upon Baby Bell Entry and Attaining Local Exchange Competition:
We'll Not Preserve the One Unless We Attain the Other, 25 Sw. U. L. REV. 487, 501 (1996).
308. See Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities? 11 J.L. & ECON. 55, 59 (1968) ("There is
scarcely a city in the country that has not experienced competition in one or more of the utility
industries.") (quoting BURTON N. BEHLING, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN PUBLIC UTILITY
INDUSTRIES 19-20 (1938)).
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competition even for markets regulators define as de jure natural
monopolies, such a distribution.
In addition to being inevitable, competition in distribution may
also prove desirable, to the extent that uneconomic duplication does
not occur. Although incumbent distribution utility access and line
fees are more obvious to customers than bundled rates, cross-
subsidies remain largely hidden from customer scrutiny within a
single distributer market. A movement towards a competitive
distribution environment will force a more explicit consideration of
the costs and political trade-offs associated with the duty to serve.
Competitive distribution markets will also work to minimize power
market distortions, by facilitating customer access to power supply
without the encumbrance of access, line, and exit fees.
With multiple distribution companies in a single geographic
area, financing for the duty to serve must find a source beyond the
SBC. Imposing access or line fees on all companies offering distribu-
tion services in a given area may provide a financing mechanism.
But, to make such a mechanism workable, regulators must also estab-
lish a principle for dividing customer service obligations among the
multiple distribution companies, taking into account expected future
growth for each distribution firm. This is likely to prove a very diffi-
cult, if not impossible, regulatory task; to the extent regulators at-
tempt it, it may even result in reaffirmation of the existing de jure
monopoly for power distribution based on geographic franchise, de-
spite the existence of competitive market conditions.
In competitive distribution markets, a more efficient way to
finance service obligations may be through a national sales tax on
power distribution or supply, coupled with federal voucher and service
extension grant programs to guarantee minimum service quality.
Because of the potential for self-generation and distribution bypass, a
tax on electricity supply, as opposed to power distribution, may prove
the most efficient mechanism for financing the duty to serve. As basic
service revenues are raised through taxation, they could be redistrib-
uted to states, which would implement utility service voucher pro-
grams for distribution companies offering a basic service package. In
addition, a portion of the tax could be directed to service extension
grant programs to provide incentives for power distributors to build,
maintain, and upgrade facilities in areas where it is not profitable.
One option is to tax consumers by imposing a direct consump-
tion tax on power users, regardless of the route of distribution. A
retail sales tax on kWh consumption, applied on a national basis,
would maximize the tax base, since it would apply to all consumers of
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electricity. Economic theory suggests that the broader the tax base
the smaller the excess burden of the tax. In addition, imposition of a
direct consumption tax on power supply allows for revenue collection
regardless of the distribution route, effectively providing for revenue
even where there is bypass. Of course, to ensure equitable cost shar-
ing, this would need to be coupled with a proportionate tax on self-
generation. A disadvantage of this approach, however, is that it is
regressive. Put another way, because it applies equally to all sales,
the poorest consumers would pay a greater portion of their income
than customers with greater wealth.
An alternative, though still regressive, approach is an industry
tax, applied to power distributors or suppliers on an ad valorem
(percentage charge on the value of goods sold) or quantity (e.g., per
kWh) basis. As a political matter, a single industry tax may be more
feasible than a broad-based electricity consumption tax, because it
would be less likely to face widespread consumer opposition. The
single industry tax would have lower transaction and administrative
costs than the consumption tax. Some, such as Bruce Egan and
Steven Wildman, have proposed this as an efficient alternative for
financing universal service in competitive telecommunications mar-
kets through a value-added service surcharge.309 In the electricity
context, to maximize the equitable sharing of the duty to serve and
the tax base, it would make the most sense to impose the tax on
power suppliers. As with the retail sales tax, imposition of an
industry tax ensures the broadest sharing of the costs and works to
avoid the pitfalls of uneconomic bypass. This form of industry tax
might be structured to allow DisCos and suppliers to deduct any taxes
built into the prices for power supply purchased as an input to the
power generation, transmission, or distribution process. Like the
consumption tax, such a tax would be imposed at a national level, in
order to avoid patchwork inefficiencies as states take different
approaches to financing utility service obligations.
The regressive nature of these power supply taxation options is
obvious. However, they are no more regressive than traditional util-
309. See Bruce L. Egan & Steven Wildman, Funding the Public Telecommunications
Infrastructure, Communications Policy Working Paper #5 (visited Feb. 1, 1998)
<http'//www.benton.org/Library/FundTelecom/working5.html> (suggesting that alternative
Value-Added Service Charges may improve the current system of access charges); see also Tony
D. Feuerstein, Redefining the Universal Service Finance Mechanism in the Face of a Local
Competitive Marketplace (Apr. 23, 1995) <http'//www.ipps.lsa.umich.edu/econ495
/writings/paper/feuerstein.html>. For a more sustained discussion of the issue, see generally
BRUCE L. EGAN, INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAYS REVISITED: THE ECONOMICS OF MULTIMEDIA
(1996).
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ity pricing and, apart from directing funds raised through progres-
sively-structured national income taxes to pay for universal service
programs, they are probably the only feasible financing mechanisms
for universal service in competitive distribution markets. In the short
run, distribution companies may be able to finance the duty to serve
under plans such as those adopted in New Hampshire, but power
suppliers will need to share a portion of the costs of the duty to serve
as competitive distribution markets begin to emerge. Eventually, the
competitive industry will be forced to pay a portion of the costs of the
duty to serve, leading to more explicit consideration of the political
trade-offs and costs associated with the duty serve.
V. CONCLUSION
Retail competition in most public utility industries, such as
telecommunications, natural gas, and electricity, is quickly emerging.
With it the laws and regulatory concepts we have invoked to regulate
public utilities since the Gilded Age are undergoing a transformation.
In electricity regulation, local retail competition is a hot agenda item
in many states and, over the next several years, will come to dominate
legislative and regulatory agendas. Policymakers and courts will face
difficult decisions about how, if at all, the duty to serve should evolve
to fit competitive retail markets.
The duty to serve applicable to public utilities, this Article
suggests, has been much more rigorous than obligations that attach to
other private property or businesses. Should regulators see it appro-
priate to do so, retail competition poses an opportunity to level these
obligations, treating the provision of telephonic, natural gas, and
electrical service as any other service in a competitive market.
Indeed, this Article suggests, the intellectual framework applicable to
natural monopoly will no longer apply to most of the electricity indus-
try, so many of the service obligations based in the assumptions of
this framework will need to be revisited. To date, state regulators
have maintained the content of traditional utility service. Yet, as the
natural monopoly model is abandoned for power supply, continuation
of these extraordinary service obligations will require regulators to
articulate new intellectual justifications, perhaps in distributive jus-
tice or fairness.
Extraordinary service obligations do not need to disappear in
competitive retail markets. This Article has suggested that, to the
extent society has made a decision to impose extraordinary service
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obligations on a competitive electricity industry, the efficiency losses
from applying the duty to serve to power distribution utility service
can be minimized. At the same time, in contrast to many consumer
advocates, this Article has also argued that application of extraordi-
nary obligations should not extend to power supply or marketing. As
compared to price regulation, which masked many discussions about
cross-subsidies, competitive retail markets will require that these
distributional goals be pursued through explicit subsidies, not implic-
itly built into customer rates for bundled service.
It will become important that, in addressing the financing of
extraordinary service obligations, regulators avoid building into com-
petitive retail markets many of the same structural mechanisms that
have posed problems elsewhere in the past. As I have suggested, in
initial restructuring of regulated utility markets, to the extent regula-
tors or courts extend the duty to serve beyond incumbent distributors,
to suppliers and marketers, new inefficiencies may result. Imposition
of a basic service obligation on the DisCo, to be fulfilled through vo-
luntary procurement of power supply and financed through an SBC,
minimizes the inefficiency of imposing a service obligation in a com-
petitive market.
Limiting application of the duty to serve to distribution,
though, poses new issues as regulators attempt to minimize the anti-
competitive problems associated with distributors that also own or
operate generation. Although it may be desirable, mandated divesti-
ture of power supply is not necessary; instead, an unbundled market
with an efficient supply exchange clearinghouse, based on the PoolCo
model, and properly set exit fees can minimize the inefficiencies asso-
ciated with application of the duty to serve to natural monopoly dis-
tribution services on an interim basis.
In the longer run, as distribution becomes competitive, effi-
cient preservation of the common law doctrine may require alterna-
tive financing mechanisms, such as the establishment of a national
sales tax or an industry tax on power supply, if society is willing to
make a commitment to such a tax. Such a tax is also likely to be nec-
essary in the telecommunications industry, as local carriers face com-
petition from wireless service providers, but may not be necessary to
finance service obligations in the natural gas industry.310
310. Although the justifications for environmental programs will differ from the consumer
protections discussed in this Article, in the short run the SBC can also be utilized to recover the
costs of these programs. However, for these programs, the industry developments I warn
against with the decay of distribution monopoly will also require regulators to find new financ-
ing mechanisms, such as a national power consumption or supply tax.
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Enhanced retail competition in historically regulated markets
need not mean the end of traditional doctrines of public utility law,
such as the duty to serve. Regulators must be bold and creative in
approaching the content and financing of extraordinary service obliga-
tions for new actors in these markets, with a keen eye towards mini-
mizing the structural inefficiencies they pose. Careful study and
appreciation of the distinct economic and institutional structures of
various utility service markets will be necessary to provide sound
guidance as regulators apply the duty to serve to competitive retail
industries. At each step of this analysis, regulators must not only ask
whether there are efficiencies to be gained. Clearly there are, but the
challenge regulators face is to devise ways of passing these new effi-
ciencies on to the average consumer.

